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The ‘Double-Seventh’ Incident, 1937*: Singapore Chinese Response to the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2011

Extract

In his two pioneer studies on the Nanyang Chinese national salvation movement between 1908 and 1941, Professor Yoji Akashi stresses developments in China, and the extension of KMT and CCP structures in the Nanyang as basic “to any investigation of Nanyang Chinese political motive and orientation”. These developments, if viewed from a rather Sino-centric standpoint, are indeed important in explaining why the Singapore hua-ch'iao (overseas Chinese) responded as they did to the Double-Seventh Incident of 1937. However, contemporary local sources reveal that forces and conditions in Singapore played a decisive part in shaping the stand and modus operandi adopted by Singapore Chinese at the outbreak of the 1937 Sino-Japanese War.

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Articles
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Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1973

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References

1 See Akashi, Yoji, “The Nanyang Chinese Anti-Japanese and Boycott Movement, 1908-1928,” in International Conference of Asian Historians, Paper No. 4 (Kuala Lumpur, 1968), p. 2Google Scholar, and the Introduction to his book The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941 (Kansas, 1970)Google Scholar.

2 Fatt, Yong Ching, “Patterns and Traditions of Loyalty in the Chinese Community of Singapore, 1900-1941,” in New Zealand Journal of History, IV. 1 (04 1970), 7787Google Scholar.

3 Ten Years of Singapore, Sin Chew Jit Poh (ed.) (Singapore, 1940), pp. 978–9Google Scholar.

4 Poh-seng, Png, “The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912-1941,” Journal of Southeast Asian History, II, 2 (03 1961), 10Google Scholar.

5 Ibid., p. 24.

8 Ibid., pp. 26-27.

9 Brimmell, J.H., A Short History of the Malayan Communist Party (Singapore, 1956), p. 10Google Scholar. See also Onraet, Rene, Singapore - A Police Background (Singapore, n.d.), p. 110112Google Scholar and Hanrahan, G. Z., The Communist Struggle in Malaya (New York, 1954), pp. 910Google Scholar.

10 Onraet, Ibid., p. 111., Brimmell, Ibid., p. 10.

11 Brimmell,Ibid., p. 11–12.

12 Ibid., p. 12–13. See also , Hanrahan, op.cit., pp. 1719Google Scholar.

13 Hanrahan,Ibid., pp. 19-21.

15 For an example of this view, see , Onraet, op.cit., p. 106Google Scholar.

16 See Fifty-Eight Years of Enterprise, the English-version of the Souvenir of the Opening Ceremony of the Newly Completed Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce Building. Hereafter cited as Souvenir of SCCC (Singapore, 1964), pp. 7191Google Scholar.

17 For the SCCC's neutrality to war-lord and Nationalist politics in the homeland, seeIbid., pp. 103-105.

18 See Ching-fatt's, YongChinese leadership in Nineteenth Century Singapore” in Journal of the Island Society, I, 1 (12 1967), pp. 118Google Scholar and “Patterns and Traditions …” op. cit., and A Preliminary Study of Chinese Leadership, 1900-1941,” Journal of Southeast Asian History, IX, 2 (09 1968)Google Scholar.

19 A hui-kuan is an association of fellow district or provincial Chinese who came from the same geographical area. The district' hui-kuan was generally identifiable not only by geographical limitations but also by district dialects which were variants of the provincial dialect. A provincial hui-kuan, such as the Singapore Hokien Huay Kuan was based upon the exclusiveness of Fukien province. The provincial hui-kuan often contained within itself a multiplicity of dialect groups or ‘communities’ who spoke different variants of the major provincial dialects. The district and provincial hui-kuans were all named after the districts or provinces from which their members were drawn.

20 See Souvenir of SCCC, p. 175.

22 In the Sept. 1937 elections for example, Lim Keng Lian, a Hokkien patriarch, was elected by popular ballot, to represent Singapore at the ill-fated National Congress scheduled for 1937. SCJP, 4.9.37, p. 5, NYSP, 3.9.37, p. 5.

23 This fact was amplified by the dialect basis of their influence and their dependence on the hui-kuans in their response t o the “Double-Seventh ” Incident.

