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  3. Commitment, Value, and Moral Realism
  • Cited by 9
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      December 2009
      September 1998
      ISBN:
      9780511583377
      9780521631112
      9780521045308
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511583377
      Dimensions:
      (216 x 138 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.425kg, 224 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (216 x 138 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.303kg, 224 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Philosophy: General Interest, Ethics, Philosophy
      Series:
      Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
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    • Selected: Digital
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    Subjects:
    Philosophy: General Interest, Ethics, Philosophy
    Series:
    Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
    Information

    Book description

    Despite the importance of commitment in moral and political philosophy, there has hitherto been little extended analysis of it. Marcel Lieberman examines the conditions under which commitment is possible, and offers at the same time an indirect argument for moral realism. He argues that realist evaluative beliefs are functionally required for commitment - especially regarding its role in self-understanding - and since it is only within a realist framework that such beliefs make sense, realism about values is a condition for the possibility of commitment itself. His ambitious study addresses questions that are of great interest to analytic philosophers but also makes many connections with continental philosophy and with folk psychology, sociology and cognitive science, and will be seen as a distinctive intervention in the debate about moral realism.

    Reviews

    "In this interesting book, Marcel Liberman develops a novel and sustained argument for moral realism." J.M. Bernstein--The Philosophical Review, Vol.110, No.2 (April 2001)

    "Lieberman successfully shows that moral realists are capable of accounting for moral commitment while nonrealists have not yet adequately done so." Ethcis

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