^{page 302 note 1} Hence the grand division in the law of restitution between “unjust enrichment by subtraction” and “unjust enrichment by a wrong”: Birks, Peter, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford, 1985), pp. 23–24, 39–44Google Scholar (hereinafter Introduction).

^{page 303 note 2} The maxim may, however, provide the rationale for the disgorgement of benefits acquired by criminal acts, such acts being wrongs of which the law takes an especially censorious view: see Fry, L. J. in Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association [1892] 1 Q. B. 147 at p. 156Google Scholar, and generally Lord Goff of Chieveley and Jones, G., The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed. (London, 1986), pp. 624–631Google Scholar. (hereinafter Restitution).

^{page 303 note 3} Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 All E. R. 545 at p. 662 (the “Spy catcher” case).

^{page 303 note 4} Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government (Everyman ed., London, 1910), p. 73Google Scholar.

^{page 304 note 5} Ibid., p. 72 (emphasis added).

^{page 304 note 6} See Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1961), pp. 27, 40–41Google Scholar; Raz, Joseph, The Authority of Law (Oxford, 1979), pp. 169–170Google Scholar.

^{page 304 note 7} Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, p. 170.

^{page 304 note 8} Raz, Joseph, “Promises in Morality and Law” (1982) 95 Harv.L.R. 916 at 937Google Scholar; Ten, C. L., Mill On Liberty (Oxford, 1980), p. 57Google Scholar.

^{page 305 note 9} Finnis, J. M., Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, 1980), pp. 171–172Google Scholar; cf. Honoré, A. M. “Ownership” in Guest, A. G. (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1961), pp. 112–124Google Scholar.

^{page 305 note 10} [1952] 2 Q.B. 246.

^{page 305 note 11} Ibid, at 254, 256–257; cf. Penarth Dock Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Pounds [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 359 at 361–362; Swordhealh Properties Ltd. v. Tabet [1979] 1 W.L.R. 285.

^{page 305 note 12} Penarth Dock Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Pounds, supra; Swordheath Properties Ltd. v. Tabet, supra (action for mesne profits); Whitwham v. Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co. [1896] 2Ch. 538.

^{page 306 note 13} Carr-Saunders v. Dick McNeil Associates Ltd. [1986]2 All E. R. 888 at 896.

^{page 306 note 14} Palmer, G. E., The Law of Restitution (Boston, 1978), vol. I, §2.10, p. 138Google Scholar; cf. Birks's test: “Was the prevention of the enrichment which the defendant has acquired a main purpose behind the wrong which he has committed?”: Introduction, p. 329.

^{page 306 note 15} [1988] 3 All E.R. 394.

^{page 306 note 16} Contrast dicta of Slade L.J. in the almost contemporaneous Court of Appeal decision in Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Long [1988] 3 AU E. R. 887 at 893–894.

^{page 306 note 17} Stoke-on-Trent City Council v. W. & J. Wass Ltd., supra, at pp. 398–401.

^{page 306 note 18} ibid., at 401.

^{page 307 note 20} Ibid., at 402.

^{page 307 note 21} Ibid., at 404.

^{page 307 note 22} Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s.96(2).

^{page 307 note 23} Ibid., s.229(2).

^{page 307 note 24} Patents Act 1977, s.61(l), (2).

^{page 307 note 25} Edelsten v. Edelsten (1863) 1 De G. J. & S. 185.

^{page 307 note 26} Lever v. Goodwin (1887) 36 Ch.D. 1, per Cotton L.J. at 7; My Kinda Town Ltd. v. Soil [1982] F.S.R. 147.

^{page 308 note 27} Meters Ltd. v. Metropolitan Gas Meters Ltd. (1911) 28 R. P. C. 157 at 164–165, approved by Lord Wilberforce in General Tire and Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. [1975] 1 W. L. R. 819 at 826; cf. Lord Shaw in Watson Laidlaw & Co. Ltd. v. Potts Cassels and Williamson (1914) 31 R. P. C. 104 at 120.