24 Siang, Song Gng, One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore (Singapore, 1967), pp. 319389Google Scholar.

25 See Souvenir of SCCC, pp. 145-250 for the whole line-up of SCCC leaders throughout its history, see also Yong Ching-fatt's “A Preliminary Study…”, 274–275.

26 In contrast, legislation was passed against the secret societies from 1890. See SSAR, 1890.

27 The SSAR of 1890-1906 contained lists of hui-kuans and societies granted registration.

28 This role was well-attested to in Ten Years of Singapore, pp. 972-981.

29 See Fatt, Yong Ching, “A Preliminary Study …” 259260Google Scholar.

31 See Ching-hwang, Yen, “China's Sales of Honours and Chinese Leadership in Singapore and Malaya, 1877-1912,” in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, I. 2. (09 1970), 2032CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Refer to Souvenir of SCCC, for lists of Chinese leaders who participated in the Nanking conventions.

33 See NYSP and SCJP editions on 8.7.37.

34 Refer to SCJP, 14.7.37, p. 5 and NYSP, 14.7.37, p. 5 for the response of a Chinese firm and the workers of a biscuit factory.

35 NYSP, 14.7.37, p. 5.

36 From 8 July, the NYSP's write-ups and editorial comments made stinging attacks against Japanese imperialism. In 1937 the NYSP's daily circulation was put at 30, 000 copies while the SCJP had a circulation of 20, 000. Straits Settlements Blue Book, 1938, (Singapore, 1939), p. 748Google Scholar.

37 The NYSP, for example, conducted interviews with well-known community leaders as part of its policy to generate support for a SCCC-initiated relief convention. See NYSP, 14.7.37-15.7.37, p. 5. The NYSP also widely publicized appeals by groups of Chinese workers calling on the SCCC, as the most revered organisation within the community, to take the lead in organising relief for North China (NYSP, 15.7.37, p. 5).

38 The NYSP was in facta paper managed by Hokkien influentials like Lee Kong Chian, Kaw Say Fun, Lee Chin Tian and George Lee. See 14th Anniversary Supplement, NYSP, 6.9.37.

39 NYSP, 16.7.37, p. 7.

40 NYSP, 22.71.37, p. 5.

41 Ibid.,

42 In head-lined interviews with the NYSP, for example, Tan freely offered his opinion on the shape and scope of the relief machinery to be set up. See NYSP, 20.7.37-24.7.37 editions.

43 NYSP, 24.7.37, p. 5.

45 In fact, SCCC leaders and dialect patriarchs deliberated from 13 July and called for the convention on 15 July, the day when the Consul-General, Kao Ling-pai returned from his four-month trip to Europe (SFP, 16.7.37, p. 15). Reports in the Chinese press, however, seemed to suggest that the Consul-General was largely bypassed by Chinese influentials of the SCCC in their subsequent deliberations.

46 ST, 23.7.37, p. 11.

49 Pressure groups like the Engineering Workers’ Guild and the Char Yong Association incessantly pressed the SCCC to convene the promised convention for relief of North China. See NYSP editions from 29 July with regard to this grass-roots lobby.

50 Many hui-kuans and workers' guilds even took the initiative in organising their own relief fund campaigns. These unco-ordinated attempts to ignore the colonial constraint and by-pass the SCCC and community influentials proved to be abortive. Ibid.

51 Refer to SCJP, 7.8.37, p. 5, NYSP. 9.8.38, p. 6 and 13.8.37, p. 5.

52 SCJP, 20.7.37, p. 5.

53 SCJP, 11.8.37, p. 5.

54 NYSP, 12.8.37, p. 5.

56 NYSP, 12.8.37, p. 5.

57 NYSP, 15.8.37, p. 5.

58 ST, 27.9.37. p. 13.

59 This fear was expressed in the SSAR, 1938, p. 417.

60 Kah, TanKee, -My Autobiography, vol. I (Singapore, 1946), p. 42Google Scholar.

61 As such, Tan undertook to enforce certain constraints imposed by the British colonial authority. These rules specified that: (1) there should be n o boycott deliberations (2) the relief fund should not be diverted to military purposes (3) no other relief coordinating bodies were to be set up (4) all remittances must be channelled to the Nanking Government.Ibid., pp. 42-43.

