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8 - Conclusion
- from Part C - The Cure
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp 264-276
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Summary
It may not be inaccurate to describe the short financial history of recent decades largely in terms of three trends – progressive financial market liberalization, excessive financialization and the emergence of a new paradigm for central banking in which monetary policy had a role in destabilization of the economy and yet was invoked to help stabilize it too!
Our contention is that financial liberalization and financialization drove the monetary policy framework to accord a higher priority to preserve and to further financialization of the global economy. That is, the monetary policy framework that the United States and the rest of the developed world adopted is a consequence of financialization and, later, it worked to reinforce financialization.
While UMPs may have brought things to a head and exposed the depth of the challenge, these trends have been a result of long-term choices, especially those made by authorities and politicians in the United States. As we explained in Chapters 2 and 4, the economic policy preferences of the United States and the evolution of Fed's monetary policy paradigm have been the long-term drivers. Globalization and financial market integration ensured that the ripples were amplified and felt on a global scale.
The economic manifestations of these trends have been the resource misallocations (both human and physical capital) away from the real economy to the financial markets, concentration of market power and oligopolies across sectors, spillovers from monetary policy actions in United States and other developed economies, shorter cycles of asset bubbles and painful clean-ups, surges in cross-border capital flows followed by the inevitable sudden stops that engender fiscal imbalances, exchange rate volatility, egregious executive compensations and tax advantages that favour capital over labour, penalization of savers to benefit debtors and a widening of income inequality and concentration of wealth that matches the Gilded Age.
The inevitable political and social dynamics associated with them have been gradually building up. While widening inequality is intrinsically bad, the more corrosive impact is felt in the capture of political institutions that set the rules of the game. A global plutocracy is entrenched across countries. The populist political backlash in developed countries is only to be expected.
Contents
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp v-vi
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6 - The Way Forward
- from Part C - The Cure
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp 151-206
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Summary
Treating the disease at its roots
This is the third and final part of the book where we discuss the cures to the ‘Rise of Finance’. To cure something, one has to establish that what we are attempting to cure is a disease. We hope we have done that at least adequately in the first two parts of the book. Now is the time to propose remedies.
As we write this in 2018, the world is approaching the tenth anniversary of the peak of the financial crisis that culminated in the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Financial crises are acute events whereas financialization is a chronic condition. In that sense, the world remains as unsafe as it was before the crisis of 2008. Much work has been done but, equally, much remains to be done.
Many proposals have been put forward for making the world's banking system safer in the aftermath of the crisis of 2008. Several of those proposals are in different stages of implementation. Some are facing resistance and delays. The process of approvals of banks’ living wills that outline how they should be wound up in the event of failure is inordinately delayed. There are also proposals for banks to pay into an insurance fund that could be used to bail them out in case of failure. Banks are expected to create contingent capital to deal with capital shortage during liquidity and solvency crises. Risk-weighted capital adequacy ratios for banks are expected to go up gradually in the coming years in accordance with the Basel III commitments.
Then, there are counter-cyclical capital buffers that are activated during excess credit growth and deactivated during credit downturns. Each national central bank sets the parameters with regard to local circumstances. Banks undergo regular stress tests. Banks are restricted from undertaking proprietary trading with depositors’ money (‘Volcker Rule’). Central banks name certain institutions as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and subject them to extensive monitoring. Of course, far from making these institutions behave more responsibly, this might make them take on more risks as they are systemically important and cannot be allowed to fail!
Prologue
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp xv-xvi
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Summary
As the Clinton presidency entered its final year in 2000, America removed the last vestiges of control on the financial services industry. The Commodities Futures Modernization Act was passed, paving the way for an explosion in the creation of financial derivatives. The Glass–Steagall Act that separated commercial banking from investment banking was repealed, enabling the creation of financial conglomerates.
The new millennium began with the collapse of the Internet and technology bubbles in the United States and elsewhere. The NASDAQ composite index crashed from 5,300 points to around 1,300 points. Then, there was 9/11. Surprisingly, the US economy endured only a brief and mild recession. In December of that year, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the United States, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate to 1.0 per cent. From 2002, a global economic recovery ensued, notwithstanding the invasion of Iraq in 2003, in search of weapons of mass destruction.
