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6 - Thailand
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- By Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Chulalongkorn University
- Edited by Ann Capling, University of Melbourne, Patrick Low, World Trade Organization, Geneva
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- Book:
- Governments, Non-State Actors and Trade Policy-Making
- Published online:
- 05 July 2014
- Print publication:
- 09 September 2010, pp 161-185
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Summary
Introduction
The politicization of trade policy-making in Thailand is arguably more pronounced than elsewhere in the world, including at the global level where multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) under the World Trade Organization (WTO) are currently stalled. Indeed, the Thai case of trade policy quagmire is quite dramatic for having adversely impinged on the country’s body politic to the extent that a popularly elected government was ousted in a military coup, and an anti-free trade agreement (FTA) bias worked its way into a new military-organized constitution, contributing to a prolonged and protracted political crisis. That Thai trade policy has become increasingly politicized over the first decade of the twenty-first century is attributable to a number of dynamics, some in parallel to trade policy experiences in the rest of the world, others more specific to domestic circumstances.
The end of the Cold War and the concomitant wave of democratization in the developing world opened up the arena of trade policy, which had previously been insulated and considered the exclusive domain of technocratic expertise and bureaucratic wherewithal at the policy level. Inclusiveness and demands for public participation made logical headway as post-1988 politics in Thailand entered a period of inexorable political liberalization. After a military coup in February 1991 threatened to produce a disguised military dictatorship through elections and parliamentary rule, a ‘people’s power’ movement took hold and expelled the military from government in a Bangkok-based, middle class-led popular uprising in May 1992. The post-May 1992 political reform movement witnessed an unprecedented expansion of civil society organizations (CSOs), culminating in the reform-driven 1997 constitution.
2 - The Tragedy of the 1997 Constitution
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- By Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Chulalongkorn University
- Edited by John Funston
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- Book:
- Divided Over Thaksin
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 17 August 2009, pp 27-37
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Summary
One of the first acts of Thailand' coup leaders after seizing power on 19 September 2006 was to abrogate the 1997 constitution. I regret to say goodbye to this constitution, which I have read in parts and in entirety time and again for almost ten years now. I harbour nowhere near the expertise of legal luminaries such as Professor Borwornsak Uwanno or Dr Wissanu Kruea-ngam, who can seemingly write constitutions overnight. Nor have I been an able practitioner in the league of Ajarn Gothom Arya, a fellow participant in this conference. Ajarn Gothom was secretary-general of the Election Commission established by the constitution, and did an excellent job in that first commission. But I did have a small part in my own way in seeing the constitution through in September 1997 when I was in London doing a Ph.D. I launched a campaign online which ended up with 3,500 signatures, mostly from people overseas, who wanted to endorse the constitution. Since then I have paid close attention to the way that constitution was implemented.
BACKGROUND OF THE 1997 CONSTITUTION
Let me begin by discussing the context of the 1997 constitution. Thailand has a long history of constitution-making. There have now been sixteen constitutions in seventy-four years — many constitutions. As recently as the 1970s, it had a constitution almost every other year, in 1972, 1976, and 1978. But the 1978 constitution was important, because it lasted for several years, and provided the rules that underpinned elections in 1979, 1983 and 1986. It was also the basis through which General Prem Tinsulanonda became prime minister from 1980–88.
The constitution of 1978 emerged from the turbulent democratic interlude between 1973 and 1976, and further instability in 1977 that led to General Kriangsak Chamanand' coup. The constitution had bicameral arrangements but with an appointed Senate. There were 252 appointed senators, obviously dominated by the military, and 301 House of Representatives members of parliament (MPs). General Prem was nominated by parliament and accepted the premiership. He was never directly elected.
The fact that the prime minister was not elected — and in addition came from the military — became a sticking point, and the main drawback of this constitution.
9 - World War II and Thailand after Sixty Years: Legacies and Latent Side Effects
- from Part II - Southeast Asia
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- By Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Chulalongkorn University
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- Book:
- Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 09 October 2007, pp 104-114
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Summary
INTRODUCTION
Unlike its neighbours in Southeast Asia, Thailand emerged from the ravages of World War II relatively unscathed. Although the government of then-Prime Minister P. Phibunsongkram (henceforth Phibun) officially sided with Japan and exploited irredentist claims of territories in Malaya, Laos and Cambodia from Great Britain and France, Thailand was forced to pay only minimal war indemnities. Owing to an influential anti-Japanese Seri Thai [Free Thai] underground movement, led by Pridi Bhanomyong, Thai leaders at war's end were able to secure American support in the face of British reparatory, punitive demands for Thailand's wartime efforts against the Allies. Spectacularly victorious after the war, the United States government persuaded its British counterpart to soften its stand on Thailand. The leaders of Seri Thai were also able to negotiate the release of financial assets in Japan and the United Kingdom for domestic economic recovery and revitalization. Notwithstanding the relatively favourable post-war settlement, the domestic political scene in the wake of the war was tumultuous, fragmented and fractious.