^{page 308 note 28} If breach of confidential information should ever come to be viewed by the courts as a tort, then the appropriate analogy would be with proprietary, not economic, torts: North, P. M., “Breach of Confidence: Is There a New Tort?” (1972–1973)Google Scholar 12 J.S.P.T.L. 149 at 160–165. The Law Commission has recommended protection for the confider by means of a new statutory tort: Breach of Confidence, Report No. 110, Cmnd. 8388 (1981), para. 6.5.

^{page 308 note 29} Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s.97(l).

^{page 308 note 30} ibid., s.233(1).

^{page 308 note 31} Registered Designs Act 1949, s.9(l).

^{page 308 note 32} Patents Act 1977, s.62(l).

^{page 308 note 33} The House of Lords left the question open in Marengo v. Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd. (1948) 65 R. P. C. 242; for the view that “innocent” passing off does not attract pecuniary remedies, see the judgment of Gummow J. in 10th Cantanae Pty. Ltd. v. Shoshana Pty. Ltd. (1987) 79 A. L. R. 299 at 319–323.

^{page 308 note 34} Edelsten v. Edelsten, supra; Colbeam Palmer Ltd. v. Stock Affiliates Pty. Ltd. (1968) 122 C. L. R. 25; A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. A. W. Gamage Ltd. (1915) 32 R. P. C. 273, per Lord Parker at p. 283.

^{page 308 note 35} As envisaged in Strand Electric and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd., supra, at 252, 255. In the United States, profits were held recoverable in Olwell v. Nye and Nissen Co. 173 P. 2d 652 (1946), where the defendant was “consciously tortious in acquiring the benefit;” and in Edwards v. Lee's Administrator 96 S.W. 2d 1028 (1936) in respect of a wilful trespasser.

^{page 309 note 36} Cheswonh v. Farrar [1967] 1 Q.B. 407.

^{page 309 note 37} (1883) 24 Ch.D. 439; followed in Morris v. Tarranl [1971] 2 Q.B. 143.

^{page 309 note 38} This rule has been heavily criticised: Birks, Introduction, p. 323; Goff and Jones, Restitution, pp. 609–611. The rule has been departed from in the United States: Edwards v. Lee's Administrator, supra; Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball 39 S.E. 2d 231 (1946).

^{page 309 note 39} Birks, Introduction, pp. 314–318.

^{page 309 note 40} As in Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull and Netherlands S.S. Co. Ltd. [1921] 2 K.B. 608.

^{page 310 note 41} United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd. [1941] A.C. 1, per Viscount Simon L.C. at pp. 18–19, Lord Atkin at p. 29, Lord Romer at pp. 34–35.

^{page 310 note 42} Birks, Introduction, p. 316.

^{page 310 note 43} The earliest examples of waiver of tort dealt with usurpation of an “office,” a form of incorporeal property giving the office-holder the estates and remedies of a freeholder: Jackson, R. M., The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law (Cambridge, 1936), pp. 61–62Google Scholar.

^{page 310 note 44} Lamine v. Dorrell (1706) 2 Ld. Raym. 216; United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., supra; Chesworth v. Farrar, supra.

^{page 310 note 45} Oughton v. Seppings (1830) 1 B. & Ad. 241; Rodgers v. Maw (1846) 15 M. & W. 444 at 448; Neate v. Harding (1851) 6 Exch. 349 at 351.

^{page 310 note 46} Powell v. Rees (1837) 7 Ad.& E. 426.

^{page 310 note 47} Chilly on Contracts, 25th ed. (London, 1983), pp. 1103–1104, para. 1978; Goff and Jones, Restitution, pp. 605–614.

^{page 310 note 48} Billing v. Ries (1841) Car. & M. 26; Hill v. Perrolt (1810) 3 Taunt. 274; Abbotts v. Barry (1820) 2 Brod. & B. 369.

^{page 310 note 49} Lowry v. Bourdieu (1780) 2 Dougl. 468 at 472; Clarke v. Shee (1774) 1 Cowp. 197 at 200.

^{page 310 note 50} Beatson, J., “The Nature of Waiver of Tort” (1979) 17 U.W.O.L. Rev. 1 at 16Google Scholar.

