When approached by émigrés, the British government accepted no commitments to national self-determination as there was no immediate advantage in adopting utopian programmes for the future of Europe. Commitments were to be avoided as they would only restrict the government's freedom of action. With no specific war aims in eastern Europe, the government was not compelled to adopt strategy to produce specific results, but could use political issues to support military policy. During the Balkan negotiations, from August 1914 to December 1915, strategic necessity and the nationality principle influenced the formation of British policy. Since nationalism appeared to be the root of Balkan problems, the nationality principle represented a long-term political consideration. Yet when the nationality principle came into conflict with strategic necessity, the latter determined policy.

Strategic considerations played a decisive role in the formation of foreign policy in part because of their own intrinsic importance and in part because of the attitude of the foreign office. It was generally assumed, particularly by Grey and Arthur Nicolson, that diplomacy in war would achieve nothing unless it was supported by favourable military action. In practice, this assumption led to the adjustment of diplomacy to strategy. Foreign policy was determined not by long-term political considerations, but by immediate strategic necessity. According to Lord Eustace Percy, a member of the war department: ‘Sir Edward Grey tended to make a virtue of this necessity by his dictum that, in war, a Foreign Secretary could have no policy but to do what the soldiers wanted.’