The practice of command in the AMF during the Second World War reached its nadir during the fighting for Singapore in February 1942. The initial Japanese assault on the island burst on positions held by the Australian 22nd Brigade on the night of 8 February, and within two days the 8th Division, of which the 22nd Brigade was a part, had ceased to function as an effective fighting formation. Four of its battalions had disintegrated; the other two, out of communication with their brigade headquarters, were acting independently; and the animosity and mistrust that had bedevilled the exercise of command in the division since its formation was out of control – to the detriment of the confused, exhausted and increasingly demoralised soldiers on the firing line.

The Australians’ month-long campaign in Malaya and Singapore had been fought at a dizzying pace. The foundation of the Japanese concept of operations in Malaya was the ‘driving charge’, a tactic that emphasised taking calculated risks to maintain the momentum of the advance and continually keep the enemy on the back foot. The 8th Division was deployed in southern Malaya when the Japanese landed in the north on 8 December and was held there while III Indian Corps fought the initial battles. As the Japanese pushed south without pause into January it was intended that the Australians would form the core of a force that would stop them dead in their tracks in the north-west corner of the state of Johore along a line running from Muar on the west coast to Segamat on the main road and rail corridor. This ‘main battle’ was never to be. After a brief flurry of resistance as the fresh Australian troops joined the fray, the British and Dominion position collapsed into an increasingly harried withdrawal. The first significant action for the Australians took place on the southern bank of the Gemencheh River on 14 January and, after a succession of what could be best termed delaying actions, they withdrew to Singapore on 31 January to prepare for its ill-fated defence.