62 NYSP, 16.8.37, p. 5.

63 Ibid.,

66 NYSP, 18.8.37, p. 5.

67 Ibid. II NYSP, 20.8.37, p. 5 and SCJP, 20.8.37, p. 5.

70 NYSP, 22.8.37, p. 5.

71 NYSP, 27.8.37, p. 5.

73 NYSP, 21.8.37, p. 5. The Kwangtung Hui-kuan, in 1937, was at the formative phase of its development.

74 NYSP, 25.8.37, p. 5.

75 NYSP, 19.9.37, p. 7.

76 NYSP, 27.9.37, p. 5.

77 NYSP, 13.9.37, p. 8.

78 NYSP, 21.10.37, p. 8.

79 NYSP, 9.10.37, p. 5.

81 SSAR, 1938, p. 407.

82 NYSP, 19.12.37, p. 5.

83 The first, conducted at the Great World Park, in early October netted $50, 000. The December fair at the New World Amusement Park, however, brought in only $12, 000. The dwindling interest in relief fairs was reflected in the poor takings of the December fair.

84 For example, Lee Kong Chian and his Lee Rubber Co., madea total donation of $300, 000 (ATOP, 23.11.37, p. 6).

85 NYSP, 2.9.37, p. 7.

86 In less than a month, some 500, 000 garments were collected, sorted and packed for the war-zones (NYSP, 27.9.37, p. 6). Although financially insignificant, this campaign involved tremendous manpower sacrifices from relief volunteers.

87 This decision was made in mid-October. However by early November., only one qualified Indian doctor had signed up. NYSP, 9.11.37, p. 7. In mid-November, a staff of nine was selected and the medical team left for China (NYSP, 15.11.37, p. 5).

88 Despite disparaging remarks from the Chinese Consul-General that unqualified personnel could serve n o practical purpose in the war-zone, training of first-aid personnel persisted (NYSP, 6.12.37, p. 6). Up to Dec. the first batch of ‘graduates’ of the association remained stranded in Singapore, failing to obtain the necessary clearance from the Chinese Consulate (NYSP, 28.11.37, p. 5).

89 NYSP, 10.9.37, p. 6.

90 NYSP, 14.9.37, p. 5.

91 NYSP, 15.9.37, p. 5.

92 See Ibid., for an example of such appeals.

93 By 23 Oct. 1937, it had raised a mere $15, 000 (NYSP, 23.10.37, p. 4).

94 SCJP, 14.8.37, p. 5.

95 NYSP, 18.10.37, p. 7.

96 It was certainly not ‘clannishness’ which stood in the way as Akashi asserts. See his book The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941, pp. 19-20. ‘Clannishness’ it must be noted, had not prevented Aw, a Khek, from moving freely among the Kwangtung Cantonese and Teochew influentials (SCJP, 24.12.37, p. 5.)

97 For a sampling of these views and Akashi's conclusions, see Akashi, op. cit.

98 SCJP, 13.7.37, p. 7 and 20.7.37, p. 5.

99 SCJP, 16.8.37, p. 7.

100 For a detailed account of this campaign, see SCJP Aug.-Dec. issues.

101 On one occasion, the SCJP publicized a report from China that an ex-employee of Tan was shot in China for treason (SCJP, 29.9.37, p. 5). Aw's attempt in Dec. to set up a separate Red-Cross committee in conjunction with some other dialect leaders to assist Buddhist first-aid teams in China was an obvious manoeuvre to weaken Tan's claim of total control over Singapore relief activities (SCJP, 22.12.37, p. 5). In addition, Aw even went out of his way to head a Kwangtung-Chinese committee of dialect leaders formed for the defence of Kwangtung province (SCJP, 24.12.37, p. 5).

102 SC/P, 14.10.37, p. 5.

103 Kee, Tan Kah, op. cit., p. 42Google Scholar. See also NYSP, 16.8.37, p. 5.

104 ST, 23.8.37, p. 12.

105 Ibid.

106 57, 20.11.37, p. 12.

