1. Sørensen, M., ‘Autonomous Legal Orders: Some Considerations Relating to a Systems Analysis of International Organisations in the World Legal Order’, 32 ICLQ (1983) p. 559.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. See among many other contributions on this subject, the (diverging) views of Pliakos, A.D., ‘La nature juridique de l'Union européenne’, Revue trimestrielle du droit européen (1993) p. 187Google Scholar; Jacqué, J.P., ‘Cours général de droit communautaire’, in 1 Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (1990) pp. 257–265Google Scholar; Dagtoglou, P., ‘The Legal Nature of the European Community’, in Thirty Years of Community Law (1983) Ch. IIGoogle Scholar; Wyatt, D., ‘New Legal Order, or Old?’, EL Rev. (1982) p. 147Google Scholar; de Witte, B., ‘Retour à Costa. La primauté du droit communautaire à la lumière du droit international’, Revue trimestrielle du droit européen (1984) p. 425, at p. 446 et seq.Google Scholar

3. See for a recent formulation of this view, Boulouis, J., ‘Le droit des Communautés européennes dans ses rapports avec le droit international général’, 235 RCADI (1992-IV) p. 9, at p. 23.Google Scholar

4. See the view expressed by Jacqué, loc. cit. n. 2, p. 259: ‘l'essentiel pour analyser la Communauté ne réside pas dans l'origine de celle-ci, mais dans lefait que les rapports entre Etats membres échappent totalement au droit international pour relever du droit propre à la Communauté.’.

5. See also the article by Karel Wellens at p. 29 et seq.

6. Simma, B., ‘Self-Contained Regimes’, 16 NYIL (1985) p. 111, at p. 123CrossRefGoogle Scholar et seq. An even more sanguine view, excluding any residual role for remedies under general international law, was taken by Schwarze, J., ‘Das allgemeine Völkerrecht in den innergemeinschaftlichen Rechtsbeziehungen’, Europarecht (1983) p. 1, at p. 18 et seq.Google Scholar

7. For a recent restatement, see Boulouis, loc. cit. n. 3, Ch. III (p. 40 et seq.).

8. See the careful analysis by Tomuschat, C., ‘Völkerrechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche vor dem EuGH’, in Festschrift für Bodo Börner (1992) p. 441.Google Scholar

9. The most elaborate early analysis of this matter is by Lambers, H.J., ‘Les clauses de révision des traités instituant les Communautés Européennes’, AFDI (1961) p. 593.Google Scholar

10. Lord, McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961) at p. 534.Google Scholar

11. Oppenheim, L., International Law: A Treatise, Lauterpacht, H., ed., Vol. I, 8th edn. (1955).Google Scholar

12. These two terms will be treated, in this article, as interchangeable. Sometimes, ‘amendment’ is used to refer to changes of individual treaty provisions, whereas ‘revision’ is used for an overall review of the whole treaty (SirWaldock, H., ‘Report on the Law of Treaties’, ILC Yearbook 1964, Vol. II, at p. 48Google Scholar). Yet, it is difficult to make that distinction in practice, and there is no consistently distinct use of those terms in the literature.

13. Oppenheim, op. cit. n. 11, 8th edn., at pp. 937–938.

14. Jennings, R. and Watts, A., eds., Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. I, 9th edn. (1992) at pp. 1254–1257.Google Scholar

15. Grewe, W.G., ‘Treaties, Revision’, 7 EPIL (1984) p. 499, at p. 501.Google Scholar

16. See particularly the ‘general rule’ formulated in Art. 39 of the Convention: ‘A treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid down in Part II [that is, the rules on conclusion and entry into force of treaties …] apply to such an agreement except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide.’

