2 results
9 - Elections: The Power of Elections in Multiparty Africa
- from Part III - Elections, Parties and Political Competition
-
- By Carolien Van Ham, University of New South Wales, Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg
- Edited by Nic Cheeseman, University of Oxford
-
- Book:
- Institutions and Democracy in Africa
- Published online:
- 05 February 2018
- Print publication:
- 22 February 2018, pp 213-237
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Multiparty elections are not only the sine qua non of modern representative democracy, they also constitute perhaps the most notable set of formal institutions on the continent today. At the same time, electoral institutions in Africa are often accompanied by the kind of competitive informal institutions described in Chapter 15. This has led to a fierce debate about the quality and impact of elections in Africa.
Elections in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter referred to as Africa) are more common than ever in the continent's history: multiparty elections have spread to almost every country. This is all the more remarkable given Africa's relatively brief experience with elections. While multiparty elections were held on the continent before 1989, the real upsurge came only after the end of the Cold War.
Under colonialism, colonial subjects in the French territories voted in elections both to assemblies in France and to local government councils, and elections were also held for councils with limited legislative power in some of the English colonies. In conjunction with decolonisation, many countries also held multiparty elections, bringing leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Kenneth Kaunda, Leopold Senghor and Jomo Kenyatta to power.
Yet, after independence, about half of all African countries reverted to military regimes, starting with the 1960 coup in the then Zaire, today Democratic Republic of Congo. More than twenty other countries fashioned one-party regimes (often with a nominal socialist ideology) holding non-competitive elections. The justification for doing so was that legal processes had been followed – such as constitutional review commissions and referenda – and that these changes were necessary to forge national unity in the interest of rapid economic development. Consequently, by the mid-1980s, forty-two out of forty-seven countries in Africa could be categorised as either military or single-party regimes. Only Botswana, Gambia and Mauritius continued with multiparty elections from independence.
The end of the Cold War marked the start of a rapid transformation. In just a few years, almost all the previously autocratic regimes started holding multiparty elections (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Lindberg 2006). The proportion of countries holding multiparty polls jumped from just 25 per cent in 1988 to 84 per cent in 1994 (van Ham and Lindberg 2015). At present, forty-six of forty-nine countries on the continent (94 per cent) hold multiparty elections for national offices.
From Sticks to Carrots: Electoral Manipulation in Africa, 1986–2012
- Carolien van Ham, Staffan I. Lindberg
-
- Journal:
- Government and Opposition / Volume 50 / Issue 3 / July 2015
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 30 April 2015, pp. 521-548
- Print publication:
- July 2015
-
- Article
- Export citation
-
Over 90 per cent of the world’s states currently select their national leaders through multiparty elections. However, in Africa the quality of elections still varies widely, ranging from elections plagued by violence and fraud to elections that are relatively ‘free and fair’. Yet, little is known about trade-offs between different strategies of electoral manipulation and the differences between incumbent and opposition actors’ strategies. We theorize that choices for specific types of manipulation are driven by available resources and cost considerations for both incumbents and opposition actors, and are mutually responsive. We also suggest that costs of manipulative strategies are shaped by the level of democratization. We test our hypotheses on a time series, cross-sectional data set with observations for 286 African elections from 1986 to 2012. We find that democratization makes ‘cheap’ forms of electoral manipulation available to incumbents such as intimidation and manipulating electoral administration less viable, thus leading to increases in vote buying. The future of democracy in Africa thus promises elections where the administration of elections becomes better and better but at the same time vote buying will increase. Not all things go together, at least not all the time. The future of democracy in Africa will mean more money in politics, more patronage and more clientelistic offers thrown around, at least in the short to medium term.