The devolution of 1885 significantly altered the orientation of structural politics in the House. Most obviously, the new regime represented a shift in the status quo, altering the basic orientation of leaders, committee members, and backbenchers toward structure. Legislative committee members, who had previously been the old regime's strongest opponents, became the new regime's staunchest supporters; members of the traditional money committees became its biggest critics. Leaders could not openly assault the regime of 1885 since their followers obviously supported the new arrangement, but they could work quietly to effect their own wills through the appointment process and their efforts to coordinate committee decisions informally.

As I suggested in Chapter 1, however, the devolution was likely to have indirect institutional consequences as well. Most importantly, now that seven legislative committees could oversee appropriations bills, resources available to protect the new status quo were dispersed throughout the chamber. As members of these legislative committees went about their jobs, they were bound to generate support for their own institutional positions by doing favors for other members. As these favors proliferated, so too did the institutional currency necessary to withstand structural challenges. In short, membership on these legislative committees was valuable not only because members could more easily aid their own constituents, but also because members could assist the constituents of others, extracting a price in the process.

Because of largely exogenous leadership changes, most of these institutional chits never had to be called in, however.