Introduction

This chapter focuses on Indonesia’s relations with the two superpowers — the United States and the former Soviet Union — as well as the economic superpower, Japan. It examines the importance of Indonesia’s “economic dependence” on the United States and Japan during the early stage of the Suharto period and its impact on Jakarta’s foreign policy behaviour. It also looks at the non-economic factors which affected Jakarta-Moscow relations before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991. In the last section of this chapter, Indonesian relations with major powers regarding regional order and security are also addressed.

Indonesia-US Relations: Convergence of Interests?

Indonesian-American relations were established during the revolutionary period when Indonesia was still fighting for its independence. Active support for Indonesia by the United States was only given after the Madiun Affair in 1948 when the Indonesian Government was under a Communist threat.

During the period of Constitutional Democracy, when the Islamic party, Masyumi, was in power, Indonesian-American relations could be described as close. An agreement on military alliance with the United States was made but it was short- lived. When Indonesian domestic politics moved towards the left and the nation’s foreign policy became even more militant and nationalistic, Indonesian-American relations deteriorated. This was also partly due to such anti-Sukarno, anti-Communist rebel groups that gained the support of the United States in their efforts to topple the central Government. The rebellions were crushed, but, as a consequence, Indonesian-American relations suffered. Meanwhile, Sukarno moved further to the left and made a formal alliance with the PRC. The nation’s relationship with the Soviet Union also became closer. The military group in Indonesia was basically anti-Communist, however, and quietly received support from the United States.

When the 1965 coup failed and the military emerged as the victor in Indonesia, Indonesian-American relations improved. The Indonesian economy before and soon after the coup was on the brink of collapse. Inflation was out of control, reaching 650 per cent annually. It was reported that, in 1966, inflation was as high as 900 per cent. The newly formed Government was aware that in order to maintain political stability, there had to be economic rehabilitation. It was also recognized that stabilizing the economy would be a way to legitimize the Suharto Government.

The Four Periods

Dr Tan Ta Sen, President of the International Zheng He Society (Singapore), gave a speech to the Peranakan Chinese Association in Melaka in 2013, arguing that the “Peranakan [Chinese] community was born during the Cheng Ho [Zheng He] and Western colonial eras. Their main characteristics was at first being localized (indigenized-Malay or Indonesian), then Westernized during the colonial era, and re-Sinicized at the present national stage”.

He divided the Chinese migrations to Melaka and Southeast Asia into “four periods”, the first of which being the “Cheng Ho and [early] colonial period”. Although he did not mention the years of this specific period, I believe he refers to 1405–1643. That is because 1405 was Zheng He’s first voyage while 1643 was the end of the Ming dynasty. He also argued that this was the period when the Peranakan Chinese community came into being in Southeast Asia, and the characteristic of this period is the “localization” of the Chinese. However, the Zheng He period in fact was very brief, i.e. 1405–33. After the demise of Zheng He, the Ming dynasty abandoned the expeditions and China began to be inward looking again. From the post-Zheng He period up to 1643, the Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch came to colonize maritime Southeast Asia.

The second period in Dr Tan’s speech was from 1644 (the beginning of the Qing or Manchu dynasty) to 1840 (the eruption of the Opium War in China). During this period, i.e. between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, Southeast Asia countries were colonized by the West. Many Chinese who did not want to live under the Manchu rule left for Southeast Asia; some took refuge in Melaka and became the Peranakans. Dr Tan argued that the Peranakan Chinese culture was in fact a fusion of the “Chinese, Western and Malay cultures”.

The third period, still in the nineteenth century, was after the Opium War (1840). China was then in turmoil and the Chinese came to Southeast Asia in large numbers for better economic opportunity. The number of Chinese new migrants outnumbered the Peranakans, and the Peranakans began to be “re-Sinicized”.

The fourth period started since World War II and lasted until now. Dr Tan argued that the re-Sinicization process which characterized this period remained till the present day. But the process was interrupted by the nation-building projects which took place after the war.

Introduction

This chapter identifies a number of factors which influence, if not determine, Indonesia’s foreign policy. These factors include Indonesian leaders’ perceptions of territorial boundaries, Indonesia’s role in world affairs, and the constraint on its behaviour posed by the country’s available resources. Indonesian political culture and elite perceptions of external threat will also be examined because they may throw light on Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour.