17. Akehurst, M., ‘Treaties, Termination’, 7 EPIL (1984) p. 507, at p. 509.Google Scholar

18. Hoyt, E.C., The Unanimity Rule in the Revision of Treaties — A Re-Examination (1959).Google Scholar

19. Hoyt, op. cit. n. 18, p. 252.

20. Aust, A., ‘The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments’, 35 ICLQ (1986) p. 787, at p. 791.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21. One recent reinterpretation of customary international law animated by this concern for change and flexibility is offered by Charney, J., ‘Universal International Law’, 87 AJIL (1993) p. 529.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22. ‘Paradoxalement, la coutume, qui n'est régie par aucun formalisme, mais seulement par des prophètes (la doctrine) et des grands prêtres (les juridictions internationales et en particulier la CIJ) qui constatent et confirment son existence et son autorité, est devenue de nos jours un instrument beaucoup plus souple que le traité pour assurer l'évolution du droit.’ (Salmon, J., ‘Changements et droit international public’, Nouveaux itinéraires en droit. Hommage à François Rigaux (1993) p. 427, at p. 433).Google Scholar

23. In the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the term ‘modification’ is used for the case of an agreement concluded between certain of the parties only, and intended to vary provisions of the treaty between themselves alone, whereas the term ‘amendment’ is used for alterations with respect to all the parties (Reuter, P., Introduction to the Law of Treaties (1989) p. 105)Google Scholar. Yet, the distinction is not always clear-cut. In thepresent article, the term ‘modification’ will also occasionally be used as the general equivalent of ‘change’.

24. See Goesel, V., ‘Codification du droit international privé et droit des traités’, AFDI (1992) p. 358, at pp. 363–366.Google Scholar

25. See for example, Art. 32 of the Berne Copyright Convention, on which see Nordemann, W. et al. , International Copyright (1990) p. 188Google Scholar et seq.; and Ricketson, S., The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886–1986 (1987) p. 813 et seq.Google Scholar

26. Cf., the guarantees for third parties required, in such a case, by the Vienna Convention in its Art. 41(1)b.

27. Waldock, loc. cit. n. 12, at p. 49.

28. See in general, Simma, B., ‘Consent: Strains in the Treaty System’, in Macdonald, R.St.J. and Johnston, D.M., eds., The Structure and Process of International Law (1983) p. 485, at p. 494 et seq.Google Scholar

29. Ibid., p. 496.

30. Capotorti, F., ‘Sul valore della prassi applicativa dei trattati secondo la Convenzione di Vienna’, International Law at the Time of its Codification. Essays in Honour of Roberto Ago, vol. I (1987) p. 197.Google Scholar

31. A possible example is the alleged abrogation of the military clauses of the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy (see Ronzitti, N., ‘Demilitarization and Neutralization in the Mediterranean’, 4 Italian YIL (1985) p. 33, at pp. 36–38).Google Scholar

32. See Tavernier, P., ‘Article 27’, in Cot, J.P. and Pellet, A., eds., La Charte des Nations Unies — Commentaire article par article (1991) at p. 495Google Scholar et seq.; Stavropoulos, M., ‘The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members of the Security Council under Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations’, 61 AJIL (1967) p. 737CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Simma, B., ‘Art. 27’, in Simma, B., ed., Charta der Vereinten Nationen — Kommentar (1991) p. 396, at pp. 415–418.Google Scholar

33. ICJ Rep. (1971) p. 22.

34. Waldock, loc. cit. n. 12 at p. 48.

35. Examples are mentioned by Grewe, loc. cit. n. 15, at p. 502.

36. On this provision see Giraud, E., ‘La révision de la Charte des Nations Unies’, 90 RCADI (1956-II) p. 307Google Scholar; J. Dehaussy, ‘Article 108’ and ‘Article 109’, in Cot and Pellet, eds., op. cit. n. 32, pp. 1417 and 1433; K. Mützelburg, ‘Art. 108’ and ‘Art. 109’, in Simma, ed., op. cit. n. 32, pp. 1108 and 1124.

37. There have been some, rather minor, amendments to the Charter regarding the composition of its organs. They have been analysed by Schwelb, E., ‘Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter of the United Nations’, 59 AJIL (1965) p. 834CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, ‘The 1963–1965 Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations: An Addendum’, 60 AJIL (1966) p. 371Google Scholar; idem, ‘The 1971 Amendment to Article 61 of the United Nations Charter and the Arrangements Accompanying it’, 21 ICLQ (1972) p. 497.Google Scholar

38. Zacklin, R., The Amendment of the Constitutive Instruments of the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies (1968)Google Scholar; Schermers, H., International Institutional Law (1980) at p. 573 et seq.Google Scholar

39. Adopted on 22 March 1989.

40. See Morgenstern, F., Legal Problems of International Organizations (1986) at p. 112Google Scholar et seq. The Basel Convention on hazardous waste may, again, serve as an illustration. The Convention proper, the Protocols to the Convention, and the Annexes to either Convention or Protocols are subject to amendment rules that are (slightly) different for each of those categories. See Arts. 17 and 18 of the Convention.

