This Handbook brings together a global team of private law experts and computer scientists to examine the interface between private law and AI, which includes issues such as whether existing private law can address the challenges of AI and whether and how private law needs to be reformed to reduce the risks of AI while retaining its benefits.

This chapter articulates the central argument (why a new legal form for social enterprises in India, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore is needed and what it should entail); explains why the four Asian jurisdictions are selected as case studies; and examines the purposes of social enterprises and their two main business models. The chapter then provides an overview of social enterprises in the four Asian jurisdictions including: their operating domains, the drivers of the development of social enterprises, the challenges faced by them, the three main conflicts of interests afflicting them, and the legal forms used by social enterprises. Importantly, the chapter shows that the legal forms available to or used by social enterprises in the four Asian jurisdictions are unable to properly address the conflicts of interests, and thus, a new legal form is required.

This chapter critically examines the fifth and last criterion of the proposed framework for social enterprise law, namely, distribution of dividends and assets, and allocation of tax benefits. I assess how restrictions on the distribution of dividends and assets can ensure that the pursuit of social benefit is not subordinated to that of profit-making by analyzing the CIC regulations. I argue that these restrictions in themselves do not necessarily ensure that the pursuit of social benefit is prioritized over profit-making. Under my criterion, it is argued that directors should be required to issue a report specifying whether and how they have complied with the corporate purpose, among other requirements. In addition, they should be required to engage in a critically self-reflexive process on how they measure impact based on the proposed three-step framework. I also argue that because investors need to be incentivized to invest in social enterprises and given that a central challenge facing social enterprises in Asia is poor access to funding, I consider how tax law can be used to incentivize investments from shareholders.

This chapter argues that beneficiaries of social enterprises should be given decision-making powers. I examine two problems with restricting the decision-making powers to shareholders, that is, shareholders can exercise the governance rights to benefit themselves but at the expense of the constituencies that the social enterprise is set up to benefit; and it is odd for a social enterprise to claim that it seeks to pursue social welfare and to promote public benefit, and yet its beneficiaries have absolutely no say in how the social enterprise is being run. I then analyze three objections in giving beneficiaries decision-making powers, that is, it will be disruptive and inefficient; beneficiaries can act opportunistically; and only shareholders have the incentive and ability to monitor. Finally, I assess five different decision-making mechanisms, that is, beneficiary advisory panel; director appointed from the beneficiary advisory panel; appointing independent nonexecutive directors; beneficiaries as shareholders; appointing a regulator and public enforcement.

The central argument in this chapter is that the duties to which directors owe the company, specifically the duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the company and the duty to exercise powers for proper purposes, should be aligned with the purpose of social enterprises. In other words, the meaning of company’s interests in the best interest duty and that of proper purpose in the proper purpose rule ought to be equated with the proposed corporate purpose advanced in Chapter 1. To make this argument, I show that the laws governing these two directors’ duties in the four common law Asian jurisdictions and those of UK CICs and US PBCs and SPCs are not aligned with the purpose of social enterprises and I demonstrate why it is important to have this alignment. I also explain how the proper purpose rule can be aligned with my proposed purpose of social enterprise.