107 SCJP, 26.8.37, p. 8.

108 Colonial Dispatch from the Governor T.S.W. Thomas to Secretary of State, No. 6081/1938, 18 Sept. 1938. See also ST report, 17.9.37, p. 12.

109 See SCJP's Sept. Dec. editions for detailed reports of the boycott enforced by trade guilds and merchant houses.

110 Ibid.

111 In Nov. for example, stalls in Java Street gave themselves two months to enforce an anti-Japanese boycott injunction. SCJP, 24.11.37, p. 5.

112 Straits Settlements Annual Report, 1938 (Singapore, 1937), p. 411Google Scholar.

113 NYSP, 25.10.37, p. 4.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Onraet, Rene, Singapore, A Police Background (London, n.d.), p. 115Google Scholar.

119 SSAR, 1937 (Singapore, 1938), p. 837Google Scholar.

120 Ibid.

121 This claim was made in the SSAR, 1938 op. cit, p. 417.

122 “Review of Communist Activities in Malaya, 1936,” Police Intelligence Journal (Singapore, 1937), p. 2Google Scholar.

123 Ibid.

124 On a single day in October, 2 Chinese guilds met at the SCCC premises and voted for boycott action (NYSP, 25.10.37, p. 4). See also ST, 18.10.37, p. 13.

125 ST, 3.11.37, p. 12. 6081/1938

126 SCJP, 23.11.37, p. 6.

127 See Png Poh-seng, “The Kuomintang in Malaya …” for a personal insight of the writer who lived through the episode in Singapore.

128 SSAR, 1938, op. cit., p. 407.

129 Colonial Despatch, No. 6081/1938 op. cit.

130 ST, 23.8.37, p. 12.

131 Ibid.

132 NYSP, 26.8.37, p. 5.

133 NYSP, 24.10.37, p. 5.

134 NYSP, 24.9.37, p. 5., SCJP, 24.9.37, p. 5.

135 NYSP, 27.9.37, p. 5., SCJP, 24.9.37, p. 5.

136 NYSP, 5A0.31, p. 5.

137 Ibid.

138 NYSP, 12.10.37, p. 5.

139 The overriding consideration of the Nanking Government was the mobilisation of cash to keep the war efforts in China going. See JVF5/V23.10.37, p. 4.

140 For details of the demonstration, see ST, 13.11.37, p. 12.

141 NYSP, 7.10.37, p. 7.

142 NYSP, 15.10.37, p. 5., 21.10.37, p. 5.

143 For a glimpse of their activities, in Singapore, refer to NYSP, 21.10.37, p. 9 and SCJP 22.10.37, p. 6.

144 On one occasion, they held talks with some one hundred Chinese community leaders at the SCCC, see NYSP, 23.10.37, p. 4.

145 NYSP, 2.10.37, p. 5.

146 See NYSP, 29.9.37, p. 5., 8.10.37, p. 6., 12.10.37, p. 5.

147 NYSP, 19.9.37, p. 5.

148 NYSP, 1.11.37, p. 5.

149 SCJP, 3.9.37, p. 5.

150 SCJP, 17.9.37, p. 5.

151 SCJP, 18.10.37, p. 6.

152 SOP, 17.10.37, p. 5.

153 Ibid.

154 NYSP, 1.10.37, p. 5.

155 NYSP, 1.10.37, p. 5. SCJP, 1.10.37, p. 5.

156 Ibid.

157 NYSP, 19.10.37, p. 5.

158 NYSP, 24.9.37, p. 5.

159 See SCJP, 12.10.37, p. 5.

160 NYsp, 8.9.37, p. 5.

161 Ibid.

162 NYSP, 7.10.37, p. 5.

163 ST, 18.10.37, p. 12.

164 NYSP, 22.10.37, p. 5.

165 Ibid.

166 For example on 16.10.37 a meeting of all Cantonese dialect influentials met at the Hai Tien to discuss bond promotion measures. On the same day, the Kheks set up their bond committee. SCJP, 17.10.37, p. 5.