America pursued simultaneous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Government spending rose rapidly, and consumer spending even more so. The US dollar weakened but foreign governments, led by China and oil-producing nations, bought American debt copiously. Interest rates stayed low despite swift and big increase in government and private debt. Prices of commodities, including crude oil, boomed. Real estate prices boomed everywhere. Millions, including those with no income, no jobs and no assets, became homeowners, as lending standards were continuously diluted by successive governments. Securitization of mortgages happened at an unprecedented pace. New over-the-counter financial derivative contracts such as credit default swaps (CDSs) were created in the trillions. It all ended in 2007 as mortgage borrowers began to default and the real estate boom ended in America. The malaise soon spread to the rest of the world through financial channels. It climaxed with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a big name on Wall Street. The world economy teetered on the edge of collapse.
In response, monetary policy turned unconventional. Unprecedented measures were adopted. The Federal Reserve set its policy rate – the federal funds rate – at 0 in December 2008 and held it there for seven years. In addition, the Federal Reserve targeted long-term interest rates through asset purchases.
Frontmatter
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp i-iv
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Part B - The Consequences
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp 51-52
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Index
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp 277-287
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1 - Introduction
- from Part A - The Causes
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp 3-17
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Summary
In 2015, ethicist Dirk Philipsen wrote a book on GDP – gross domestic product. The book was titled The Little Big Number: How GDP Came to Rule the World and What to do About it. Katy Lederer, who reviewed the book for the New Yorker, quotes this gem from the book:
… a pill-dependent smoker who, on the way to his divorce lawyer, crashes his oversized car into a school bus because he is texting about an impending derivatives trade.
Philipsen has used this extreme example to make the point that GDP makes no distinction between ethical and unethical activities. All of the above boost GDP but do little to boost economic welfare or well-being. Yes, it includes the derivatives trade.
A piece of news from Financial Times in June 2018 proved that Philipsen was not exaggerating. A financial market trader, running a hedge fund inside the private equity firm Blackstone, used to take positions in credit default swaps (CDSs) (an insurance contract that compensates the owner if the borrower defaults on payments – interest and/or principal repayment – on the bond on which the insurance was bought). Nothing exceptional. Hedge fund managers and traders routinely do this. The difference was that he then used it to lean on the companies that had to make the payment to miss payments or delay them such that they constituted a technical default. His CDSs would then pay him out the compensation. Few days later, the companies would make their delayed payments to bondholders. In one of his last trades, he did the opposite. He sold CDSs to other hedge funds on a company that looked very likely to default on its next payment and collected premiums from those who bought the CDS. Then, the company was lent enough money such that it did not default on the payment. The insurance was for nothing. Those who bought the CDS lost their premiums! Several months later, the company defaulted and filed for bankruptcy. This is the equivalent of fixing matches in sports. We are also reminded of Almighty, a novel by fiction writer Irving Wallace, in which a newspaper owner would begin to create news-stories and make them happen so that his newspaper could be the first one to report the exclusive breaking news!
Part C - The Cure
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 16 May 2019, pp 149-150
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7 - Finance in India
- from Part C - The Cure
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp 207-263
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Introduction
The earlier chapters focused on the rise of finance mostly in the context of advanced economies. This chapter examines its relevance for India. It goes further than that – it evaluates the state of the financial sector in India. As with many things, India's finance sector too is a phenomenon of many parts. Some are rudimentary and some are sophisticated. Unlike the advanced economies, India's challenges are different. On the one hand, a significant share of its citizens is financially excluded and its credit markets suffer from several deficiencies. On the other hand, pockets of the economy as well as certain economic activities are experiencing an increasing trend of financialization. India needs to walk this trade-off going forward.
As a large continent-sized economy with many states of the sizes of countries in Europe and Africa folded in it, India is always in a state of churn. But India's financial sector seems to be in a particular state of heightened churn. Fortunately, crises and churns always provide opportunities for charting a new path, a better road map for the future. Indeed, a lot has been achieved. One way to gauge that is to look back at the agenda that was deemed essential for India sometime in the past and see how much of it has been achieved.
