5 results
ISIS in Indonesia (2015)
- from INDONESIA
- Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
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- Book:
- Turning Points and Transitions
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 29 May 2019
- Print publication:
- 21 November 2018, pp 353-360
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Summary
A steep decline in terrorist acts in Indonesia in 2014 should have been good news, especially because it underscored that police vigilance was high and extremist capacity was weak. But a third factor was also involved that was not such good news: more extremists were focused on getting to Syria and joining what they believed was a more important jihad than any they could wage at home. By late 2014, about 100 Indonesians, possibly more, were believed to have left to fight in Syria, some with their wives and children, and most to join the Islamic State.
Violent Extremists in Indonesia in 2014
By early 2014, Indonesia's jihadist community was divided between those who supported violence inside Indonesia, with the police as the primary target, and those who believed that at least for the moment, violence at home was counter-productive. The former generally supported the Islamic State and its predecessor, the Islamic State in Greater Syria and Iraq (ISIS). The latter were more likely to support IS's main rival in Syria, the al-Nusra Front, and its allies.
Prominent in the first group was Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), a group of some thirty armed men led by Santoso alias Abu Wardah in the hills outside Poso, Central Sulawesi. Santoso had run a series of military-style training camps in Poso beginning in 2011, and graduates and supporters are now scattered across Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB). Despite being effectively under police siege during the year in his jungle camp, Santoso managed to smuggle out videos periodically to YouTube and radical websites. While neither he nor any other group managed any bombings in 2014, the few attacks on police during the year were all linked to MIT. Santoso was the first Indonesian to publicly pledge loyalty to the Islamic State after its leader, Abubakar al-Baghdadi, announced the establishment of the new caliphate on 29 June 2014 (1 Ramadan).
The pro-violence group also included remnants of Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB), many members of which had previous ties to an old Darul Islam network led by the now-imprisoned Abdullah Umar. It included some but not all members of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's organization, Jamaah Anshorul Tauhid (JAT), and many followers of the imprisoned cleric Aman Abdurrahman who had no specific organizational affiliation.
7 - Law Enforcement, Prevention, and Deradicalization: How SBY Handled Terrorism
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- By Solahudin, researcher at the Indonesia Strategic Policy Institute (ISPI), Jakarta.
- Edited by Siwage Dharma Negara, Deasy Simandjuntak, Ulla Fionna
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- Book:
- Aspirations with Limitations
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 08 June 2019
- Print publication:
- 29 June 2018, pp 136-152
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Summary
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) had to confront a series of terrorist attacks while in office. He built on his experience as coordinating minister for political, legal, and security affairs in the Megawati government (2001–4), when he had to deal with the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta. In his ten years as president (2004–14), Indonesia continued to be plagued by a network of terrorist cells, but the risk of high-casualty attacks receded over time. The SBY government succeeded in managing but not eradicating the terrorism threat, and the decline of terrorist capacity was due to many factors other than government policy. In general, his government did better at rounding up perpetrators once they had committed violence than in preventing radicalization or “immunizing” communities against extremist ideology. This was in part because the police became skilled in crime scene investigation and using sophisticated equipment to track down known suspects. This reactive “hard approach” is almost by definition easier than a proactive “soft approach” of trying to tackle the problem at its roots. But it was also because once an attack had taken place, there was near universal political support for arresting those responsible. Prevention strategies aimed at extremist discussion groups or social media were much more sensitive, and SBY had little appetite for political confrontation. The result was that over his two terms in office, while several hundred suspected terrorists were arrested and over ninety killed in police operations, almost no progress was made on prevention and deradicalization. One consequence was that as a new threat appeared late in SBY's second term in the form of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terror group, the government had few good tools or people in place to address it.
The 2002 Bali Bombings: How Counterterrorism Efforts Began
On Saturday night, 12 October 2002, a one-tonne bomb exploded in two clubs, Sari Club and Paddy's Café. The two clubs, the most popular in the area of Legian, Bali, were totally destroyed. Cars and other vehicles in the area were turned into charred ruins. Windows throughout Legian were shattered and the roofs of cafes and homes flew off. In all, 202 people lost their lives and more than 300 were wounded.
ISIS in Indonesia
- from INDONESIA
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- By Sidney Jones, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), Jakarta, Indonesia, Solahudin
- Edited by Daljit Singh
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2015
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 19 May 2017
- Print publication:
- 19 May 2015, pp 154-164
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Summary
A steep decline in terrorist acts in Indonesia in 2014 should have been good news, especially because it underscored that police vigilance was high and extremist capacity was weak. But a third factor was also involved that was not such good news: more extremists were focused on getting to Syria and joining what they believed was a more important jihad than any they could wage at home. By late 2014, about 100 Indonesians, possibly more, were believed to have left to fight in Syria, some with their wives and children, and most to join the Islamic State.
Violent Extremists in Indonesia in 2014
By early 2014, Indonesia's jihadist community was divided between those who supported violence inside Indonesia, with the police as the primary target, and those who believed that at least for the moment, violence at home was counterproductive. The former generally supported the Islamic State and its predecessor, the Islamic State in Greater Syria and Iraq (ISIS). The latter were more likely to support IS's main rival in Syria, the al-Nusra Front, and its allies.