^{page 310 note 51} Lightly v. Clouston (1808) 1 Taunt. 112; Foster v. Stewart (1814) 3 M. & S. 192.

^{page 311 note 52} (1853) 2 El. & Bl. 216.

^{page 311 note 53} Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Board 268 F. 575 (1920).

^{page 311 note 54} WinHeld, P. H., The Law of Quasi-Contracts (London, 1952), pp. 98–100Google Scholar.

^{page 311 note 55} Salmond, J. W., The Law of Torts, 3rd ed. (London, 1912), pp. 145–146Google Scholar.

^{page 311 note 56} Anon. (1700) 12 Mod. 415; Barber v. Dennis (1703) 1 Salk. 68; and see Stoljar, S. J., The Law of Quasi-Contract (Sydney, 1964), p. 92Google Scholar.

^{page 311 note 57} Hart v. E.P. Dutton & Co. 93 N.Y.S. 2d 871 (1949), where waiver was refused in respect of libel.

^{page 311 note 58} Cf. dicta of Viscount Simon LC in United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., supra, at 13.

^{page 311 note 59} The obligations are usually voluntarily undertaken, but are sometimes imposed by operation of law, as in English v. Dedham Vale Properties Ltd. [1978] 1 W.L.R. 93 (fiduciary) and Seager v. Copydex Ltd. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923 (confidentiality). Similarly, an obligation of confidentiality has been imposed on someone who surreptitiously, or otherwise reprehensibly, acquires confidential information: Franklin v. Giddins [1978] Qd.R. 72.

^{page 312 note 60} Bray v. Ford [1896] A.C. 44 at 51; cf. the formulations of Lord Wilberforce in N.Z. Netherlands Society v. Kuys [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1126 at 1129, and Lord Upjohn in Phipps v. Boardman [1967] 2 A.C. 46 at 123.

^{page 312 note 61} Finn, P. D., Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney, 1977), p. 200Google Scholar; cf. McClean, A. J., “The Theoretical Basis of the Trustee's Duty of Loyalty” (1969) 7 Alberta L.R. 218Google Scholar.

^{page 312 note 62} Birks, Introduction, pp. 332–333.

^{page 312 note 63} Bray v. Ford, supra, at p. 51 (emphasis added).

^{page 312 note 64} See generally, Finn, op. cit., pp. 222–231.

^{page 313 note 65} Phipps v. Boardman [1967] 2 A.C. 46.

^{page 313 note 66} Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1942] 1 All E.R. 378; Keech v. Sandford (1726) Sel.Cas.T. King 61.

^{page 313 note 67} Phipps v. Boardman, supra; Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, supra.

^{page 313 note 68} Birks, Introduction, pp. 341–342.

^{page 313 note 69} Cf. the speech of Lord Russell in Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, supra at pp. 385–386, which treats liability as based on the taking of a profit, without reference to any conflict of interest and irrespective of any loss to the beneficiaries; cf. Lord Reid and Lord Upjohn in Brown v. I.R.C. [1965] A.C. 244 at 256, 265–266.

^{page 314 note 70} Supra, at p. 62.

^{page 314 note 71} Cf. the High Court of Australia in Furs Ltd. v. Tomkies (1936) 54 C.L.R. 583 at 592.

^{page 314 note 72} Phipps v. Boardman, supra.

^{page 314 note 73} Phipps v. Boardman, supra; Furs Ltd. v. Tomkies, supra at p. 592; Reading v. Attorney-General [1951] A.C. 507. It is not clear in the last case whether Sgt. Reading should be regarded as a fiduciary; the better view may be that he was a public officer (Finn, op. cit., p. 215), though subject to obligations which are built on an analogy with fiduciaries.

^{page 314 note 74} The two concepts are linked not only juridically, but also etymologically: “confidence” and “fiduciary” being formed on fidere, to trust (with the addition of the intensive prefix con- in the former case).