167 Governor of the SS to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 October 1937, CO. 273.

168 Draft letter from the CO. to the FO. and Treasury, 13 October 1937, CO. 273.

169 Louis, Roger, British Strategy in the Far East; 1919-1939 (London 1971), pp. 1213Google Scholar.

170 Ibid.

171 NYSP, 10.10.37, p. 5.

172 See SSAR, 1938 (Singapore, 1939) p. 422Google Scholar. for an occasion of such satisfaction expressed by the Secretary of the Chinese Affairs Commission, A.B. Jordon.

173 SCJP, 19.10.37, p. 5.

174 SCO, 23.10.37, p. 5.

175 NYSP, 25.10.37, p. 5.

176 Ibid.

177 Ibid.

178 Ibid.

179 For a rigorous definition of the ‘Straits Chinese’, refer to Poh-seng's, PngThe Straits Chinese in Singapore: A case of Local Identity and Socio-Cultural Accomodation,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. X, No. 1, 03 1969Google Scholar.

180 Straits Census, 1888, Singapore.

181 See Freedman, M., The Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Longer View (London, 1965)Google Scholar. Lea E. Williams, in his study of Indonesian Chinese nationalism, discusses the case of the sinicization of the Indonesian Peranakan Chinese in the first two decades of this century in a different setting and context. Refer to Williams, Lea E., Overseas Chinese Nationalism, The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1916 (Glencoe, 1960)Google Scholar.

182 Onraet, R., op. cit., p. 106Google Scholar.

183 Ibid.

184 The Straits Settlements Annual Report, 1938 (Singapore, 1939), p. 383Google Scholar.

185 Siang, Song Ong, op. cit., pp. 319–20Google Scholar.

186 Hock, Lee Yong, “A history of the Straits Chinese British Association,” Unpublished B.A. Hons. Academic Exercise, Singapore, 1960Google Scholar.

187 ST, 8.10.37, p. 12, 26.10.37.

188 ST, 12.12.37, p. 12.

189 ST. 13.12.37, p. 12, and 3.11.37, p. 13.

190 NYSP, 24.8.37., p. 5. and SCJP, 24.8.37., p. 6.

191 ST, 16.10.37., p. 13.

192 NYSP, 5.10.37, p. 5.

193 At the turn of the century, Dr. Lim, together with two other prominent Straits Chinese, Song Ong Siang and Gnoh Lean Tuck (better known as Dr. Wu Lien-teh) had been founder-editors of the Straits Chinese Magazine, a mouthpiece through which they made frequent pronouncements of loyalty to the British Queen. See Png Poh-seng, op. cit., p. 100. However, by 1937, both Dr. Lim and Dr. Wu had been effectively ‘sinicized’ into the mainstream of an on-going Chinese nationalism.

194 NYSP, 28.10.37, p. 5.

195 For an e.g., see NYSP, 23.10.37, p. 4.

196 Williams, op. cit., described Dr. Lim as a vigorous nationalist and a ‘patron’ of East Indies Chinese nationalism at the turn of this century. Also, for an account of Dr. Lim's public service to the Chinese people, see Hee, Khor Eng, “The public life of Dr. Lim Boon Keng,” Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, Singapore, 1958Google Scholar.

197 At the Annual General Meeting of the SCBA held in Dec. 1937, Dr. Lim was neither an ex-co. member nor an ordinary member (ST, 12.12.37, p. 10).

198 NYSP, 28.10.37, p. 5.

199 SFP, 27.9.37, p. 7.

200 Ibid.

201 SFP, 28.9.37, p. 7.

202 ST, 28.10.37 and 16.11.37, issues gave two instances of such involvement.

203 ST, 27.9.37, p. 13.

204 Onraet, R., op. cit., p. 116Google Scholar.

205 Kee, Tan Kah, op. cit. p. 42Google Scholar.

206 Dr Yong Ching Fatt, for example, asserts that the SCBA leaders “were themselves mediators between the Government and the Chinese community”. See his article “A Preliminary Study …”

207 Kee, Tan Kah, op. cit., ST, 29.9.37, p. 13Google Scholar.

208 Gungwu, Wang, “Chinese Politics in Malaya,” China Quarterly, Vol. 43, 1970, pp. 45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.