Prominent in the first group was Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), a group of some thirty armed men led by Santoso alias Abu Wardah in the hills outside Poso, Central Sulawesi. Santoso had run a series of military-style training camps in Poso beginning in 2011, and graduates and supporters are now scattered across Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB). Despite being effectively under police siege during the year in his jungle camp, Santoso managed to smuggle out videos periodically to YouTube and radical websites. While neither he nor any other group managed any bombings in 2014, the few attacks on police during the year were all linked to MIT. Santoso was the first Indonesian to publicly pledge loyalty to the Islamic State after its leader, Abubakar al-Baghdadi, announced the establishment of the new caliphate on 29 June 2014 (1 Ramadan).
The pro-violence group also included remnants of Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB), many members of which had previous ties to an old Darul Islam network led by the now-imprisoned Abdullah Umar. It included some but not all members of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's organization, Jamaah Anshorul Tauhid (JAT), and many followers of the imprisoned cleric Aman Abdurrahman who had no specific organizational affiliation.
Terrorism in Indonesia: A Fading Threat?
- from INDONESIA
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- By Sidney Jones, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), Jakarta, Indonesia, Solahudin, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), Jakarta, Indonesia
- Edited by Daljit Singh
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2014
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 19 May 2017
- Print publication:
- 03 June 2014, pp 139-148
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Summary
Violent extremism in Indonesia continued to be low-tech and low-casualty, but groups continued to proliferate from Sumatra to Sumbawa, and there seemed to be an inexhaustible supply of recruits. The typical terrorist suspect was not a mass killer with global ambitions; he was more likely to be one step up from a petty criminal whose efforts to make simple pipe bombs almost always failed. There were no women among the 66 arrested and 21 suspects killed during 2013. One attempted suicide bombing killed only the bomber. Guns were in high demand, used for fund-raising robberies and revenge attacks on police — terrorists managed to kill three officers, down from eight in 2012. While police continued to be the primary target, several plots were hatched, all unsuccessful, to avenge attacks on Muslims in Myanmar. Despite the generally low capacity of wouldbe terrorists, however, concerns were mounting that three factors could lead to new enthusiasm for jihad at home: anger over deaths of suspects in police operations; releases from prison of convicted extremists; and the return of Indonesian fighters from Syria.
Most of the Islamist violence during the year was attributable to two networks, the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT), based in Poso, Central Sulawesi, and the Mujahidin of Western Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Barat, MIB), based in greater Jakarta and West Java. Both were alliances that included splinter groups of Darul Islam, the venerable sixty-five-year-old Islamic insurgency, and defectors from JAT, but the two were not formally linked. At year's end, MIT was still alive, if besieged; MIB had been largely crushed. The once-feared Jemaah Islamiyah, which since 2007 had disengaged from violence in Indonesia, was reburnishing its reputation as a jihadi organization through its channels to Syrian Islamist rebels.
In addition to Islamist groups, a tiny but growing anarchist movement with international links launched a number of arson attacks across the country from Jakarta to Aceh to South Kalimantan. The media paid no attention, much to the chagrin of those involved.
Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia
MIT, led by Santoso alias Abu Wardah, a former member of JI's affiliate in Poso, grew out of a JAT military cell in Central Sulawesi that was formed in 2010 in the aftermath of the break-up by police of a militant training camp in Aceh.
17 - The political impact of carving up Papua
- from PART 5 - CHALLENGES FOR INDONESIA'S PERIPHERY
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- By Cillian Nolan, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Jakarta, Sidney Jones, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Jakarta, Solahudin, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Jakarta
- Edited by Hal Hill
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- Book:
- Regional Dynamics in a Decentralized Indonesia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 20 May 2014, pp 409-432
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Summary
INTRODUCTION
Administrative fragmentation, through the process known as pemekaran, is transforming political dynamics in Papua, strengthening clan identities, generating a new assertiveness among elected Papuan officials and nurturing new conflicts. Papua has undergone greater administrative division than any other area of Indonesia. What in 1999 was a single province with 10 subprovincial districts or municipalities (kabupaten/ kota) has become two provinces, Papua and West Papua, with 42 districts and municipalities, and further new units in process – all of this taking place in one of the poorest and most violence-wracked regions of Indonesia.
Papua is historically and culturally different from the rest of Indonesia. Whereas the rest of the former Dutch East Indies secured independence in 1949, the western half of the island of New Guinea was incorporated into Indonesia only in 1969 following a controversial United Nations-supervised referendum. It has been home to an active independence movement ever since. It is culturally Melanesian, not Malay, and it has over 200 indigenous ethnic groups. In addition, a large migrant population from the rest of Indonesia has grown up over the last several decades, including migrants from both Java and elsewhere as part of an official resettlement program during the 1970s and 1980s, as well as many others who came on their own to trade or to take jobs in the civil service. In 2001, the Indonesian government granted Papua ‘special autonomy’ in the hope that this would weaken the independence movement, but whatever good will might have emerged from this initiative was destroyed two years later when, without consultation, the government divided the province first into three, then back into two, provinces. In the decade since special autonomy came into force, there has been limited progress on devolving political powers that would be significantly greater than those enjoyed by other Indonesian provinces; the main impact has been to flood Papua and West Papua with cash, much of which has disappeared through corruption. Both provinces remain at or near the bottom of the country's Human Development Index (HDI), despite huge wealth from various extractive industries and, increasingly, palm oil.
It is in this context that the ‘blossoming’ (pemekaran) of administrative units is taking place today, without any clear strategy or development logic, other than the tired refrain of ‘bringing government closer to the people’.