ARRIVING AT THE END

Perhaps the most puzzling sentence in the entire Ethics is one that Aristotle apparently thinks should be perfectly clear. It occurs at the beginning of 10.7, where he begins to give his final views on the ultimate goal of human life, happiness (eudaimonia): “If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it be activity in accordance with the best virtue” (1177a12–13). This is puzzling, because Aristotle, as we have seen, has throughout the Ethics been deliberately maintaining a kind of indecision as regards what we have called Selection and Collection. Happiness is activity in accordance with virtue – granted – but is it some single such activity (Selection) or all such activities (Collection)? As late as 10.5 he was apparently keeping the question open: “So whether there is one sort of activity or several which are characteristic of a complete and blessedly happy man, the pleasures that bring these activities to completion would in the strict sense be referred to as ‘human pleasures’ ” (1176a26–28). If anything, that passage tips toward Collection, since it speaks of the pleasures that bring these activities to completion (in the plural). Yet in 10.7 the matter is suddenly settled.