Given its resonance in both traditions, the problem of other minds seems to us especially suitable as a case-study, or a symptom, in order to make clear some of the different methodological and meta-philosophical commitments of the two traditions. Although there is no canonical account of the problem(s) of other minds that can be baldly stated and that is exhaustive of both traditions, several aspects of the problem can be set out. It seems to have: (i) an epistemological dimension (How do we know that others exist? Can we justifiably claim to know that they do?); (ii) an ontological dimension incorporating issues to do with personal identity (What is the structure of our world such that intersubjectivity is possible? What are the fundamental aspects of our relations to others and how do they impact upon/constitute our self-identity?); and (iii) some involvement with one's conception of the nature of mind (How does the mind – or the concept of “mind” – relate to the brain, the body, and the world?). While these three issues are co-imbricated, analytic engagements with the problem of other minds generally treat it as a straightforward sceptical problem, of much the same kind as Hume's problem of induction, Descartes' arguments for global scepticism, Russell's scepticism about the past and so on. Hence in the analytic tradition the focus is on epistemic matters primarily, although conceptual issues to do with “mindedness” also arise.