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The sensitivity principle is a compelling idea in epistemology and is typically characterized as a necessary condition for knowledge. This collection of thirteen new essays constitutes a state-of-the-art discussion of this important principle. Some of the essays build on and strengthen sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge and offer novel defences of those accounts. Others present original objections to sensitivity-based accounts (objections that must be taken seriously even by those who defend enhanced versions of sensitivity) and offer comprehensive analysis and discussion of sensitivity's virtues and problems. The resulting collection will stimulate new debate about the sensitivity principle and will be of great interest and value to scholars and advanced students of epistemology.
This chapter gives a brief overview of The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, which presents state-of-the-art thinking about a very simple and intuitively compelling idea in epistemology. The book sparks renewed interest in sensitivity, perhaps restoring it to the throne of principles in externalist epistemology. Given the resilience of sensitivity, those who wish to reject sensitivity theories will try to uncover criticisms in addition to the several counterexamples that have been proposed and to the allegation that sensitivity forces us to deny closure. In this book, three prominent epistemologists, Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Jonathan Vogel, and Peter Klein, offer novel criticisms of sensitivity theories or steer extant criticisms in new and different directions. The book comprises essays defending the relative merits of safety over sensitivity. The book also includes a critical commentary by Anthony Brueckner on Sherrilyn Roush's (2005) Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science.
This chapter shows that explanationist counterfactualism (EC) is not threatened by objections like those leveled by Sosa, Saul Kripke, and Williamson. It is reported that Kripke offers a case like the following: Henry, still out on his drive, believes that there is a red barn before him. Besides handling the cases put forth by Sosa, Kripke, and Williamson, the chapter's proposal has another virtue: it clarifies and helps bring into focus the recent literature on skepticism. One would need to do more in order to determine whether (EC)'s explanatory condition includes demands that concern belief- forming methods and perceptual equivalence. it might very well be that we need to identify and examine other demands of that condition. EC pays real dividends in helping us focus our attention on key elements in the skeptical debate, elements that might help us finally to put an end to that debate.
There are two competing ways of understanding the anti-luck condition in the contemporary literature. Call the safety principle the claim that knowledge entails safe belief, and call the sensitivity principle the claim that knowledge entails sensitive belief. Modest anti-luck epistemology merely endorses the safety principle and hence argues that safety is a key necessary condition for knowledge. A range of putative counterexamples have been put forward to the idea that knowledge entails safety, and thus to the view that we are here characterizing as modest anti-luck epistemology. This chapter argues for three main claims. First, that safety offers the best rendering of the anti-luck condition. Second, that safety is merely necessary, and not sufficient for knowledge. Third, that the main counterexamples offered to the necessity of safety and thus to modest anti-luck epistemology, do not hit their target.
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