This chapter examines the relationship between differences in national political institutions and differences in environmental performance. Unlike the preceding chapter, which addressed the implications of patterns of interest group influence on environmental outcomes under an assumption that environmental interests are on the policy agenda, here I deal directly with barriers to the articulation, aggregation, and representation of environmental interests in the political arena.

A major reason for caring about political institutions is their effect on democratic responsiveness. In Democracies (1984) and Patterns of Democracy (1999), Arend Lijphart suggested that differences in institutional practices used to translate citizen preferences into policy have an important role in explaining differences in national policies. The significance of political institutions in effecting social choices and outcomes has received considerable attention in comparative politics and political economy (e.g., Alt and Chrystal 1983; Huber and Stephens 2001; Knight 1992; Lijphart 1999; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Powell 1982). This includes environmental performance. In particular, political scientists have proposed a number of hypotheses about the relationship between varieties of democratic institutions and the ability of society to respond to “diffuse interests” such as environmental protection effectively (Vogel 1993).

Environmental protection can be generally classified as a diffuse benefit because the benefits to individuals from the provision of environmental protection are relatively small or uncertain. Such benefits tend to be underprovided because of collective action problems.