In 2008, Raghuram Rajan had delivered a speech at the Institute for Economic Growth in Delhi on the topic of financial sector reforms in India and the global crisis. In the speech, he had recommended that India implement a bankruptcy code, make it easy for foreigners to invest in Indian bond market, enable no-frills accounts for the vast majority of the population and establish credit bureaus and allow foreign direct investment in asset reconstruction companies. In the decade since, all of these have been accomplished. Yes, many things remain to be done but much has been done too. This is the state of affairs in Indian public policy, in general. Given its continental size and huge population, issues will keep surfacing even as some are settled.
For analytical comfort, we can distinguish between finance and financialization for a developing country. Developing countries need access to finance, especially for their low-income citizens and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Part A - The Causes
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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List of Tables and Boxes
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp ix-x
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5 - Consequences of Unconventional Monetary Policy
- from Part B - The Consequences
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp 99-148
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Summary
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 and the long and deep recession that followed it left a deep scar on all developed economies. After Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008, asset prices plunged and fear gripped the financial markets, forcing credit markets to dry up. Spooked by uncertainties about counter-party risks, lenders shut shop. The liquidity squeeze made even solvent institutions face the threat of insolvency.
Businesses, governments and households were left with bruised balance sheets. Credit markets froze, consumption and investment tanked, and economies contracted. Since governments had limited fiscal space to indulge in pump priming, the onus of containing the damage and leading the economic recovery efforts fell on the shoulders of central banks. Central banks assumed centre stage in this context (see Box 5.1).
Box 5.1 The false dawn of being the only game in town
The extraordinary monetary accommodation that started in the aftermath of the global financial crisis had a very justifiable rationale. The turmoil and its impact on the economy were devastating. Households, corporates and financial institutions needed the space and time to deleverage in a gradual and orderly manner. Keeping borrowing costs low was critical to this. Besides, this would also provide the time for governments to get their acts together with both fiscal policies as well as certain deep-rooted structural reforms so as to restore the economy to its pre-crisis levels.
Unfortunately, this had two flawed assumptions. One, governments would get their acts together. Two, we had to regain pre-crisis growth path. But both of these stood on flimsy foundations. Political considerations meant that governments were reluctant to bite the bullet with hard choices. In any case, governments in most developed economies had limited fiscal space available to prime the pump any more. In contrast, the likes of quantitative easing appeared a free lunch. And, as Larry Summers has written in the context of secular stagnation, the pre-crisis growth was itself built on unsustainable excesses. Regaining that was neither desirable nor possible without inflating more bubbles.
The resulting abdication by governments paved the path for central banks to assume leadership of the fight to restore growth. And the quest for pre-crisis growth necessarily meant prolonging the monetary accommodation and creating the conditions for another bubble.
2 - The Rise of Finance: Origins
- from Part A - The Causes
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp 18-50
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Summary
This chapter begins by establishing a common understanding of financialization in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, it underscores the important point that is often missed in the discourse on reining in finance. Its rise was part of the neoliberal agenda that began to be assembled in the 1980s. Section 2.3 traces the rise and growth of financialization in the twentieth century to the onset of economic stagflation in the 1970s in much of the developed world. That propelled many forces that have dominated and shaped the world economy in unforeseen ways. Globalization of trade and financialization are two important forces that the economic troubles of the 1970s spawned. In Section 2.4, we show that deregulation propelled and strengthened financialization and made it inexorable even though finance is far less amenable to the free and untrammelled play of market forces compared to other economic activities. In Section 2.5, we establish that financialization went global, thanks to the hegemony of the US dollar and the dependence of the rest of the world on American economic growth.
What is financialization?
The most comprehensive analysis or a more formal treatment of financialization comes from Thomas Palley. For him, financialization is ‘a process whereby financial markets, financial institutions, and financial elites gain greater influence over economic policy and economic outcomes’. He identifies three principal impacts – elevation of the significance of financial sector relative to the real sector, transfer of income from the real sector to the financial sector and increase in income inequality and contribution to wage stagnation. He also points to three different conduits – changes in the structure and operation of financial markets, behaviours of non-financial corporations and economic policy.
Donald Tomaskovic-Devey and Ken-Hou Lin of the University of Massachusetts in Amherst (the alma mater of one of us) go one step further than Palley. They define financialization as consisting of two interdependent processes: the increasing importance of financial services firms to the American society in economic, political and social terms and the increased involvement of non-financial firms in financial activity. So, they view financialization as a process that placed financial services firms at the centre of American society and not just at the centre of the American economy. We lean towards this formulation. Financialization not only influenced the economy but also had social consequences through its impact on wages and compensation.
