When we come to explore the question of politics in Agamben's thought, everything hinges, it seems, on whether we can make a clear distinction between politics and power (sovereignty), and yet, on the surface of things, it appears that this distinction is fraught with complexity. The problem here is actually twofold. First, Agamben, in many places, seems to conflate these two terms. Indeed, almost everything he says in Homo Sacer appears to point to the whole of politics becoming entirely subsumed within biopolitics and the sovereign exception, that is, within the order of power. Indeed, biopolitics and sovereign exceptionalism appear to constitute the very field of politics. Under biopolitics, life and politics become indistinct: ‘The novelty of modern biopolitics lies in the fact that the biological given is as such immediately political, and the political is as such immediately the biological given’ (Agamben 1998: 148 [emphasis in original]). Similarly, the sovereign moment of the exception and, particularly, the relation of the ban become the key figures of politics. We have to remember, also, that the camp is described as the very nomos of our modern political space. Second, as we have seen, any gestures towards an alternative conception of politics remain just that – gestures. They are vague, enigmatic and lack concreteness. So arriving at a clear conceptual distinction between the order of power and politics, particularly some form of political subjectivity and action, is very difficult at the outset.