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7 - Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2015

David Parrott
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
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Summary

To win a war you do not need to score a ‘perfect ten’ in military excellence, you just have to perform better, perhaps less badly, than the enemy.

What has been insufficiently discussed . . . is the crucial evidence of the inefficiency, waste and the clear and straightforward corruption that for centuries has accompanied the preparations for war, to the point where it would perhaps be possible to write a ‘history of peculation’.

The traditional depiction of early modern military contracting bears some resemblance to accounts of the age of the dinosaurs which my generation encountered as children in the 1960s. Dinosaurs (then treated as a single generic life-form, like mercenaries and military contracting) were slow, lumbering and ineffectual. They survived essentially because at the outset they faced no serious competition, and by sheer size could dominate a given environment. But they were ‘obviously’ doomed to extinction when set against warm-blooded mammals with their adaptability, speed and evolutionary potential, and the story of the dinosaurs was presented as one of increasingly unsustainable developments in size, in ever-more elaborate defensive carapaces, horns and spikes, and ever-greater dependence on very specific conditions from which they could derive enough food for survival. The obvious question of why such self-evident evolutionary losers should have managed to dominate life on earth for 140 million years was just beginning to be asked at a popular level in the 1960s, but had not yet challenged the general assumptions which suggested that the story was one of physiological and adaptive failure.

Yet in subsequent decades understanding of dinosaurs has undergone a revolution. Lazy habits of speech ensure that the traditional associations and assumptions have not entirely vanished, but they coexist with a scientific consensus that the dinosaurs were extraordinarily adaptable, resilient forms of vertebrate life, able to dominate different environments, climates and competitors over unimaginably long periods of time. Military contracting, easily dismissed under the generalized and unspecific category of ‘(hiring) mercenaries’, is in need of a similar, more thoughtful evaluation.

Type
Chapter
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The Business of War
Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe
, pp. 307 - 327
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

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  • Conclusion
  • David Parrott, University of Oxford
  • Book: The Business of War
  • Online publication: 05 January 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139023337.011
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  • Conclusion
  • David Parrott, University of Oxford
  • Book: The Business of War
  • Online publication: 05 January 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139023337.011
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • David Parrott, University of Oxford
  • Book: The Business of War
  • Online publication: 05 January 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139023337.011
Available formats
×