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The chapter begins with an evaluation of Russia’s formal regulation of its economy and foreign trade in the seventeenth century, in particular the key developments in the new commercial codes in 1653 and 1667. It continues with the reaction of both Russian and foreign merchants to the new regulations to provide context for the impact of legislation on the “real” operation of the economy. On the British side, it focuses on the actions of the British Russia Company in the seventeenth century, in particular after its loss of its tax-free status in the middle of the century. It also provides context for the Russia and Britain’s search for Asian commodities. A part of this chapter is related through the accounts of Fedot Kotov, a Russian merchant sent as an envoy to Iran, and Samuel Collins, an English doctor working in the Russian court. These narratives provide context for the effect of the new legislation and its implementation.
This chapter turns toward the attempt to recover from the Elton scandal and reestablish positive trade connections, but this process was undermined by the combined threats of the Seven Years’ War and the American Revolution, both of which restricted all commercial activities from extensive wartime piracy. While the peaceful interludes between conflicts proved to be the most profitable years of Anglo-Russian commerce in the eighteenth century, this chapter demonstrates that it was not Catherine the Great’s embrace of new economic freedoms but rather the absence of British and French piracy that allowed the commercial expansion. It was not a turn away from “mercantilistic” regulations but rather geopolitical opportunities that made Russia commercially successful.
The chapter focuses on the era of commercial change that coincides with the reign of Peter the Great, not only from Peter’s interest in expanding Russia’s trade networks to the east and west but also the hostile takeover of the British Russia Company by their fellow Eastland Company merchants. The takeover was managed by the Eastland Company’s ability to exploit a British fear of the collapse of the colonial tobacco market and push for open new revenue streams, particularly ending Russia’s longstanding embargo on tobacco imports. The chapter ends with a consideration of the British men employed in Peter the Great’s government, and the ways in which their “inside” information on Russian commercial activities allowed the new Russia Company to better navigate the Russian marketplace.
The conclusion reveals the ways in which the commercial entanglements between the two powers predict the eventual conflicts of the Great Game of diplomacy in the later nineteenth century. Russia’s economy was one of Europe’s strongest in the eighteenth century, but its lack of new reforms or innovations endangered its economic position in the nineteenth, leading to the rise of the myth of Russian “backwardness.” The conclusion points toward this being a new phenomenon rather than a perpetual condition, challenging traditional arguments on Russia’s development.
The introduction situates Eurasia as an arena of global commerce in an era of the expansion of European overseas trade networks. The book challenges the theory of the decline of the Silk Roads in the eighteenth century by presenting new evidence for the success of Eurasia’s economy, and repudiates world history assessments of Russia as a global “semi-periphery.”
This chapter examines the peak of Russia’s commercial success in the eighteenth century, following the American Revolution. Russia benefited from increased foreign competition, particularly the arrival of new American merchants whose goal was the displacement of British interests. Napoleon’s imposition of the Continental Blockade at the beginning of the nineteenth century led to a period of American ascendancy in Russia’s markets, although Napoleon’s defeat and the restoration of regular trade would restore the British position. British trade may have struggled at the turn of the century, and this chapter reveals the continuing importance of British men in Russian service who supplied new “insider” information to the British government to support its imperial interests in Asia. Even in a period of commercial uncertainly, Britain could benefit from its involvement in Russia’s economy.
Commercial competition between Britain and Russia became entangled during the eighteenth century in Iran, the Middle East, and China, and disputes emerged over control of the North Pacific. Focusing on the British Russia Company, Matthew P. Romaniello charts the ways in which the company navigated these commercial and diplomatic frontiers. He reveals how geopolitical developments affected trade far more than commercial regulations, while also challenging depictions of this period as a straightforward era of Russian economic decline. By looking at merchants' and diplomats' correspondence and the actions and experiences of men working in Eurasia for Russia and Britain, he demonstrates the importance of restoring human experiences in global processes and provides individual perspective on this game of empire. This approach reveals that economic fears, more than commodities exchanged, motivated actions across the geopolitical landscape of Europe during the Seven Years' War and the American and French Revolutions.