Abstract
Resource-rich states often exhibit a paradox of plenty: ample fiscal capacity from natural-resource rents coexists with the chronic under-provision of public goods. This paper examines that tension in Azerbaijan and asks under what institutional conditions hydrocarbon wealth is converted into durable public value. Combining a structured synthesis of the scholarly and policy literature with a descriptive analysis of macro-fiscal, infrastructural, and environmental indicators for 2000–2024, it maps the potential for, and the constraints on, public-goods provision across the fiscal, infrastructural, environmental, and governance domains. Three findings stand out. First, the assets of the State Oil Fund (SOFAZ) create substantial fiscal space, yet the developmental return on that space depends on the quality of public investment management, the credibility of fiscal rules, and the discipline of project selection rather than on the volume of spending. Second, the Caspian environmental commons and the national water system are transboundary, common-pool goods whose provision requires coordinated regional action and sustained monitoring. Third, transport, reconstruction, and digital infrastructure promise large social returns that materialize only where transparent appraisal and maintenance financing are institutionalized. The paper concludes that the binding constraint on public-goods provision in Azerbaijan—and, by extension, in resource-rich emerging economies—is institutional rather than fiscal, and it specifies the sovereign-wealth, public-investment, and regional-cooperation reforms through which exhaustible rents can be translated into intergenerational welfare.



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