^{page 314 note 75} Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd. (1948) 65 R.P.C. 203 at 211; Seager v. Copydex Ltd. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923 at 931; Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 All E.R. 545 at 639, 648, 658–659; Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd. (No. 2) (1984) 156 C.L.R. 414, per Deane J. at pp. 437–438.

^{page 315 note 76} Finn, op. cit., pp. 1–2.

^{page 315 note 77} Gurry, Francis, Breach of Confidence (Oxford, 1984), pp. 158–159Google Scholar; cf. Meagher, R. P., Gummow, W. M. C. and Lehane, J. R. F., Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, 2nd ed. (Sydney, 1984), para. 4107Google Scholar; Shaw L.J. in Schering Chemicals Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd. [1981] 2 All E.R. 321 at 337–338.

^{page 315 note 78} G.D. Searle & Co. Ltd. v. Celltech Ltd. [1982] F.S.R. 92, per Brightman L.J. at p. 105; cf. dicta in Phipps v. Boardman, supra, on information as property, per Viscount Dilhorne at pp. 89–90, Lord Hodson at p. 107 and Lord Guest at p. 115, contra Lord Upjohn at pp. 127–128 and Lord Cohen at p. 102. The language sometimes hardens from analogy to identity: Seager v. Copydex Ltd. (No. 2) [1969] R.P.C. 250 at 256. The proprietary analysis may, however, be appropriate where the issue is other than remedies for breach of confidence: e.g. whether a secret can form the subject matter of a trust or whether it can be assigned: G. Jones “Restitution of Benefits Obtained in Breach of Another's Confidence” (1970) 86 L.Q.R. 463 at 464–465.

^{page 315 note 79} E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland 244 U.S. 100 at 102 (1917); cf. Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd. (No. 2) (1984) 156 C.L.R. 414, per Deane J. at p. 438; Wheatley v. Bell [1982] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 544 per Helsham C.J. in Eq. at pp. 549–550; Law Commission, Breach of Confidence, Law Com. Report No. 110, Cmnd. 8388 (1981), para. 2.10.

^{page 316 note 80} Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 All E.R. 545 (the “Spycatcher” case); Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd. [1976] O.B. 752, per Lord Widgery C.J. at. 770; Commonwealth of Australia v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd. (1980) 147 C.L.R. 39, per Mason J. at p. 51.

^{page 316 note 81} Attorney-General v., Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), supra. Rather than regarding public interest as a constituent element in the claim for breach of confidence, the better view is that it is the public interest in disclosure that is a defence, as F. A. Mann points out: (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 497 at 498.

^{page 316 note 82} Commonwealth of Australia v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd., supra, at p. 51 per Mason J. (although at p. 52 Mason J. suggests that detriment to an individual may be shown merely by the consequence that disclosure will “expose his actions to public discussion and criticism”). Megarry J. left the question open in Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd. [1969] R.P.C. 41 at 48. The House of Lords in Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), supra, revealed the full range of possibilities: Lord Griffiths thought detriment essential (at p. 650), Lord Keith disagreed (at p. 640), and Lord Goff left the matter open (at p. 659).

^{page 316 note 83} In X v. Y [1988] 2 All E.R. 648 at 657, Rose J. said that “detriment in the use of the information is not a necessary precondition to injunctive relief.” Proof of detriment to the confider was held to be unnecessary in the U.S. case, Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp 135 F. 2d 303 (1943); cf. the views of Finn, op. cit., at p. 160; and Meagher, Gummow, Lehane, op. tit., para. 4110.

^{page 317 note 84} Peter Pan Manufacturing Corp. v. Corsets Silhouette Ltd. [1963] R.P.C. 45, per Pennycuick J. at p. 58.

^{page 317 note 85} Now re-enacted in s.50 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

^{page 317 note 86} Seager v. Copydex Ltd. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923. The Court of Appeal did not state the jurisdictional basis for the award of damages in that case, but the present interpretation is consistent with the previous decision of the Court of Appeal in Sallman Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd. (1948) 65 R.P.C. 203 and was recently supported by Lord Goff in Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), supra, at 662; cf. Slade J. in English v. Dedham Vale Properties Ltd., supra, at p. III; an d compar e Gurry, op. at., pp. 431–437, an d Birks, Introduction, pp. 344–345.

