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13 - Group Differences in Intelligence
- from Part IV - Applications of Intelligence Research
- Edited by Robert J. Sternberg, Cornell University, New York
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- Book:
- Human Intelligence
- Print publication:
- 08 August 2019, pp 349-380
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Summary
After reading the last 12 chapters, it has probably become apparent to you that virtually everything associated with the concept of intelligence, including its conceptualization and measurement, is fraught with controversy. However, the topic of group differences in intelligence is particularly treacherous for researchers and anyone who writes about differences. Here is the one statement that scientists and others concerned with group differences in intelligence can agree on: There are some group differences, on average, on some tests that purportedly measure intelligence. This may be the only statement that we make in this chapter that goes unchallenged. The way we answer questions about group differences in intelligence is both personal and political. Every person belongs to many groups – racial, ethnic, language, country of origin, religious, gender, age, rural–urban, and many more. Even though we will be very careful when discussing differences to emphasize that the questions are about average differences among groups, these statements quickly become interpreted as statements about every member of the group, and readers may become defensive or prideful depending on their own group membership. The way we understand the extent of and reasons for these group differences has important social implications. Is there little overlap between two groups or are the group means so close together that the average difference has little or no meaning? If we think of group differences as large, then we could justify different treatment for members of different groups, perhaps in education, affirmative action, social welfare programs, parenting practices, and in other ways.
3 - Developing Childhood Proclivities into Adult Competencies: The Overlooked Multiplier Effect
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- By Stephen J. Ceci, Cornell University, Susan M. Barnett, Cornell University, Tomoe Kanaya, Cornell University
- Edited by Robert J. Sternberg, Yale University, Connecticut, Elena L. Grigorenko, Yale University, Connecticut
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- Book:
- The Psychology of Abilities, Competencies, and Expertise
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 23 June 2003, pp 70-92
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Summary
In this chapter, we tackle a problem that has been at the heart of the debate over the relative influence of genes and environments in producing cognitive competencies. Our goal is to attempt to reconcile the disparate claims of behavior genetics researchers who stress the prepotency of genes in producing intellectual competence (for example, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegan, and McGue, 1998) with those whom Scarr (1997) refers to as “socialization theorists” because of their stance on the crucial role of the social and material environment in shaping developmental outcomes.
Our means of making this reconciliation is to describe recent efforts by diverse scholars to explain cognitive growth in terms of theories, models, and metaphors that are inherently multiplicative, more so than prior ones. We do not intend to delve into a comparative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each model or metaphor, as that is not our goal, but instead we want to make the point that various researchers, coming from very different orientations, have found the need to postulate similar types of multiplier effects to account for cognitive growth across a wide range of attainments (reading, intelligence, mathematics, motoric).
In the treatment that follows we use the terms “proclivities,” “penchants,” and “abilities” interchangeably, to refer to basic, underlying “resource pools” that are undoubtedly biologically based. Thus, we speak of a newborn's penchant, ability, or proclivity to stare, attend, remember, and process the perceptual world.