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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
A close examination of early and modern American constitutional interpretation reveals that there has been an essential change in the manner in which the Constitution is interpreted. When that comparison takes the form of a comparison between very early Supreme Court decisions and very recent ones the difference is relatively clear—at least that there is a difference. To some extent, what some of the differences are is observable. For instance, the overt balancing of interests (those of state and individual) in modern civil liberties cases is quite different from the character of earlier Supreme Court decisions.
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