Indonesia’s Territory and Role in World Affairs

The perception of Indonesia’s territory and role in world affairs by its leaders is important because of its effect on Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour. The difficulty, however, is in determining whose perceptions should be accepted as valid. Should they be those of the foreign policy elite or should they be those of Indonesian leaders in general? It is reasonable to assume that the perceptions of Indonesian leaders responsible for formulating foreign policy are the crucial ones. In the case of Indonesia, however, domestic policy-makers and foreign policy leaders are often the same individuals. This has been reflected in the role of the President, especially during the Guided Democracy and New Order periods.

Indonesia’s history and traditions have been mainly responsible for the perceptions of Indonesian leaders concerning the nation’s territory and role in world affairs. Indonesia, before August 1945, was known as the Dutch East Indies and the country is still defined today by the former boundaries of the Dutch colony. (Since 1976, Indonesia has also included the former Portuguese East Timor.) Most Indonesian leaders, however, especially the pre-war nationalists and the 1945 generation, consider Indonesia to be a continuation of two ancient empires, Sriwijaya and Majapahit.

Before independence, Indonesian leaders debated the boundaries of an independent Indonesia. One view, represented by Mohammad Yamin, a nationalist poet and statesman, for example, subscribed to the “Great Indonesia” concept (Indonesia Raya). He maintained that the height of the Majapahit Empire was the period of greatest glory in Indonesia’s history. Citing the work of Prapanca, a fourteenth century poet of Java, Yamin said that Indonesia, under Majapahit rule, had included the Dutch East Indies, Malaya (Peninsular Malaysia), Borneo, Timor, and Papua (New Guinea). He believed that an independent Indonesia should include the former territory of the Majapahit Empire.

In writing this book, I have benefited greatly from numerous discussions that I have had with many friends and scholars over the last 20 years. I have also profited from various seminars on Indonesia’s foreign affairs given by Indonesian officials, diplomats and academics. Many of these seminars and talks were behind closed doors or off the record, and therefore they cannot be cited. Nonetheless, they have had a strong influence on my study.

Many friends in Indonesia have shared their expertise with me, and in doing so have enriched my understanding of both Indonesia’s domestic politics and foreign policy. Their names are too many to be mentioned here but I would like to offer all of them my sincere thanks.

A significant portion of the study was conducted between 1988 and 1989 during my sabbatical leave in three institutions: the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore (ISEAS), Ohio University and Cornell University. Each possesses an excellent library, and I am grateful to the staff of those libraries for assisting me in my research.

A few friends have read the early version of my manuscript, either in part or in full. I would like in particular to thank Chin Kin Wah, N. Ganesan, Michael Leifer, Jamie Mackie and Nancy Viviani for their useful suggestions. I am also grateful to Triena Ong who has given me editorial advice. Nevertheless, for any mistakes and shortcomings which still exist in this book, I am alone responsible.

Leo Suryadinata

July 1995

Singapore

The Chinese Indonesian Muslim community has been active again in recent years. The presence of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia is not new; there were Chinese Muslims prior to the coming of Cheng Ho (also spelled as Zheng He), a Muslim admiral during the Ming Dynasty, to Indonesia and the Chinese Muslim community was boosted in size with his visit (1405–33) but those Muslims who came then had been largely assimilated and merged into the local population. The present Chinese Muslims are relatively newer; some of them are new converts during the Suharto era and after. This chapter attempts to briefly examine the Muslim Chinese in Indonesia in terms of their origins and developments with special reference to the post-independence development. The chapter would also address the issue of Chinese-ness and Indonesian-ness among the Chinese Muslim communities.

