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This chapter assesses the impact of the 2013 UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) and the 2016 IOM-UN agreement on the IOM’s relationship to human rights protection. In doing so, it contextualizes the ongoing debate of the organization’s normative framework, (controversial) human rights practices and relationship to the UN. The authors argue that by signing the 2016 UN-IOM agreement, the IOM is indirectly bound by the principles underlying the HRDDP as far as it cannot act against its core norms. At the same time, the article argues that given the policy’s limitations, one should not put too much hope into the applicability of the HRDDDP to the IOM. This is because it only aims at preventing “grave violations” of human rights in specific contexts. Therefore, the chapter concludes with some suggestions on how the HRDDP could be reformed in light of the IOM’s new relation with the UN to protect human rights more effectively.
The present volume contributes to the emerging field of comparative foreign relations law by focusing on how foreign relations law interacts with international law, a topic that has been underexplored in the literature. This concluding chapter reflects on the relationship between these two bodies of law, drawing on examples from this volume and also from The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law. It begins by offering a working definition of foreign relations law that is both analytically distinct from international law and useful for comparative analysis. It then explains how foreign relations law and international law have important and often under-appreciated effects on each other, sometimes in ways that are constructive and mutually reinforcing, but at other times in ways that produce potential conflict.
Like an interface, foreign relations law addresses multiple and diverse questions about how the ‘domestic’ relates to the ‘international’ sphere. This introductory chapter unfolds the idea of bridges and boundaries between foreign relations law and public international law and develops the guiding questions of the volume. It also reflects on missed encounters between the two fields and introduces the core concepts and the approach of the book. Finally, it exposes the overall structure of the book and summarizes the contents of individual chapters.
Foreign relations law and public international law are two closely related academic fields that tend to speak past each other. As this innovative volume shows, the two are closely interrelated and depend on each other for their mutual construction and identity. A better understanding of this relationship is of vital importance for upholding important constitutional values like democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, while enabling states to engage in meaningful forms of international cooperation. The book takes a close look at the encounters between the two fields and offers perspectives for a constructive engagement between the two. Collectively, the contributions argue that the delimitation between the two fields occurs in a hybrid zone of interaction which requires both bridges and boundaries: bridges for the construction of the relationship between the two fields, and boundaries for preserving key normative expectations of both domestic and international law. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Edited by
Jacco Bomhoff, London School of Economics and Political Science,David Dyzenhaus, University of Toronto,Thomas Poole, London School of Economics and Political Science
Helmut Philipp Aust’s topic is the connection between foreign relations law and domestic conceptions of democracy, and in particular the question of ‘who gets to decide on the international commitments of a state?’. Populism and a broader inward–turn in the politics of many Western states, Aust writes, mean that ‘there is a growing level of discontent with the way that the external sphere is impacting on the internal’. These changing perceptions of ’the international’ filter through into different conceptions of foreign relations law, which, in turn, affect the ability of states to cooperate internationally. The chapter presents two variants of foreign relations law – a ’closed’ version prevalent in the USA, and a German version traditionally more open to international cooperation. Through a comparative analysis, Aust shows how the openness to international cooperation that was long seen to lie at the heart of the German Basic Law, is coming under increasing pressure.
Since the German Federal Constitutional Court's 1994 decision on the deployment of AWACS surveillance aircraft over the Adriatic Sea, it is one of the cornerstones of German constitutional law that Parliament (the Bundestag) needs to consent to the external use of German Armed Forces in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is likely. However, the Bundestag may neither determine “the modalities, the dimension and the duration of the operations, nor the necessary coordination within and with the organs of international organizations.” As the requirement of constitutive parliamentary approval is not directly set out in the German Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court (in the following: FCC or the Court) derived it from the general constitutional framework. The concept of “parliamentary army”, designed by the Court, attempts to strike a balance between executive effectiveness and parliamentary participation.
“Digital technology is transforming what it means to be a subject.” The increase in the use of big data, self-learning algorithms, and fully automated decision-making processes calls into question the concept of human agency that is at the basis of much of modern human rights law. Already today, it is possible to imagine a form of “algorithmic authority,” i.e., the exercise of authority over individuals based on the more or less automated use of algorithms. What would this development mean for human rights law and its central categories? What does the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted seventy years ago as a founding document of the human rights movement at the international level, have to say about this?