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21 - Anomalies of measurement: when it works, but should not

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2009

By
Rob Austin  and
Jody Hoffer Gittell
Edited by
Andy Neely
Rob Austin
Affiliation:
Associate Professor Harvard Business School, USA
Jody Hoffer Gittell
Affiliation:
Associate Professor The Heller School for Social Policy and Management, Brandeis University
Andy Neely
Affiliation:
Cranfield University, UK
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Summary

Introduction

One ostensible objective of research on performance measurement is to determine the characteristics of measurement systems that lead to high performance. To this end, descriptive theories of performance measurement hypothesize relationships between work contexts, the design of measurement systems, the aptitudes and behaviour of workers, and the outcomes that result from the work. Normative theories specify principles of design for measurement systems intended to produce desirable outcomes.

Usually, normative theories do not specifically assert that high performance results only from performance measurement systems constructed in accord with theory. Nonetheless, high performance achieved via means other than performance measurement should surely operate in a way that is consistent with the mechanisms inherent in these performance measurement theories. Furthermore, some theories in use, such as the one summarized by the widely accepted aphorism “What you can't measure, you can't manage”, seem to imply that a performance measurement system designed according to certain basic principles is a prerequisite for high performance.

This chapter is simple in its layout and objectives. First, we identify a minimal set of principles for designing performance measurement systems that can be extracted from theories in a wide variety of academic disciplines and applied settings. We arrive at three principles that we believe will seem unobjectionable to most performance measurement proponents. Second, we present four vignettes that describe actual events from the airline industry in which the principles of performance measurement seem to be deliberately subverted in order to produce high performance.

Type
Chapter
Information
Business Performance Measurement
Unifying Theory and Integrating Practice
 , pp. 449 - 476
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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