Pre-Colonial Era

Prior to the arrival of Western colonialists, some Chinese Muslims had migrated to the Malay archipelagos. When Cheng Ho visited the areas which are now known as Indonesia, he discovered Chinese Muslim enclaves. Many argued that although Cheng Ho’s mission was not to spread Islam, but it is believed that as a Muslim, he was involved in spreading the religion. In addition to Chinese temples, he built many mosques. More researches in the spread of Islam in the Malay archipelagos during the Cheng Ho period are needed, but it is interesting to note that they are many Islamic legacies attributed to Admiral Cheng Ho. From historical records such as Lidai Bao’an (Ryukyu Kingdoms Records) and also Raffles’ History of Java, it was reported that some Chinese Muslims were engaged in spreading Islam in Sumatra and Java. The rise of Islamic kingdoms in Java has also been attributed to Chinese Muslims. Although some Muslim scholars doubted this as a historical fact, the historical legacies, including the architecture of mosques and Muslim tombs, and local legends pointed to the influence of China and the Chinese in Java. Many Chinese Muslims gradually integrated into local society and disappeared, and new Chinese migrants were mainly non-Muslims, giving rise to a different type of Chinese community. Nevertheless, there were still Chinese Muslim enclaves in Indonesia even after the coming of the Dutch.

Introduction

Using the various “determinants” discussed above as a backdrop, this chapter examines Indonesia’s foreign policy before Suharto came to power. What was its nature? What were the major issues? Who made the policies? A brief study of Indonesia’s foreign policy before the New Order is important because Suharto’s foreign policy, to a certain extent, has shown continuity with that of Sukarno.

Various factors which have been identified in the previous chapter, such as leaders’ perceptions of Indonesia’s territory and role, the dominant political culture and Indonesia’s capabilities, have affected Indonesia’s foreign policy throughout the period from the revolution to the Suharto era.

Pre-New Order policy can be divided into at least three periods: the revolutionary period (1945-1949), the Liberal Democracy Period (1950-1958), and the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965).

The Revolutionary Period (1945-1949)

Before considering Indonesia’s foreign policy during the revolutionary period, it is necessary to ask whether there was a foreign policy before December 1949. Some observers argue that, prior to that time, Indonesia was not an independent state because the Dutch had not transferred sovereignty. Accordingly, prior to 1949-1950, Indonesia did not have any foreign policy.

Indonesian nationalists argue that Indonesia was already a sovereign state when independence was declared. A state is defined in terms of independent government (a republic), clear boundaries (those of the Dutch East Indies, although before December 1949 the nationalists were not in full control) and a population (Indonesian peoples who lived in the Dutch East Indies). Moreover, when independence was proclaimed, the Republican Government was the only government because the Japanese had capitulated on 15 August 1945, and Allied troops only arrived a few weeks later. After mid-September, the Allied Forces led by the British intended to restore Dutch rule in Indonesia. Their actions brought them into physical conflict with Indonesians who were then struggling for their independence. Although the republic was initially confined to a limited area and was not recognized by all the major powers, it was recognized by some small states (in the Middle East) and by some major powers (the Soviet Union in 1948, before the Dutch transfer of sovereignty). Since Indonesia was already a state in 1945, its foreign policy also began in that year.

In any case, the fact remains that the Republicans were able to establish a foothold in Java and expand their influence.

Introduction

This chapter examines Indonesia’s policy towards China under Suharto. It explains why it took so long for Jakarta to normalize relations with Beijing and what obstacles arose in the process. What were the factors that contributed to the diplomatic breakthrough in 1989? What were the roles of the military and the President in this normalization process? Are there any issues which may affect the relations?

Sino-Indonesian Relations under Sukarno

It is a well-known fact that, during Sukarno’s time, Indonesia was on good terms with the PRC, especially in the mid-1960s when Indonesia, together with the PRC, attempted to set up the Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) headquartered in Jakarta. CONEFO was supposed to be a United Nations of poor countries because at the time, the PRC had not yet been admitted to the UN, and Indonesia had just left the organization. This did not mean, however, that all socio-political forces in Indonesia were in support of close Beijing-Jakarta relations. On the contrary, the army was worried about a Beijing-Jakarta axis but was not able to move Indonesia away from the PRC anti-colonialist coalition.

