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NIH Licensing Would Benefit from Free-Market Provisions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 March 2024

Robin Feldman Open the ORCID record for Robin Feldman [Opens in a new window]  and
Zachary Rosen
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Abstract

Government encouragement of free markets is a highly effective means of fostering pharmaceutical innovation; the NIH, by including “free-market provisions” in its licensing agreements that discourage anti-competitive and research-impeding behavior, can do a great deal to support this goal even without legislative overhaul.

Keywords

NIHPatentTrade SecretFree MarketGovernment Licensing
Type
Commentary
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 51 , Issue S2: Promoting Drug and Vaccine Innovation and Managing High Prices: Three Proposals for Policy Reform , Winter 2023 , pp. 24 - 27
Copyright
© 2023 The Author(s)

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