In exile in a remote and desolate place, Nestorius was still bitter about the Council of Ephesus (AD 431) some twenty years after the event. He remembered it as a travesty of a tribunal: ‘I was summoned by Cyril, who had assembled the Council […]. Who was judge? Cyril. Who was the accuser? Cyril. […]. Cyril was everything.’ In view of his condemnation, and in identifying Cyril’s activities on the occasion with roles usually played out in a court case, Nestorius recognized the basic pattern of proceedings of the council as that of a trial. Yet, in taking over all the major roles in such a trial simultaneously, Cyril had made a mockery of all proper judicial procedure. Minimum standards of proper procedure had been violated, and Nestorius, in his outburst against Cyril’s misconduct, expects his audience to recognize the fact and share his expectations of due process. However, his frustration with the council runs deeper than a mere dispute over correct procedure. Nestorius is even more deeply angered by the apparent lack of proper examination of his theology. Even if he is not explicit on the point, it seems obvious that he had expected the council to be something altogether different from a trial, something more closely resembling a philosophical dialogue or substantive doctrinal debate. In fact, the emperor’s letter of invitation had expressed a similar expectation, in that it had called for an open-ended discussion of theological difficulties and admonished the participants of the council to aim for an amicable consensus.