In the 1960s, prior to the emergence of the New Order, there were three political forces competing for influence in domestic politics. Communist influence continued to grow after the 1957 by-elections and the Army also gained in strength after crushing the 1958 regional rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The President, who was becoming more left-wing in his political orientation, initially attempted to balance the PKI against the Army and vice-versa, but gradually he moved closer to the PKI. Fearing the rise of the military, the PKI wanted to establish a Fifth Army under its control made up of peasants and workers. Sukarno lent his support to the idea and sent Omar Dhani, the chief of the Air Force, to negotiate with the PRC in the hopes of getting small weapons for the Fifth Force. Apparently, the President wanted to balance the army’s strength by aligning himself with the PKI and the Air Force.

This balance of power game came to a sudden end on 30 September 1965 when an alleged communist coup took place. Six generals were kidnapped and slain, but General Nasution escaped. General Suharto, who was the commander of the Strategic Unit in Jakarta, was not on the list.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I felt extremely honoured to be here today to share with you my thoughts on the prospects of the Peranakan community at the age of globalization. Being a Baba and Nyonya yourself, I am sure you are very concerned about the future of the Peranakan community. The word “Peranakan” is more commonly used in Bahasa Indonesia than in Bahasa Melayu. In the past, the terms “Baba and Nyonya” were commonly used to refer to the localized Chinese. However, Peranakan in fact includes all localized foreigners or their descendants. Thus, we have the Chinese Peranakans (Baba and Nyonya), Indian Peranakans (Chitty or Mamak-Indian Muslim), Portuguese Peranakans, and European Peranakans (Eurasian or Serani). Melaka is the home of the Peranakans in both Malaysia and Singapore and so it is not only appropriate and relevant but also historically significant for me to deal with this topic here. Although I am a Singaporean, and not a Baba myself, in the past decades I have business concerns in Melaka and frequently visited Melaka. Thus, I am virtually a local Melakan, living at the centre of the old town and have witnessed the change that has taken place in the past two decades.

I would like to begin by giving you a few significant glimpses into the history of the Chinese diaspora as well as the eventual development of the Peranakan community in Melaka so as to set the tone of proper historical perspective. The Chinese have been migrating southward from China to Southeast Asia for centuries, driven from their homeland by economic necessity, political disturbance, flood and drought. Chinese diaspora outside China are generally addressed as Tang Ren (Teng Lang, 唐人) because since the seventh century in the Tang dynasty, Chinese mariners and traders were engaging in considerable international maritime trade, travelling as far afield as East Africa through the Straits of Melaka. They actually went to mainland Southeast Asia as early as the Qin dynasty and were addressed as Qin Ren (秦人). However, they were merely sojourners before the fourteenth century.

Cheng Ho’s (Zheng He, 郑和) historic seven voyages to the western ocean in the early fifteenth century marked the first wave of Chinese migration to Southeast Asia. Cheng Ho discovered the presence of Chinese settlements in Island Southeast Asia.

Introduction

Since the last decades, there has been a resurgence of interest in Peranakan Chinese culture in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia as witnessed by the opening of a Peranakan museum and the making of a popular TV series “Little Nyonya” (xiao niang re 小娘惹), both in Singapore; the republication of pre-war Peranakan literature, the exhibition of Peranakan furniture, and the publication of a Peranakan pictorial book, all in Jakarta, the establishment of the Benteng Heritage Museum in Banten, West Java; and seminars on Peranakan Chinese and the renovation of Peranakan houses in Malacca, Malaysia. Although the resurgence is still rather weak, yet it has been noticeable.

This chapter examines the Peranakan Chinese culture with special reference to their literature in the above three countries, their developments, their similarities and differences, and their future development. By Peranakan Chinese literature, I mean the literature in Malay/Indonesian or Dutch/English produced by the Peranakan Chinese. It should be noted that this chapter does not mean to be comprehensive; rather, it aims to present the subject matter in a comparative perspective. Through a comparative study, we will be able to see different factors and conditions which result in the development of different literatures. I am fully aware that the topic is broad and complex, therefore I would like to treat this chapter as a preliminary survey rather than an in-depth study.

Publications in Peranakan Malay: Pre-Independence

The Peranakan Chinese elite in colonial IMS were either Dutch-educated or English-educated, but Peranakan Malay was used as the medium of communication with the Peranakan masses. It is not surprising that in IMS, Peranakan publications are divided into Malay and Dutch/English versions and those in Malay are the largest in number. Some publications use two languages (i.e. Malay and Dutch, or Malay and English), but the Malay portion is often larger than the foreign language section.

