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6 - Johnson and the Critical Realignment of 1964

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 November 2009

Norman Schofield
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
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Summary

INTRODUCTION

It is commonly assumed that politics is inherently one dimensional. In such a world, theory suggests that political candidates would be drawn into the electoral center in order to maximize votes. Against such a tendency would be the motivation of ideological political activists to pull their preferred candidate away from the center. The balance of electoral incentives and activist pull creates the “political equilibrium” at any election.

But is politics inherently one dimensional? This chapter continues with the argument that politics is fundamentally two dimensional. Politics may appear to be characterized by a single cleavage, but this is because the two parties themselves “organize” politics along the dimension that separates them. Party disagreement on one dimension of politics makes that dimension more salient, while the other dimension is obscured by tacit party agreement.

The existence of a submerged or passive dimension of politics transforms the calculus of activist support and electoral preferences. Activists who are most concerned about the dimension of politics on which parties passively agree constitute a pool of disaffected voters who see no perceptible difference between the two main parties on the issues that matter most to them. These disaffected activists often offer a temptation to vote-maximizing candidates who may see them as the potential margin of victory in a close election. Such a development would be resented and resisted by party activists who are most concerned about the active dimension that differentiates the two parties, and would rather see their party go down to defeat than re-orient itself to a new set of policy issues and a new agenda.

Type
Chapter
Information
Architects of Political Change
Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice Theory
, pp. 166 - 199
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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