The British coal industry was central to the war effort. Industry, including most crucially the manufacture of munitions, needed coal. The railways shifted its products and were essential for the movement of troops. Military operations depended on coal, most notably the provision of South Wales steam coal to the fleet. A reliable and affordable supply for household consumption was vital for both warmth and morale. Much of the export market had vanished in August 1914, but coal was provided to the French whose own coalfields were largely under German occupation. The challenge for the government and the industry is evident in the basic statistics. Production had peaked in 1913 at 287 million tons produced by a workforce of 1,118,000. By 1918, production was 60 million tons less, a drop only partially compensated for by a halving of the output exported. The workforce had fallen by over 100,000; output per man-shift had declined from 20.32 cwt to 17.75. The average selling price at the pithead had doubled. Rumours abounded of fabulous profits. State intervention was inevitable. Any effective response to the problem of output necessitated the co-operation of the workforce and the involvement of its trade union representatives.1