India and the United States

In their approach to Southeast Asia in the late 1940s the British not only had recent experience in mind, but experience of the early years of the Pacific war. Their image of the advance of communism was coloured not only by their understanding of its ideological threat and of Russian leadership. It was also coloured by a comparison between the threat of China in 1948–9 and that of Japan in 1940–1. Now, as then, Britain could dispose of little force. But it was important to bolster friendly regimes, to inhibit de facto penetration, and to elicit US support. Mutatis mutandis, the same strategies were again invoked. The significance of Indo-China and Siam was assessed in a similar way. If they fell, the Peninsula and the islands would be exposed. The ‘domino’ theory evolved in part from British experience and British perceptions of the past.

The British had recognised that, while the Far East was the main area of US responsibility, Southeast Asia was the main area of theirs. Their recipe was based on an East-West rapprochement, accommodating nationalism and the European presence, the aim being stability and prosperity. In the territories for which they were or had been responsible, their remedies were under challenge in 1948. Elsewhere the reconciliation of Indonesians and Dutch still evaded them, and in French Indo-China reconciliation seemed almost inconceivable. The prospect of communist triumph in China redoubled the attempt to make Southeast Asia a zone of peace and stability before it was too late.