41. One example is J.P. Jacqué's general course on Community law which starts precisely by emphasizing the dynamic nature of Community law (Jacqué, J.P., ‘Cours général de droit communautaire’, in 1 Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Book 1 (1991) p. 237Google Scholar. A full survey is provided by Bieber, R. and Ress, G., eds., Die Dynamik des Europarechts — The Dynamics of EC Law (1987).Google Scholar

42. This reference was located, before Maastricht, in the Preamble of the EEC Treaty.

43. The Euratom Treaty had an identical amendment provision, and the ECSC Treaty a very similar one. They will not be separately considered here.

44. See Cloos, J., Reinesch, G., Vignes, D., Weyland, J., Le traité de Maastricht. Genèse, analyse, commentaires (1993) at p. 131.Google Scholar

45. This link was made, in more general terms, by Schemers: ‘The constitutions of those organizations which interfere most directly with the legal order of their Members therefore require (at least) the unanimity of the Members for all amendments’ (op. cit. n. 38, at p. 571).

46. This issue is thoroughly discussed by Karl, W., Vertrag und spätere Praxis im Völkerrecht (1983) at p. 341 et seq.Google Scholar

47. Karl, op. cit. n. 46, at pp. 341–343.

48. Karl, op. cit. n. 46, at p. 341.

49. Lambers, loc. cit. n. 9, at p. 597.

50. de Zwaan, J.W., ‘The Single European Act: Conclusion ofa Unique Document’, CML Rev. (1986) p. 747, at p. 750Google Scholar; Masclet, J.C., L'union politique de l'Europe, 5th edn. (1993) at p. 91.Google Scholar

51. Lambers, loc. cit. n. 9, at p. 603.

52. Case 43/75 Defrenne [1976] ECR 480. The principle of equal pay for work of equal value, laid down in Art. 119 of the EEC treaty, had to be implemented by the end of the first stage of the ‘transitional period’, i.e., before 1 January 1962. On 30 December 1961, the Member States adopted a Resolution with an ‘action plan’, which in effect purported to delay full implementation of the equal pay principle. In the case of Mrs. Defrenne, the Court of Justice held that Art. 119 had direct effect since the end of 1961, and that the Resolution of December 1961 ‘was ineffective to make any valid modification of the time-limit fixed by the Treaty’ (para. 57 of the judgment). The Court then added: ‘In fact, apart from any specific provisions, the Treaty can only be modified by means of the amendment procedure carried out in accordance with Article 236’ (ibid.).

53. Case 68/86 UK v. Council [1988] ECR 855, at p. 898.

54. Louis, J. V., ‘Quelques considérations sur la révision des traités instituant les Communautés’, Cahiers de droit européen (1980) p. 553Google Scholar; Waelbroeck, M., ‘Article 236’, in Mégret, J. et al. , eds., 15 Le droit de la Communauté économique européenne (1987)Google Scholar; Everting, U., ‘Sind die Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft noch Herren der Verträge?’, in Festschrift Mosler (1983) p. 173Google Scholar; Schwarze, J., ‘Das allgemeine Völkerrecht in den innergemeinschaftlichen Rechtsbeziehungen’, Europarecht (1983) p. 1, at p. 14Google Scholar; Schermers, op. cit. n. 38, at p. 568; Jacqué, loc. cit. n. 41, at pp. 271–272; W. Meng, ‘Artikel 236’, in der Groeben, H. von, Thiesing, J. and Ehlermann, C.D., Kommentar des EWG-Vertrages (1991) p. 5834, at p. 5843.Google Scholar

55. See Art. L of the Treaty on European Union.

56. The Treaty of 27 October 1956 modifying the institutional rules of the ECSC Treaty as a consequence of the termination of the economic connection of Saarland with France; the Treaty of 25 March 1957 modifying the provisions of the ECSC Treaty on the Court of Justice and the Assembly so as to allow those institutions to be shared with the two newly created Communities, the EEC and Euratom.

