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The effects of the take-option in dictator-game experiments: a comment on Engel’s (2011) meta-study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Le Zhang  and
Andreas Ortmann
Le Zhang*
Affiliation:
UNSW, Kensington, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Andreas Ortmann*
Affiliation:
UNSW, Kensington, Sydney, NSW, Australia
*
le.zhang1@unsw.edu.au
a.ortmann@unsw.edu.au
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Abstract

In this paper, we report a replication of Engel’s (Exp. Econ. 14(4):583–610, 2011) meta-study of dictator game experiments. We find Engel’s meta-study of dictator game experiments to be robust, with one important exception: the coding of the take-option (List in J. Polit. Econ. 115(3):482–493, 2007; Bardsley in Exp. Econ. 11(2):122–133, 2008; Cappelen et al. in Econ. Lett. 118(2):280–283, 2013). While Engel reports this as having no statistically significant effect, in our replications, we find an economically and statistically significant negative effect on giving in line with the relevant literature.

Keywords

Dictator game experimentsMeta-analysisGivingNormalized givingTake-option

JEL classification

C24: Truncated and Censored Models • Switching Regression Models • Threshold Regression Models C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 17 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 414 - 420
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

This project was developed jointly as part of L.Z.’s dissertation project on the production and evaluation of evidence in experimental economics; L.Z. did the data collection and analysis, this manuscript was written in collaboration between L.Z. and A.O. We thank Professor Engel for sharing his data and for promptly and comprehensively answering our questions. We also thank participants of a seminar at UNSW and specifically Denise Doiron, Denzil Fiebig, Gigi Foster, Ben Greiner, and Shiko Maruyama for very useful comments on an earlier draft. We also like to thank three referees for this journal for helpful reports and the editor for excellent guidance. Jade Wong and Jeanette Deetlefs provided editing suggestions. Remaining mistakes are ours.

References

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