Following the downfall of Phibun's wartime government in July 1944, a series of shortlived and unstable democratic governments spearheaded by Pridi and his associates came to power over the next three years. During this period, the civilian leadership under Pridi drawn from political parties with socialist and leftist leanings as well as from the Seri Thai movement held sway, as the military and conservative élite under Phibun were in retreat. However, the threat of communist expansionism associated with Pridi's socialist ideas and crucial domestic developments, including the Supreme Court's exoneration of Phibun and his associates on war crimes charges in April 1946, the mysterious death of the young King Anand two months later for which Pridi was held accountable by the public, and Pridi's genuine support for anti-colonial nationalist movements in Southeast Asia, undermined the former Seri Thai leader's political legitimacy.
Soon thereafter, the brief post-war interval of parliamentary democracy came to an end.
Thaksin's Political Zenith and Nadir
- from Thailand
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- By Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Chulalongkorn University
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2006
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 31 May 2006, pp 285-302
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Summary
The year 2005 is likely to be remembered as extraordinary, even peculiar, in the history of Thailand's evolving democracy since 1932. Within the year Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra soared to unprecedented political heights and then descended steeply into a political abyss. His Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party secured a thumping victory in the February 2005 General Election. Yet less than a year later, he faced a virulent Bangkok-based insurrection that called for no less than his resignation and permanent banishment from Thai politics. How did Thailand's most popularly elected prime minister who had risen so meteorically decline so precipitously?
This article sheds some light on key episodes following Thaksin's re- election triumph in February 2005. It begins with the significance of the re-election and the factors that led to the TRT's overwhelming victory. In the immediate aftermath of his re-election, Thaksin exhibited uncharacteristic signs of magnanimity and benevolent statesmanship, which lasted just several weeks. By mid-2005, his authoritarian streaks returned in full force, fanning the flames of discontent over his governance. By September an anti-Thaksin movement broke out into the open, spearheaded by a disgruntled media tycoon who had been an erstwhile ally of the Prime Minister. While this movement was initially confined to the Bangkok-based intelligentsia, middle classes, and civil society groups, it expanded into a mass movement to topple Thaksin when his family- owned Shin Corporation (Shin Corp) was sold to the Singapore government's Temasek Holdings in January 2006. The Prime Minister's political standing appeared untenable as long as he remained unable to convincingly explain the controversial sale of Shin Corp. The article concludes with the implications of these developments for the post-Thaksin era, including Thailand's near-term prospects.
Overwhelming Election Victory
In line with widespread expectations, Thaksin and the TRT scored a crushing victory in Thailand's general election on 6 February 2005. Despite claims of vote-buying and fraud, the election was relatively clean by Thai standards. The TRT garnered more than 75 per cent of the 500 seats for members of parliament (MPs), including 67 party-list seats.
Thailand: Democratic Authoritarianism
- from THAILAND
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- By Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Chulalongkorn University
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2003
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 08 July 2003, pp 277-290
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Summary
Introduction
On the face of it, 2002 should be seen — in the parlance of political science — as the year of intensification of Thailand's democratic “consolidation”. The promulgation of a new Constitution in October 1997 had been the culmination of five years of political reforms designed to exorcise the ghosts of frequent military coups, patronage, “money politics”, and vote-buying that long plagued the country's politics of representation. Less than three years later, 200 senators were elected to the upper chamber for the first time. The election of the 500-member lower house followed suit in January 2001. Concurrently, a clutch of so-called democratic institutions, revolving around the Election Commission, the National Counter Corruption Commission, and the Constitution Court, were spun into action as mandated by the Constitution in an effort to promote transparency and accountability of the political system. The stability and effectiveness of the government were constitutionally enhanced by new electoral stipulations that induced a consolidation of the party system towards larger political parties and by “party- list” mechanisms that enabled capable individuals to enter Cabinet relatively untainted by the mud slinging of election campaigns. Given the eclectic design of the Constitution, its initial implementation in the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis generated pervasive optimism both at home and abroad. The Thai economy may have lost a decade of growth, but at least Thai democracy was on its way to fulfilment. Or so it seemed.
As 2002 drew to a close, it has turned out that Thailand's democratic consolidation is less than meets the eye. The government of Thaksin Shinawatra, the prime minister who ushered his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party into power on a landslide victory in the January 2001 election, has arguably turned Thai democracy on its head. The TRT has monopolized the party system, marginalized the opposition, co-opted and coerced the media, extended its controlling tentacles over the military and the police, and shunned the dissenting voices of civil society groups.