57. See Isaac, G., Droit communautaire général, 3rd edn. (1992) at p. 114Google Scholar; Oppermann, T., Europarecht (1991) at p. 165.Google Scholar

58. The ECSC Treaty entered into force on 25 July 1952.

59. Lambers, loc. cit. n. 9, at p. 605.

60. Yet, they have come close to such an admission: the Council (which may be considered to be a good interpreter of Member States' views) expressed its agreement with the Court's position on the obligatory nature of Art. 236 in an answer to a question in the European Parliament (Written Question 398/77, Official Journal of the EC (1977) C 270/18).

61. ‘Certes, les institutions ne sont-elles pas écartées, mais leur rôle, sans devenir purement formel, cesse d'être à lui seul déterminant aux stades où il est prévu qu'il doit l'être’ (Boulouis, loc. cit. n. 3, at p. 33).

62. During the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, regular ‘inter-institutional conferences’ were held between the negotiating ministers and a delegation of the European Parliament that could thus receive up to date information and convey its views to the negotiators. Yet, the European Parliament could only exercise a small degree of influence on the outcome (S. Vanhoonacker, ‘The European Parliament and European Political Union’, in Laursen, F. and Vanhoonacker, S., The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union (1992) p. 215, at p. 219).Google Scholar

63. See the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 311, para. 6: ‘States Parties agree that there shall be no amendments to the basic principles relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth in article 136 and that they shall not be party to any agreement in derogation thereof.’

64. Barents, R., ‘The Court of Justice and the EEA-Agreement’, Rivista di diritto europeo (1992) p. 751, at p. 766Google Scholar. The same view is expressed, e.g., by da Cruz Vilaça, J.L. and Piçarra, N., ‘Ya-t-il des limites matérielles à la révision des traités instituant les Communautés européennes?’, Cahiers de droit européen (1993) p. 3Google Scholar: ‘(L)a Cour de justice a esquissé un tableau de référence concernant les limites matérielles implicites à la révision du traité.’

65. Da Cruz Vilaça and Piçarra, ioc. cit. n. 64; Bieber, R., ‘Les limites matérielles et formelles à la révision des traités établissant la Communauté européenne’, Revue du Marché commun et de l'Union européenne (1993) p. 343.Google Scholar

66. Da Cruz Vilaça and Piçarra, loc. cit. n. 64, at p. 33.

67. Bieber, loc. cit. n. 65, at p. 348.

68. See Kirchhof, P., ‘Die Identität der Verfassung in ihren unabänderlichen Inhalten’, in Isensee, J. and Kirchhof, P., eds., I Handbuch des Staatsrechts (1987) p. 775.Google Scholar

69. See the comparative survey by Häberle, P., ‘Verfassungsrechtliche Ewigkeitsklauseln als verfassungsstaatliche Identitätsgarantien’, in Völkerrecht im Dienste des Menschen. Festschrift für Hans Haug (1986) p. 81.Google Scholar

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71. Treaty on European Union, Art. N.

72. Everting, U., ‘Reflections on the Structure of the European Union’, 29 CML Rev. (1992) p. 1053, at p. 1066.Google Scholar

73. For further arguments pointing to this conclusion, see Heintzen, M., ‘Hierarchisierungsprozesse innerhalb des Primärrechts der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’, Europarecht (1994) p. 35.Google Scholar

74. W. Meng, ‘Artikel 237’, in von der Groeben, Thiesing and Ehlermann, eds., op. cit. n. 54, p. 5862, at p. 5898. Another argument offered by Meng in support of this conclusion is that all the procedural requirements for a revision in accordance with Art. 236 EEC Treaty (or Art. N EU Treaty) are also requirements for accession under Art. 237 EEC Treaty (or Art. O EU Treaty).

