Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of acronyms
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A veto player theory of conflict bargaining
- 3 Testing the effect of veto players on duration
- 4 Bargaining and fighting in Rwanda and Burundi
- 5 The effects of veto players on conflict severity, genocide, and the duration of peace
- 6 Designing peace processes in multi-party civil wars
- 7 Conclusion
- Appendix A Civil wars included in the dataset
- Appendix B Descriptive statistics for variables in quantitative analyses
- References
- Index
1 - Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of acronyms
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A veto player theory of conflict bargaining
- 3 Testing the effect of veto players on duration
- 4 Bargaining and fighting in Rwanda and Burundi
- 5 The effects of veto players on conflict severity, genocide, and the duration of peace
- 6 Designing peace processes in multi-party civil wars
- 7 Conclusion
- Appendix A Civil wars included in the dataset
- Appendix B Descriptive statistics for variables in quantitative analyses
- References
- Index
Summary
All civil wars end. How long they last before they end, however, differs greatly between conflicts. Some, such as wars in Bolivia in 1967, Congo/Zaire in 1967 and 1977, and the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico of 1994, end within months. Others, such as those in Afghanistan, Colombia, Somalia, and southern Sudan, rage for decades without resolution. What explains why some civil wars end quickly and others last so long?
Understanding the factors driving the duration of war is important. A clear illustration is the case of Iraq. Notwithstanding a brief political row in the United States over the use of the term, there was a virtual consensus among scholars that, at least by early 2006, Iraq was in civil war. Years of political debate continued around a variety of issues, but one aspect of this debate concerned the length of time that international troops would need to remain in the country before Iraq was able to “stand on its own feet.”
In part, this was a question about goals: what should the “bench-marks” be that would lead to a US withdrawal? Should the United States wait until Iraq was democratic and peaceful or use some lesser standard to define “victory” and justify leaving? On another level, it was a question about duration. How long would it take for the level of violence to subside and the various internal factions to reach a political compromise that would allow for a stable government?
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Barriers to Peace in Civil War , pp. 1 - 22Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011