Kant holds that some nonhuman animals “are acquainted with” objects, despite lacking conceptual capacities (“understanding”). What does this tell us about his theory of human cognition? Numerous authors have argued that this is a significant point in favour of Nonconceptualism—the claim that, for Kant, sensible representations of objects do not depend on the understanding. Against this, I argue that Kant’s views about animal minds can readily be accommodated by a certain kind of Conceptualism. It remains viable to think that, for Kant, (i) humans’ sensible representations necessarily represent objects as temporally structured in ways that allow us to have thoughts about them, and (ii) such representations are produced, and could only be produced, by the understanding. This allows Conceptualists to maintain that humans’ sensible representations depend on the understanding, while accepting that animals have sensible representations of objects too. We must, therefore, reassess both the warrant for Nonconceptualism and the shape Conceptualist readings must take.

The reputation of Erasmus in the period after his death has been the object of considerable interest in recent years following the impression made by Marcel Bataillon's Érasme et l'Espagne (Paris, 1937) and, more recently, by Andreas Flitner's essay Erasmus im Urteil seiner Nachwelt (Tübingen, 1952). The vicissitudes of an influence felt to be important, yet at the same time widely suspect, is something of a critical index to European moral sentiment. It is clear also that the reception of this influence has differed with the climate of opinion from country to country as well as from time to time, and it would seem desirable to fill up the outline, so admirably sketched by Flitner, at points where our present information is relatively thin. One such point is to be found in France in the latter part of the sixteenth century.

“‘There's some herb that's good for everybody except for them J. that thinks they're sick when they ain't,’ announced Mrs. Todd, with a truly professional air of finality. ‘Come, William, let's have Sweet Home, an’ then mother'll sing Cupid an' the Bee for us.'” Accuracy in detail is a merit that no one would deny to the work of Sarah Orne Jewett and hence some time ago, on reading the words just quoted from The Country of the Pointed Firs, the present writer was puzzled at finding Cupid and the Bee linked with Sweet Home in a setting meant to call up nothing but the homely reality of Maine. The title suggested Theocritus (pseudo-Theocritus) or an Anacreon (pseudo-Anacreon) unlikely to be much on the mind of Mrs. Todd or her aged mother. Sweet Home is duly sung, but we hear no more of Cupid and the Bee. One only gathers that to Miss Jewett in 1896 it had the color of an old song suitable to the age of the singer. As I had long been noting down occurrences of the theme,

As Cupid midst the roses played,
Transporting in the damask shade,
A bee stepped unseen among
The silken leaves' his finger stung.

His beauteous cheeks with tears were drowned;
He stormed, he blew the burning wound,
Then nimbly running through the grove
Thus plaintive to the Queen of Love:

“I'm killed, Mamma; alas, I die!
A little serpent winged to fly
That's called the bee in yonder plain,
Has stung me, and I die with pain.”

When Venus smiling thus rejoining:
“My dear, if you such anguish find
From the resentment of a bee,
Think what they feel that's stung by thee.”

The problem of the relationship of the endocrine system to personality and its disorders has long been an intriguing one. The literature abounds with the views of the psychiatrist, physiologist, pathologist and endocrinologist, and still there remains a multitude of challenging questions unanswered. The ætiology of personality disorders, that of the psychoses, and the true function of the endocrines and their working mechanism have never been satisfactorily determined. To establish scientifically any ætiological factor in medicine one must make a definite diagnosis of the entity, identify the ætiological factor, the specific pathological picture, and the influence of specific therapy.