4 - The Monetary Policy Framework
- from Part B - The Consequences
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp 64-98
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Summary
This chapter is a continuation of Chapter 3 in the sense that we are still wrestling with the consequences of financialization. In a sense, the previous chapter was about social consequences whereas Chapters 4 and 5 are about consequences of financialization on the economy, on capital markets and on systemic risk, acting through monetary policy.
We had noted earlier that Alan Greenspan favoured and championed deregulation of finance. But once deregulation became a fait accompli, the importance of finance to the economy grew and the financial sector became a formidable political and economic force. Therefore, policymakers came to the conclusion that what was good for finance was good for the economy. Consequently, monetary policy was tailored to ensure that it encouraged and did not impede financial sector activity and financial markets.
This needed an intellectual framework. The experience of the 1970s came to the rescue. In the wake of the twin oil price shocks, labour militancy and turmoil in the Persian Gulf, economic growth stagnated but the inflation rate rose sharply in many parts of the advanced world. We had recorded earlier that it gave rise to the neoliberal agenda that put the interests of capital and capitalists at the top and centre of economic policy. Monetary policy had to focus on price stability. Inflation had to be leashed. Since labour costs are the largest portion of cost of production, restraining wages became the prerequisite for preventing inflation from running up. Hence, at the first sign of acceleration in wages, central banks applied the monetary brakes and raised interest rates. The balance between labour and capital had tilted in favour of the latter.
Since central banks were responsible for the creation of money, it appeared logical to give them the responsibility to preserve the value of money. Is it really the case that money supply was the determinant of inflation? It might have been the case when Friedman and Anna Schwartz examined the data and proclaimed that inflation was always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. But did it hold true in the modern era when the introduction of credit cards and electronic payments had upended the traditional role of money?
3 - Wages, Compensation and Inequality
- from Part B - The Consequences
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp 53-63
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Summary
We examine the consequences of financialization across various dimensions. One is the impact on wages and compensation in America and in the non-financial economy. Second is the human resource misallocation due to financialization. Third is the impact on broader inequality. This chapter analyses these three impacts or consequences and examines the evidence.
Fourth, and perhaps the most important, consequence of financialization is its impact on monetary policy or the capture of monetary policy by finance. In turn, it has global ramifications. Therefore, we dedicate Chapters 4 and 5 to an analysis of the monetary policy framework and monetary policy actions in America and their global consequences. Chapter 4 examines the monetary policy framework that America has adopted. Chapter 5 is an examination of the consequences of UMPs deployed in the wake of the crisis of 2008.
In recent years, attention has turned to the role of finance in the creation and perpetuation of social and class divisions. Inequality is the paramount economic challenge of the twenty-first century. There is increasing realization that financialization has a lot to do with it. That is what we turn to next.
Wages and compensation trends in Finance
Large increases in wages and compensation at the executive levels and widening differential with the remaining employees while not unique to financial markets is most pronounced there. Since the 1990s executive compensation has ballooned (Figure 3.1).
The work of Harvard Law School professor Lucian Bebchuk, an authority on executive compensation trends, has shown how it has distorted incentives all round. His book with Jesse Fried, Pay without Performance, is a devastating indictment of modern managerial capitalism. They document that from 1993 to 2002, the aggregate compensation of the top five executives in all US public companies amounted to 7.5 per cent of all corporate earnings!
In another work, they attribute the incentive distortionary executive compensation practices to the triumph of managerial power over those of diffuse shareholders and conflicted boards, and the resultant separation of ownership and control. Describing such excessive compensation as a rent extraction arising from failure of corporate governance, they point in particular to two features – compensation that rewards executives even for short-term and reversible results which led to accumulation of latent risks, and its linkage only to returns to equity which resulted in highly leveraged bets.