^{page 317 note 87} In Seager v. Copydex Ltd., supra, the defendants were unconscious wrongdoers in contrast to the deliberate wrongdoing in Peter Pan Manufacturing Corp. v. Corsets Silhouette Ltd., supra. See Birks, Introduction, p. 345; Gurry, op. tit., pp. 420–423; G. Jones, “Restitution of Benefits Obtained in Breach of Another's Confidence” (1970) 86 L.Q.R. 463 at 486–488. An apportionment of profits is made in cases where not all the defendant's profit was improperly made: My Kinda Town Ltd. v. Soil [1982] F.S.R. 147 at 156.

^{page 317 note 88} [1969] R.P.C. 250.

^{page 317 note 89} Ibid., per Lord Denning M. R. at p. 256; per Salmon L.J. at p. 257.

^{page 318 note 90} Birks, Peter, “Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract” (1987) L.M.C.L.Q. 421Google Scholar;Jones, G., “The Recovery of Benefits Gained from a Breach of Contract” (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 443Google Scholar.

^{page 318 note 91} [1977] Ch. 106 at 332; cf. The Siboen and The Sibotre [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 293, per Kerr J. at 337. Contrast the judgment of Deane J. in the High Court of Australia in Hospital Products Ltd. v. U.S. Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41 at 122–125, and dicta of Deane J. in Trident General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. McNiece Bros. Pty. Ltd. (1988) 62 A.L.J.R. 508 at 525.

^{page 318 note 92} Supra.

^{page 318 note 93} Supra; cf. Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd., supra.

^{page 318 note 94} [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798.

^{page 318 note 95} Birks, Introduction, p. 335.

^{page 319 note 96} Whilwham v. Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co., supra; Strand Electric and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd., supra; Penarth Dock Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Pounds, supra.

^{page 319 note 97} SirMegarry, Robert and Wade, H. W. R., The Law of Real Property, 5th ed. (London, 1984), pp. 772–773, 775–776Google Scholar.

^{page 319 note 98} Bracewell v. Appleby [1975] Ch. 408 (right of way); Carr-Saunders v. Dick McNeil Associates Ltd. [1986] 2 All E.R. 888 (easement of light). Another re-interpretation of Wrotham Park was proffered by Nourse L.J. in Stoke-on-Trent City Council v. W. & J. Wass Ltd., supra, at pp. 399–401. The “practical result” of the case is there said to be “something akin to an award of exemplary damages for breach of contract.” No mention was made of the traditional rule barring exemplary damages for breach of contract, as laid down by the House of Lords in Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd. [1909] A.C. 488, and applied by the Court of Appeal in Perera v. Vandiyar [1953] 1 W.L.R. 672 and in Kenny v. Preen [1963] 1 Q.B. 499. With respect, the reasoning of Brightman J. does not call for any re-interpretation, and according to general principle it is the ratio, not the “practical result,” of a case which gives it significance as a precedent: for an extreme example, see Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964]A.C. 465.

^{page 319 note 99} Robinson v. Harmon (1848) 1 Exch. 850 at 855.

^{page 319 note 1} Fried, Charles, Contract as Promise (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), pp. 17–21Google Scholar. This is not to deny that there are other sources of compensation, such as the plaintiff's detrimental reliance, as Fuller, L. L. and showed, W. R. Perdue: “The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages” (1936)Google Scholar 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373.

^{page 320 note 2} Atiyah, P. S., Essays in Contract (Oxford, 1986), pp. 34–35Google Scholar; “Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations” (1978)94 L.Q.R. 193 at 215–216; cf. The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, 1979), pp. 3–5.

^{page 320 note 3} Raz, Joseph, “Promises in Morality and Law” (1982)Google Scholar 95 Harv.L.R. 916 at 937.

^{page 320 note 4} Birks, Peter, “Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract” (1987)Google Scholar L.M.C.L.Q. 421 at 421; cf. Goff and Jones, Restitution, at pp. 457–458.