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4 - Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy under the Tsai Administration
- Edited by Gordon Houlden, University of Alberta, Scott Romaniuk, University of Alberta, Nong Hong
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- Book:
- Security, Strategy, and Military Dynamics in the South China Sea
- Published by:
- Bristol University Press
- Published online:
- 13 April 2023
- Print publication:
- 27 July 2021, pp 79-100
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Summary
Introduction
In January 2016, Tsai Ing-wen, the candidate for the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), won in Taiwan's presidential election and was inaugurated as the 14th-term president of the Republic of China (“ROC”) in May of the same year. The new Tsai government adopted a foreign policy position of “cutting off Mainland China, following the United States [US] and Japan, and catering to ASEAN,” which affects the planning and development of Taiwan's South China Sea (SCS) policy under the Tsai administration. In July 2016, Taiwan announced that the award rendered by the Tribunal that heard the Philippines v. China SCS arbitration case is completely unacceptable because, inter alia, in the award, the ROC is referred to as the “Taiwan Authority of China.”
On July 19, 2016, President Tsai put forth four principles and five actions pertaining to the SCS issues. One of the policy principles is concerned about the obligation to uphold the freedom of navigation and overflight in the SCS region, which is also one of the main policy concerns of the US government. In January 2019, asked by The Sunday Telegraph if she would support a British presence in the SCS, President Tsai signalled that Taiwan would welcome: “any actions that will be helpful towards maintaining peace in the SCS, as well as maintaining freedom of passage.” The Tsai government is also taking actions to promote closer Taiwan–Japan security cooperation in line with the development of the US Indo-Pacific strategy. In March 2017, it was reported that Taiwan's Ministry of Defence was taking a very low-profile attitude in response to Japan's sending warships to the SCS.
Currently, Taiwan's main SCS policy actions focus on the promotion of scientific collaboration and developing Taiping Island as a centre of humanitarian assistance and rescue as well as a base for logistic supply. In June 2019, an international conference on the Pratas Islands was organized by the newly established Ocean Affairs Council (OAC). International scholars were invited to visit the Pratas Islands and make presentations on a variety of issues regarding ocean law, policy, and security. However, it should be noted that President Tsai herself, as the head of the National Security Council (NSC), together with senior national security advisors of the Council, is in charge of the government's SCS policy making, not the OAC.
11 - The South China Sea Dispute in U.S.–ASEAN Relations
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- By Yann-Huei Song, Institute of European and American Studies
- Edited by Ian Storey, Cheng-Yi Lin
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- Book:
- The South China Sea Dispute
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 19 May 2017
- Print publication:
- 23 May 2016, pp 247-271
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Summary
Before 2009, the South China Sea dispute was not a major policy issue in relations between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Since then, however, escalating tensions over sovereignty and maritime boundary claims in the South China Sea has become an increasingly salient issue in bilateral relations. Arguably the South China Sea dispute has been used by the administration of President Barack Obama to support its strategy of increased engagement with Southeast Asia and to push for greater U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region more generally. For some ASEAN states, if not for all ten members, the upswing of tensions in the South China Sea has increased the perception that the People's Republic of China (PRC) increasingly poses a strategic threat, making it necessary to move closer to the United States to check Beijing's assertive moves and to counter-balance its growing power in Southeast Asia. One of the indicators of this changing attitude is found in ASEAN's decision to invite the United States to join the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus).
On 15 November 2009, a joint statement was issued after the 1st U.S.–ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in Singapore. While Washington and ASEAN agreed to strengthen efforts to combat international terrorism and other transnational crimes such as illicit drug trafficking and piracy, they did not touch upon cooperation on maritime security issues, in particular those related to the South China Sea dispute. Two years later, however, at the 3rd U.S.–ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in Bali on 18 November 2011, the joint statement included the phrase “South China Sea” for the first time, as well as their concern that peace and stability be maintained in the area. U.S. and ASEAN leaders also agreed to make greater efforts to promote “cooperation on maritime issues, including maritime security, search and rescue, and safety of navigation in the region through promotion of capacity building, information sharing and technology cooperation and explore the possibility of utilizing such venues as the ASEAN Maritime Forum”. In addition, on 19 November 2011, at the 6th EAS, sixteen of the eighteen countries — including the United States and eight ASEAN members — raised the South China Sea issue.