Abstract
Abstract Background: The rise of "zero-click" exploits has created a lucrative market for commercial spyware, allowing state actors to compromise devices without user interaction. Methods: This study utilizes a qualitative analysis of open-source intelligence, investigative journalism, and forensic reports to map the ecosystem of Private Sector Offensive Actors (PSOAs). Results: Investigation into firms like NSO Group and Intellexa reveals a systemic pattern where "national security" tools are repurposed for political espionage against journalists and activists. The market currently thrives within a regulatory void, resistant to fragmented national sanctions. Conclusion: The normalization of mercenary surveillance poses an existential threat to press freedom and the rule of law. The paper recommends a global moratorium on the transfer of such technology until a binding international legal framework is established.



![Author ORCID: We display the ORCID iD icon alongside authors names on our website to acknowledge that the ORCiD has been authenticated when entered by the user. To view the users ORCiD record click the icon. [opens in a new tab]](https://www.cambridge.org/engage/assets/public/coe/logo/orcid.png)