Regionalism and nationalism

The British had set out on an ambitious policy in Southeast Asia, and by March–April 1946 they had achieved some of their major objectives. They had returned to Burma, Malaya and Borneo. Their allies had returned to Indo-China and to Indonesia, and had apparently been prompted to work with the nationalist movements they found. In the coming months, the British were to discover some of the weaknesses in their position. They conceded power to the AFPFL. They abandoned the Malayan Union. By a substantial diplomatic effort they pushed the Dutch and the Indonesians into the Linggadjati agreement. But they did not prevent the unleashing of war in Vietnam.

Southeast Asia was, of course, not dealt with in a vacuum. Britain's interests, and indeed its responsibilities, were worldwide; yet its power was limited. Its policies in Southeast Asia were thus affected by its own priorities and by the attitudes of other powers. Southeast Asia was important to the British, both for specific reasons and for general ones. Britain needed access to the dollars Malaya could earn, and it needed the base facilities that Singapore could offer. It also saw Southeast Asia as a potential zone of stability in which the commercial interests of Britain could survive and develop long-term. But Southeast Asia was less important than Europe and less important even than the Middle East. Its position vis-à-vis India was to become more equivocal, but at this time India was still a prime interest.