During much of modern moral philosophy the predominant systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism. One reason for this is that it has been espoused by a long line of brilliant writers who have built up a body of thought truly impressive in its scope and refinement. … Those who criticized them often did so on a much narrower front. … [T]hey failed, I believe, to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it. The outcome is that we often seem forced to choose between utilitarianism and intuitionism. …

What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract. … [T]his theory seems to offer an alternative to the dominant utilitarianism of the tradition. … Of the traditional views, it is this conception, I believe, which best approximates our considered judgments of justice and constitutes the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society.