If truth is an offspring of the symbiotic relationship between the ways things express themselves and the ways they are said, it is because truth is rooted in a λόγος attuned to the appearing of phenomena. Aristotle's name for the sort of saying that addresses things by allowing them to show themselves as themselves is λόγος ἀποφαντικός – declarative saying. The question concerning truth in Aristotle announces itself implicitly as a matter of justice when his account of declarative saying is heard as an attempt to articulate a way of addressing the appearing of things held ultimately accountable by the ways things express themselves. This way of address is grounded in an ability to lend articulate voice to that which speaks with inarticulate eloquence. It is cultivated by an attentiveness that seeks to articulate things as they show themselves to be. In order to discern this way of address in Aristotle, it will be necessary to begin by attending to the way voice brings Aristotle's account of declarative saying to life.

Aristotle addresses the meaning of declarative saying in De Interpretatione, a text that seems on the face of it to treat λόγος in isolation from the life that gives it voice.