Let us look at the publications in colonial Indonesia (known as Dutch East Indies) and British Malaya and Singapore.

Colonial Indonesia

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, with the rise of Chinese cultural nationalism in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, the Peranakan began to translate Chinese popular stories into the language that they are familiar with: Malay.

Introduction

Indonesia and Vietnam share a common historical experience in that these two Southeast Asian countries achieved their independence through revolution, and the leaders of each country have emphasized this point from time to time. They have even argued that this common experience has formed the basis of Indonesia-Vietnam relations. How true is this assertion? What is the nature of their relations? Has Communist ideology been a major factor in the relations between Communist Vietnam and anti-Communist Indonesia? What has really determined bilateral ties? What has been the role of Suharto in Indonesia’s policy towards Vietnam? And last but not least, what are the prospects for the future?

Origins of Relations

Indonesia has had informal contacts with Vietnam since the 1940s. Diplomatic ties between Jakarta and Hanoi were only established after the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung. Jakarta set up a Consulate-General in Hanoi in December 1955, three months after it had established a Consulate-General in Saigon. This policy of equidistance to the two Vietnams was abandoned during the Sukarno period when revolutionary fervour was rising and Indonesia’s foreign policy was moving towards the left.

In 1959, Ho Chi Minh was invited to visit Indonesia and was given an honorary degree by a regional Indonesian university. In the same year, Sukarno returned the visit. When the Vietnam war escalated, members of the Indonesian elite, many of whom had been involved in the anti-colonial movement, sympathized with the North Vietnamese. Many of them saw the South Vietnamese as American puppets. On 10 August 1964, Sukarno finally decided to upgrade diplomatic relations between Jakarta and Hanoi from consulate to ambassadorial level. This led to the suspension of diplomatic ties between Jakarta and Saigon, and the Indonesian consulate in Saigon was closed. Soon after, Indonesia decided to recognize the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSV) and allowed the establishment of its representative office in Jakarta. Indonesian relations with Communist states, including North Vietnam, became much closer. Together with the PRC, they formed what was known as the Jakarta-Hanoi-Phnom Penh-Beijing-Pyongyang axis. This was the so-called honeymoon period, not only between Indonesia and the PRC, but also between Indonesia and North Vietnam.

Introduction

This chapter examines Indonesia’s role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Forum. In the first part, the following questions on NAM are asked: How important is NAM to Suharto’s Indonesia? Why has Indonesia been interested in becoming the Chairman of the NAM conference? What has been done by Indonesian leaders to achieve this objective? Have they been successful? In the second part, another set of questions are posed: What has been the importance of APEC to Suharto’s Indonesia? Why did Suharto change his mind on APEC? Was it for economic reasons or political reasons, or both? Is it the way for Suharto to project Indonesia’s international leadership position?

The Non-Aligned Movement

Origins of NAM

Indonesia perceives itself as one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, and it wants to be recognized as such. Not surprisingly, Indonesia has tried very hard in recent years to secure the chairmanship of the NAM conference.

In most Indonesian publications on the subject of Indonesian foreign policy, the Non-Aligned Movement has been considered to have originated at the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference, also known as the Bandung Conference. The Bandung Principles, or Dasasila Bandung, are believed to be the basis of the NAM principles. In fact, the first conference of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, and Abdul Nasser of Egypt are always linked with the Movement and the countries that they represented have, in turn, chaired the Movement. Indonesia was always left out.

The first Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement was attended by 28 countries which had expressed concern over tensions in the international arena, especially relations between the two superpowers. The conference participants wished the superpowers to refrain from using military means to solve their differences and stated that they did not wish to be aligned with either superpower. The non-aligned countries would be willing to work with any country to achieve world peace. Although Indonesia was one of the participants in this conference, its role was not conspicuous.

The second NAM Conference was held in Cairo in 1964. At this conference, there was a conflict of interest between India and Indonesia. India was in favour of peaceful co-existence of countries with different political systems while Indonesia advocated confrontation between the New Emerging Forces (Nefos) and the Old Established Forces (Oldefos).