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9 - The politics of central banker tenure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2013

Christopher Adolph
Affiliation:
University of Washington, Seattle
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Summary

Because it isn't maybe as simple as bribery, campaign contributions, and that kind of thing. I think that we've had twenty-five years of the Goldman Sachses of the world ruling the world, and the people like Tim Geithner, when they leave office, the way they make their living … is to go to work for a financial institution for huge sums of money; that people have trouble with getting their minds around the world where that's not the way the world works, and there is maybe a slight quickness to believe the world can't function without Goldman Sachs.

MICHAEL LEWIS

THE OVERLOOKED EVIDENCE that central banker conservatism affects monetary policy demonstrates that a narrow-minded focus on institutional guarantees of autonomy has crowded out attention to other facets of monetary politics. When distinct or even potentially opposing concepts are gathered under the umbrella of central bank independence, we end up with confused explanations and misguided policy. In this chapter, we turn from central bank independence and central bankers' conservatism to consider two other concepts, central banker turnover and central bank accountability, which have too often been blended with independence. As with conservatism and independence, a sharper distinction between turnover and accountability reveals that politics play a larger than expected role in monetary policy.

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Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics
The Myth of Neutrality
, pp. 280 - 303
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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