The chapter is split into two major sections, with the first addressing Russian linkages in Moldova and Ukraine. By supporting authoritarian-minded elites in these two states, Russia can help its chosen allies gain and consolidate power. While this notion of bolstering authoritarians is outside the focus of this book, how Russia goes about doing it and the lessons drawn are very much part of the learning process, and so are included here. The next section of the chapter analyses the internal networks in all four case studies that help with learning. The chapter argues that internal networks are crucial to learning and that Russia plays a key role in supporting authoritarian-minded elites in Moldova and Ukraine.

Much of the existing literature has addressed authoritarian learning from external examples but has failed to analyse internal examples. The chapter begins by analysing learning from China, Singapore, and Kazakhstan among the case studies, finding that China is a source of learning. Another example is the restrictive NGO laws that took off after the Russian foreign agents law across the post-Soviet region, which highlights copying at the very least, if not direct learning. The chapter then turns to the domestic, analysing Belarusian learning from the Soviet Union. The main point of interest in the chapter is that the Moldovan and Ukrainian regimes appear to learn from the internal, both in terms of failure and success. This is particularly the case regarding the examples of Plahotniuc and Poroshenko learning from previous regimes both belonged to. The chapter ends with a discussion of the importance of success and failure in authoritarian learning.

To give a clear understanding of authoritarian learning, the chapter provides a research design and methodology for better investigating authoritarian learning. Using the four cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine we analyse the different aspects of authoritarian learning. Methodologically we use process-tracing and interviews to investigate the nuances of authoritarian learning. While not all the four case studies can be classified as authoritarian regimes, there are periods of attempted authoritarian consolidation in each and there are some elites with authoritarian tendencies across the four cases studied. The chapter offers research questions that the rest of the book will investigate to better understand the distinctions of authoritarian learning

The internal aspect of learning is something that the existing literature has not investigated in detail. A range of examples are investigated in this chapter, with the first section addressing Belarusian and Russian learning from the Soviet Union. Then the chapter analyses how Putin learnt from his image failure after the sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine in the early 2000s. The Kursk sinking led to a significant change in image with Putin becoming a macho-man. The 2009 Moldovan Twitter Revolution led to learning after the protest on the part of the nominally pro-European government and the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan provided learning opportunities for Ukrainian governments. The chapter then addresses sub-optimal legislation in Belarus and Russia and potential learning from the failure. Learning from failure has not been investigated too much in the existing literature and this chapter addresses the issue.

The chapter sets out to explain what is meant by authoritarian learning. It starts by defining authoritarianism, learning and authoritarian learning before detailing the research findings that it is under-theorised, that it is less hierarchical then widely considered in the literature, that the intra-state level is as crucial to learning as the inter-state level, that regional organisations are important, and that authoritarian learning is more than the spread of ideas. Rather, learning between authoritarian-minded elites is direct, with regular dialogue to develop best survival practices to consolidate power. Authoritarian learning theoretically incorporates experiential and social learning and integrates diffusion, emulation, linkage, policy-transfer, and lesson-drawing. Having addressed the theoretical aspects of authoritarian learning, we address the external and internal networks of authoritarian learning. The chapter ends by providing a plan for the book.

Existing literature has concentrated on analysing the inter-state level regarding authoritarian learning, but this chapter investigates the role of post-Soviet regional organisations in authoritarian learning. The chapter analyses the four post-Soviet regional organisations of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the Union State between Belarus and Russia. While strictly speaking the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is not solely a post-Soviet organisation, it is analysed here as all members – except China – are states within the post-Soviet space. Regional organisations provide ‘learning rooms’, for sharing best practices and providing training exercises to produce an effective palette for consolidating power.

The chapter addresses examples of learning from external failure, firstly ascertaining Chinese learning from the collapse of the Soviet Union. It then addresses case learning from three revolutions: the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan in Ukraine and the Arab Spring from across the North African and Middle East region. The three protests led to learning on the part of Belarus and Russia in particular. The Orange Revolution directly contributed to preventive counter-revolutions in Belarus and Russia. The collapse of authoritarian regimes across the Middle East and North Africa led to rapid learning from Belarus and Russia. The Euromaidan saw clear learning from Belarus and Russia, but also from Moldova. However, evidence of Moldovan learning is limited, and the chapter highlights that external learning is limited regarding Moldova and Ukraine.

Authoritarian learning is a concept that does not merely occur at the highest levels of government. Rather, those involved in the actual learning tend to be personnel further down the state hierarchy. This chapter analyses which state institutions are involved in learning. While information is difficult to obtain, there are pointers in the chapter to the notion that lower-level personnel are the main protagonists when it comes to learning. While there are several institutions involved in learning, there are differences in the number engaged in learning from external and internal examples

This final chapter brings the analysis together, highlighting the findings of the book once again. Authoritarian learning is not as vertical as widely considered in the literature, with Russia playing less of a role in the processes of learning than previously considered. Another key finding is that there are clear instances of dialogue in this type of learning. This points to – at the very least – a strong form of diffusion that provides for regular contact, dialogue and sharing of best practices for consolidation. A final key finding is the importance of post-Soviet regional organisations in providing learning opportunities and chances for sharing best practices. Therefore, these organisations are crucial for learning. The chapter ends by developing some policy recommendations for coping – and countering – the likely continuation and growth in the number of authoritarian regimes in the coming years.