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The turn of the nineteenth century is widely seen in histories of international law as a watershed moment, when the naturalism of the eighteenth century paved the way for legal positivism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Intellectual historians and legal theorists have generally hailed Vattel as the truly decisive break from the earlier tradition of jurisprudence associated with Gentili and Grotius. The natural law framework of his predecessors relied on universally recognizable principles based in reason, whereas Vattel’s emphasis on consent and voluntarism oriented ‘international law … on its positivist career’ and infused it with ‘wholesome realism.’
Edited by
Jacco Bomhoff, London School of Economics and Political Science,David Dyzenhaus, University of Toronto,Thomas Poole, London School of Economics and Political Science
Theodore Christov traces Hobbes’s own thought on the nature of the sovereign state within the international sphere and disassociates him from such a common assumption. He argues that the domestic constitution of the Hobbesian sovereign is the precondition for the emergence of an international legal framework based on the consent of voluntary states and informed by their practice of the law of nations. The possibility for international legal compliance can be ensured only when states configure their domestic constitutions not as independently sovereign but as interdependently sovereign.