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During the past two decades, there have been growing calls for broadening the discipline of international relations (IR) by giving due recognition to the history, culture, ideas, and agency of non-Western states and societies. Several aspects of this trend are noteworthy. First, it originated from the growing dissatisfaction by non-Western scholars with the Western (US and European) dominance of the IR field, a dominance that obscures and marginalizes the past and recent contributions of other societies. As such, the primary voices challenging this dominance have been non-Western scholars, sometimes in collaboration with a few Western counterparts. These include not just scholars of postcolonialism and race, but also some working in the English School and constructivist and non-Western/post-Western traditions.
This chapter explains why it is worth studying the thinking and practice of international relations and world order in three pre-modern civilizations. It argues that the end of the era of Western dominance is now happening, and these three cultures are becoming more powerful and influential in IR as the West declines. It is therefore important to know what they will bring to the table. IR grew up in the period of Western dominance but now needs to become more global in its sources.
This chapter reviews the three case studies in terms of six areas of comparison: power politics, hierarchy, peaceful coexistence, international political economy, territoriality/transnationalism, and modes of thinking. It observes a spectrum with China and hierarchy at one end, Europe and anarchy at the other, and India and the Islamic world in between. It notes how the thinking and practice of the past are as relevant in the three case studies as they are in Europe and charts out the similarities and differences among the cases, how they compare with Western IR, and how this provides the foundations for a more pluralist, global discipline of International Relations.
This chapter looks at the thinking and practice of international relations and world order in pre-Muslim India. It opens by setting India’s geopolitical context. In terms of thinking it covers Kautilya’s Arthashastra, Ashoka’s Dharma, and the ontology and epistemology of India’s epic literature. In terms of practice, it covers the Mahajanapadas and the peaceful spread of Indian culture.
This chapter looks at the thinking and practice of international relations and world order in the Islamic world. It opens by setting Islam's complex geopolitical context. In terms of thinking it covers the umma, the realms of al-Harb, al-Islam, and al-Ahd, jihad, the work of Ibn Khaldun, and Ijtihad. In terms of practice it covers the relationship between the umma and the Islamic state, the division of Islam into rival empires, and the rivalry between Sunnis and Shias within Islam. A key theme is the contradictions between thinking and practice.
This chapter addresses five difficulties in our approach: how to handle the close link between the discipline of IR that we now have and the period of Western world dominance; does culture matter in international relations or is it all materialism?; how ‘Western’ is modern IR?; Can ancient and modern concepts and practices be equated?; Empires versus states, and how to differentiate inside and outside.
This chapter looks at the thinking and practice of international relations and world order in China. It opens by setting China’s geopolitical context. In terms of thinking it covers Tianxia, the Mandate of Heaven, hierarchy, face, zhongyong dialectics, yin-yang, collectivism, and relationalism. In terms of practice it covers the warring states and the tribute system. It argues that China was the most different of the three cases in terms of international relations.
Buzan and Acharya challenge the discipline of International Relations to reimagine itself in the light of the thinking about, and practice of, international relations and world order from premodern India, China and the Islamic world. This prequel to their 2019 book, The Making of Global International Relations, takes the story back from the two-century tale of modern IR, to reveal the deep global history of the discipline. It shows the multiple origins and meanings of many concepts thought of as only modern and Western. It opens pathways for the rest of the world into this most Eurocentric of disciplines, encouraging them to bring their own histories, concepts and theories with them. The authors have written this book with the hope of inspiring others to extend these pathways by bringing in a wider array of cultures, and exploring how they thought about and acted in worlds composed of multiple, independent, collective actors.
“Civilization” is back at the forefront of global policy debates. The leaders of rising powers such as China, India, Turkey, and Russia have stressed their civilizational identity in framing their domestic and foreign policy platforms. An emphasis on civilizational identity is also evident in U.S. president Donald Trump's domestic and foreign policy. Some analysts argue that the twenty-first century might belong to the civilization state, just as the past few centuries were dominated by the nation-state. But is the rise of civilization state inevitable? Will it further undermine the liberal international order and fuel a clash of civilizations, as predicted by the late Samuel Huntington? Or might ideas from East Asian and other non-Western civilizations contribute to greater pluralism in our thinking about world order and the study of international relations?
This chapter reviews the revolutions of modernity that flowered during the nineteenth century, redefining the material and ideational landscapes of humankind, and setting up the modern international system in which we still live. It takes a particular look at Japan as both a harbinger of the rise of the rest, and as a refutation of the idea that the first round of modernity was exclusively Western. It concludes by looking at the causes and consequences of the First World War.
The key theme of this chapter is the first wave of institutionalisation of IR in the wake of the trauma to the European core. IR emerged tenuously in the core countries as a distinct academic discipline and policy science, with particular strengths in the US and Britain. Its main focus was on the immediate policy crisis confronting the core after the First World War: understanding its causes in order to prevent a second, giving particular attention to the role of armaments, diplomacy and the potential of the new League of Nations. Concern with the periphery stayed firmly in the background. A few institutions, university chairs and departments were dedicated to teaching and researching IR, and there was an annual academic International Studies Conference linked to the League of Nations that tried to define the scope and content of the discipline. There was also more thinking about ir in the periphery, though this remained largely marginal to Western IR.