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6 - International Labour Migration: A Very Mixed Blessing
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- By Chris Manning, Honorary Associate Professor with the Indonesia Project and Arndt-Corden Department of Economics at the Australian National University., Sukamdi, Associate Professor in the Faculty of Geography, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
- Edited by Siwage Dharma Negara, Deasy Simandjuntak, Ulla Fionna
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- Book:
- Aspirations with Limitations
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 08 June 2019
- Print publication:
- 29 June 2018, pp 105-135
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Summary
June 2011 was a month that encapsulated the highs and lows of Susilo BambangYudhoyono's (SBY's) policies on international migrant workers. On the eleventh of that month the Indonesian president proudly announced his support for the migrant worker convention in one of his many eloquent speeches, on this occasion given as a guest at the 100th annual meeting of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Geneva. A week later this socially responsive approach was sharply questioned by the execution of the Indonesian maid Ruyati Binti Sapubi in Saudi Arabia, in part signalling a foreign policy failure on the part of SBY, and one that was widely criticized at home. Some have argued that international migration was one area among many where SBY promised more than he could deliver; while introducing a number of innovations, and eventually taking a hard line with several of the host countries for Indonesia migrants, it is said that the government struggled to get beyond “rhetoric” in devising practical policies and building the institutions to support them (Budianti, Chandrakirana and Yentriyani 2015, p. 210).
The government continued to strongly support international migration as a source of employment and of foreign exchange during the SBY years. During this period the number of Indonesians working abroad increased substantially and its composition changed, first more in favour of females and domestic workers and later back to a greater reliance on males and formal sector workers, mainly as a result of government reassessment of priorities. However, there was a policy shift during SBY's second term after shortcomings were increasingly exposed in the media and by civil society groups. Because of continuing reports of exploitation of female domestic workers in particular, culminating in the execution of Ruyati in 2011, the government temporarily halted the sending of domestic workers to the main recipient countries, Malaysia (in 2009) and later Saudi Arabia. At the same time, there were a number of important new institutional developments. These included bilateral agreements with receiving countries that had the potential to improve migrant conditions overseas. Regrettably, reform was slow and piecemeal. The regulatory and institutional changes did not have a positive impact on the welfare of migrant workers, which officials had promised and many observers had pressed for.
11 - State-Created Socio-Cultural Poverty: Lessons from Some Micro Studies
- from Part III - Purchasing Power
- Edited by Aris Ananta
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- Book:
- The Indonesian Crisis
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 05 December 2002, pp 296-312
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Summary
Introduction
There is great variation in the perceptions and evaluations on the economic crisis in Indonesia made by academicians and practitioners. How did the crisis affect the people's lives and how could it be solved? How was the socio-economic situation during 1998 and 1999? How vulnerable and miserable were the people at that time?
Mubyarto (2000) has shown that there are roughly two different views on the conditions during the crisis in 1997–99. The first is the doomsday view, which perceives the situation as being catastrophic and devastating. The second is the “not that bad” view, which sees Indonesians suffering but not that much.
The doomsday view is usually macroeconomic in nature. The drastic drop in the value of the rupiah, the sky-rocketing prices, the collapse of the banking system, the fall in foreign reserves, the high rate of unemployment, and its drastic increase are some examples of indicators often cited as signs of the collapse of the macroeconomy. Policy-making, including recommendations by foreign institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is also often based on this macroeconomic point of view.
On the other hand, the “not that bad” view is reflected in the almost “business as usual” activities of many people, especially among the middle and lower income groups. Both traditional markets and modern supermarkets are as crowded as before. Traffic in Jakarta is as bad as before the crisis. Small and medium-sized firms, including those in the informal sectors, continue to make profit. The poor, who had been poor even before the crisis, may not have noticed the difference between the crisis and non-crisis periods.
This chapter argues that the doomsday view was the underlying factor in policy-making (by both Indonesian and international institutions) during at least the first half of 1998. With this assumption, the Government of Indonesia, helped by international donor agencies, established the SSN (Social Safety Net) programme, to help people cope with the crisis. However, this chapter attempts to show that the SSN programme has created socio-cultural poverty among the people. This discussion is based on anthropological research carried out in some rural areas in Central Java and Yogyakarta. The results may not be applicable for other areas in Indonesia, but it can provide important lessons in formulating programmes to help the people.