List of Figures
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Singapore Management University, Gulzar Natarajan
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- Book:
- The Rise of Finance
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019, pp vii-viii
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The Rise of Finance
- Causes, Consequences and Cures
- V. Anantha Nageswaran, Gulzar Natarajan
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- 02 May 2019
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- 16 May 2019
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Financialisation, or the disproportionate importance of financial considerations in economic decisions, has been a defining feature of the economic history of the last twenty-five years. The wave of deregulation that accompanied the neoliberal agenda in the US, aided by the dominance of US dollar and American economy, has resulted in the globalisation of finance. This book examines the rise of financialisation globally, while charting its drawbacks and prescribing suggestions for a definitive overhaul of the structure. Bringing together various strands of the latest research and evidence generated in recent years, empirical analysis, and views of reputed experts in the field, it presents a counter-point to the canonical ideas of analysing financial market dynamics and financial globalisation. It proposes a revision of the current monetary policy paradigm to correct its excessive focus on equity markets and their 'wealth effect', embrace a more symmetric response to the economic cycle, and a mandate to focus on financial stability as much as price stability.
Tuberculous otitis media: a resurgence?
- M Kameswaran, K Natarajan, M Parthiban, P V Krishnan, S Raghunandhan
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- Journal:
- The Journal of Laryngology & Otology / Volume 131 / Issue 9 / September 2017
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 20 July 2017, pp. 785-792
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- September 2017
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Objective:
Tuberculosis is a global health problem that is especially prevalent in developing countries such as India. Recently, atypical presentation has become more common and a high index of suspicion is essential. This study analysed the various presenting symptoms and signs of tuberculous otitis media and the role of diagnostic tests, with the aim of formulating criteria for the diagnosis.
Methods:A total of 502 patients underwent tympanomastoidectomy over a two-year period. Microbiological and histopathological examinations and polymerase chain reaction analysis of tissue taken during tympanomastoidectomy were performed.
Results:A total of 25 patients (5 per cent) were diagnosed with tuberculous otitis media. Severe mixed hearing loss, facial palsy, labyrinthine fistula, post-aural fistula, perichondritis and extradural abscess were noted.
Conclusion:There seems to be a resurgence in tuberculous otitis media in India. Microbiological, histopathological and polymerase chain reaction tests for tuberculosis are helpful for its diagnosis.
Contributors
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- By Avishek Adhikari, Susanne E. Ahmari, Anne Marie Albano, Carlos Blanco, Desiree K. Caban, Jonathan S. Comer, Jeremy D. Coplan, Ana Alicia De La Cruz, Emily R. Doherty, Bruce Dohrenwend, Amit Etkin, Brian A. Fallon, Michael B. First, Abby J. Fyer, Angela Ghesquiere, Jay A. Gingrich, Robert A. Glick, Joshua A. Gordon, Ethan E. Gorenstein, Marco A. Grados, James P. Hambrick, James Hanks, Kelli Jane K. Harding, Richard G. Heimberg, Rene Hen, Devon E. Hinton, Myron A. Hofer, Matthew J. Kaplowitz, Sharaf S. Khan, Donald F. Klein, Karestan C. Koenen, E. David Leonardo, Roberto Lewis-Fernández, Jeffrey A. Lieberman, Michael R. Liebowitz, Sarah H. Lisanby, Antonio Mantovani, John C. Markowitz, Patrick J. McGrath, Caitlin McOmish, Jeffrey M. Miller, Jan Mohlman, Elizabeth Sagurton Mulhare, Philip R. Muskin, Navin Arun Natarajan, Yuval Neria, Nicole R. Nugent, Mayumi Okuda, Mark Olfson, Laszlo A. Papp, Sapana R. Patel, Anthony Pinto, Kristin Pontoski, Jesse W. Richardson-Jones, Carolyn I. Rodriguez, Steven P. Roose, Moira A. Rynn, Franklin Schneier, M. Katherine Shear, Ranjeeb Shrestha, Helen Blair Simpson, Smit S. Sinha, Natalia Skritskaya, Jami Socha, Eun Jung Suh, Gregory M. Sullivan, Anthony J. Tranguch, Hilary B. Vidair, Tor D. Wager, Myrna M Weissman, Noelia V. Weisstaub
- Edited by Helen Blair Simpson, Columbia University, New York, Yuval Neria, Columbia University, New York, Roberto Lewis-Fernández, Columbia University, New York, Franklin Schneier, Columbia University, New York
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- Book:
- Anxiety Disorders
- Published online:
- 10 November 2010
- Print publication:
- 26 August 2010, pp vii-xii
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