Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-cfpbc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T15:29:02.879Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Popular Referendum and Electoral Accountability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2016

Patrick Le Bihan
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper studies how citizen-initiated referenda affect the decision-making of elected representatives. In the absence of direct democracy, elected officials who do not share the preferences of voters may enact their preferred policies even at the cost of decreasing the likelihood of reelection. Direct democracy diminishes the policy benefits of doing that, as voters may now overturn some of the policy decisions. Hence, elected officials are induced to implement the policies preferred by the voters not only on those issues that are subject to a possible citizen-initiated referendum, but also on those that are not. This result holds even when the voters’ information about their true interests is limited. Moreover, whereas in a representative democracy, being more informed may undermine voters’ ability to control public officials, the possibility of citizen-initiated referenda means that additional information improves voter control, including on issues that may be outside the direct democracy domain.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , October 2018 , pp. 715 - 731
Copyright
© The European Political Science Association 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Patrick Le Bihan is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Sciences Po, Centre de recherches politiques (CEVIPOF), CNRS, 75007 Paris (patrick.lebihan@sciencespo.fr). The author thanks Eric Dickson, Wioletta Dziuda, Jean-Guillaume Forand, Cathy Hafer, Simon Hug, Roger Myerson, Howard Rosenthal, Mike Ting and seminar audiences at the IAST, the LSE, NYU, the University of Chicago, and UCSD for helpful comments and suggestions. The author is especially grateful to Dimitri Landa for his support with this project. Support through ANR-Labex IAST is gratefully acknowledged. To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2016.41

References

Aguiar-Conraria, Luís, and Magalhães, Pedro C.. 2010. ‘How Quorum Rules Distort Referendum Outcomes: Evidence from a Pivotal Voter Model’. European Journal of Political Economy 26(4):541–557.Google Scholar
Ashworth, Scott, and Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2006. ‘Delivering the Goods: Legislative Particularism in Different Electoral and Institutional Settings’. Journal of Politics 68(1):168–179.Google Scholar
Ashworth, Scott, and Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2015. ‘Unified vs. Divided Political Authority’. Constitutional Design and the Scope of Authority, Becker Friedman Institute, University of Chicago, 2013.Google Scholar
Ashworth, Scott, and Shotts, Kenneth W.. 2010. ‘Does Informative Media Commentary Reduce Politicians’ Incentives to Pander?’. Journal of Public Economics 94(11–12):838–847.Google Scholar
Bali, Valentina A., and Davis, Belinda C.. 2007. ‘One More Piece to Make Us Puzzle’. Political Research Quarterly 60(2):215–229.Google Scholar
Besley, Timothy. 2006. Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Besley, Timothy, and Coate, Stephen. 2008. ‘Issue Unbundling Via Citizens’ Initiatives’. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3(4):379–397.Google Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, and Landa, Dimitri. 2015. ‘Political Accountability and Sequential Policymaking’. Journal of Public Economics 132:95–108.Google Scholar
Butler, David, and Ranney, Austin (eds) 1994. Referendums Around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy. Washington, DC: Aei Press.Google Scholar
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Herron, Michael C., and Shotts, Kenneth W.. 2001. ‘Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking’. American Journal of Political Science 45(3):532–550.Google Scholar
Cho, In-Koo, and Kreps, David M.. 1987. ‘Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(2):179–221.Google Scholar
Dyck, Joshua J. 2009. ‘Initiated Distrust: Direct Democracy and Trust in Government’. American Politics Research 37:539–568.Google Scholar
Feld, Lars P., and Matsusaka, John G.. 2003. ‘Budget Referendums and Government Spending: Evidence from Swiss Cantons’. Journal of Public Economics 87(12):2703–2724.Google Scholar
Ferejohn, John. 1986. ‘Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control’. Public Choice 50(1/3):5–25.Google Scholar
Fox, Justin, and Stephenson, Matthew C.. 2011. ‘Judicial Review as a Response to Political Posturing’. American Political Science Review 105(2):397–414.Google Scholar
Gehlbach, Scott. 2006. ‘Electoral Institutions and the National Provision of Local Public Goods’. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2(1):5–25.Google Scholar
Gerber, Elisabeth R. 1996. ‘Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives’. American Journal of Political Science 40(1):99–128.Google Scholar
Gerber, Elisabeth R. 1999. The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Gordon, Sanford C., and Landa, Dimitri. 2009. ‘Do the Advantages of Incumbency Advantage Incumbents?’. The Journal of Politics 71(4):1481–1498.Google Scholar
Gordon, Sanford C., Huber, Gregory A., and Landa, Dimitri. 2007. ‘Challenger Entry and Voter Learning’. American Political Science Review 101(2):303–320.Google Scholar
Hobolt, Sara. 2009. Europe in Question: Referendums on European Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hug, Simon. 2004. ‘Occurrence and Policy Consequences of Referendums’. Journal of Theoretical Politics 16(3):321–356.Google Scholar
Kelleher, Christine A., and Wolak, Jennifer. 2007. ‘Explaining Public Confidence in the Branches of State Government’. Political Research Quarterly 60(4):707–721.Google Scholar
Leeman, Lucas, and Wasserfallen, Fabio. Forthcoming. ‘The Democratic Effect of Direct Democracy’. American Political Science Review.Google Scholar
Lohmann, Susanne. 1998. ‘An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests’. American Political Science Review 92(4):809–827.Google Scholar
Maniquet, Frangois, and Morelli, Massimo. 2015. ‘Approval Quorums Dominate Participation Quorums’. Social Choice and Welfare 45(1):1–27.Google Scholar
Maskin, Eric, and Tirole, Jean. 2004. ‘The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government’. The American Economic Review 94(4):1034–1054.Google Scholar
Matsusaka, John G. 1992. ‘Economics of Direct Legislation’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(2):541–571.Google Scholar
Matsusaka, John G. 2004. For the Many or the Few: The Initiative, Public Policy, and American Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Matsusaka, John G. 2010. ‘Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach’. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 5(2):133–167.Google Scholar
Matsusaka, John G., and McCarty, Nolan M.. 2001. ‘Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives’. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17(2):413–448.Google Scholar
Persson, Torsten, Roland, Gerard, and Tabellini, Guido. 1997. ‘Separation of Powers and Political Accountability’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4):1163–1202.Google Scholar
Persson, Torsten, and Tabellini, Guido. 1994. ‘Representative Democracy and Capital Taxation’. Journal of Public Economics 55(1):53–70.Google Scholar
Persson, Torsten, and Tabellini, Guido. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
Prato, Carlo, and Strulovici, Bruno H.. Forthcoming. ‘The Hidden Cost of Direct Democracy: How Ballot Initiatives Affect Politicians’ Selection and Incentives’. Journal of Theoretical Politics.Google Scholar
Redoano, Michela, and Scharf, Kimberly A.. 2004. ‘The Political Economy of Policy Centralization: Direct Versus Representative Democracy’. Journal of Public Economics 88(3):799–817.Google Scholar
Uleri, Pier Vincenzo, and Gallagher, Michael (eds) 1996. The Referendum Experience in Europe. London: St. Martin’s Press.Google Scholar
Xefteris, Dimitrios. 2011. ‘Referenda as a Catch-22’. Social Choice and Welfare 37(1):121–138.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: PDF

Le Bihan supplementary material

Appendix

Download Le Bihan supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 322.4 KB
Supplementary material: File

Le Bihan supplementary material

Le Bihan supplementary material 2

Download Le Bihan supplementary material(File)
File 87.4 KB