75. For a mathematical demonstration of this point, see Hosli, M.O., ‘Admission of European Free Trade Association States to the European Community: Effects on Voting Power in the European Community Council of Ministers’, 47 Int. Organization (1993) p. 629.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

76. Either one chooses to maintain the blocking minority at the same percentage of the votes (approximately 70%) by raising the numbers from 23 out of 76 to 27 out of 90 (which dilutes the capacity for the present Member States to block unpalatable decisions), or one chooses to keep the same absolute number of votes needed for a blocking minority at 23 (which makes decision-making more cumbersome than before). Either way, the balance of power within the Council is affected by the ‘adjustment’.

77. See the text of the Ioannina compromise, and a critical assessment, in ‘Editorial Comments’, CML Rev. (1994) p. 453.Google Scholar

78. See e.g., the views expressed by M. Duverger, MEP, in Le Monde (3 March 1994) (‘Surmonter l'obstruction des petits Etats’).

79. Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339.

80. Case C-70/88 Parliament v. Council (Chernobyl) [1990] ECR 1–2041; see Bradley, K., ‘Sense and Sensibility: Parliament v. Council Continued’, EL Rev. (1991) p. 245.Google Scholar

81. Arnull, A., ‘Judging the New Europe’, EL Rev. (1994) p. 3, at p. 8.Google Scholar

82. As translated by Tomuschat, C., ‘A United Germany within the European Community’, 27 CML Rev. (1990) p. 415, at p. 424.Google Scholar

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86. Hartley, T.C., ‘Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht Agreement’, 42 ICLQ (1993) p. 213, at p. 235CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Curtin, D. and van Ooik, R., ‘Denmark and the Edinburgh Summit: Maastricht without Tears’, in O'Keeffe, D. and Twomey, P.M., eds., Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (1994) p. 349, at pp. 354–356Google Scholar; Schuster, G., ‘Der Sonderstatus Dänemarks im Vertrag über die Europäische Union’, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (1993) p. 177, at p. 178.Google Scholar

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89. EC Treaty, Art. 109 J.

90. Art. 40, para. 4.

91. Art. 40, para. 1.

92. Resolution of the European Parliament of 14 February 1984. See the commentary by the four legal experts who had assisted the EP in writing the draft: Capotorti, F., Hilf, M., Jacobs, F. and Jacqué, J.P., The European Union Treaty (1986)Google Scholar. Further, the contributions in Bieber, R., Jacqué, J.P. and Weiler, J., eds., An Ever-Closer Union: A Critical Analysis of the Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union (1985).Google Scholar

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94. Art. 82 of the Draft Treaty on European Union.

95. Art. 84 of the Draft Treaty on European Union. Allowing for amendments of the Treaty by majority decision would have been inconsistent with the fact that important Union decisions continued to require, according to the Parliament's draft, the unanimous vote of the Council.

96. Whatever else may have been involved, the Draft Treaty on European Union also involved a revision of the EEC Treaty, and therefore the requirements of Art. 236 EEC Treaty (including the requirement of the ‘common accord’ of States) had to be respected. (See e.g., Lauwaars, R.H., ‘De Europese Unie: het ontwerp-Verdrag van het Europese Parlement en het rapport van het Comité-Dooge’, SEW 6 (1985) p. 398, at pp. 403–404).Google Scholar

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98. Weiler, J. and Modrall, J., ‘Institutional Reform: Consensus or Majority’, EL Rev. (1985) p. 316Google Scholar; Schwarze, J., ‘Mitgliedschaft in einer zukünftigen politischen Union’, Deutsches Venvaltungsblatt (1985) p. 309.Google Scholar

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100. See e.g., the demonstration by Rideau, J., ‘La ratification et l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Maastricht. Aspects internationaux’, 11 Revue française de droit constitutionnel (1992)p. 479.Google Scholar

101. It is interesting to note that the European Parliament was aware of this problem when adopting its 1984 Draft Treaty. The Draft provided that, if not all States decided to ratify the new Treaty, those who did would decide by common accord ‘on relations with the Member States which have not yet ratified’ (Art. 82 of the Draft Treaty), which seems to assume that the Union would have come into existence only after those relations had been adequately settled. There again, one could doubt whether such a ‘deal’ could ever cope with the many practical problems that would inevitably arise.

102. European Parliament, Resolution of 10 February 1994 on the Constitution of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities (1994) C 61/155.