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Kripke’s sole route to the necessary a posteriori

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Erin Eaker
Erin Eaker*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, 1118C Skinner Building, College Park, MD20740, USA
*
*Email: eeaker@umd.edu
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Abstract

In ‘Kripke on epistemic and metaphysical possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori’, Scott Soames identifies two arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths in Naming and Necessity (NN). He argues that Kripke’s second argument relies on either of two principles, each of which leads to contradiction. He also claims that it has led to ‘two-dimensionalist’ approaches to the necessary a posteriori which are fundamentally at odds with the insights about meaning and modality expressed in NN. I argue that the alleged second argument is not in NN. I identify the mistakes that lead to Soames’ misinterpretation.

Keywords

necessary a posterioriScott SoamesSaul KripkeNaming and Necessitytwo-dimensional semanticsepistemic possibilitymetaphysical possibilitydisquotation principle
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 3-4 , August 2014 , pp. 388 - 406
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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