Starting with the academic debate about whether Chamberlain believed or merely hoped that he had secured peace at Munich, the main theme is the prime minister’s attempts to balance détente and deterrence. Policy was based on the prime minister’s persistent hope that Hitler shared his desire for peaceful change in Europe. Even so, defence expenditure rose rapidly. Initially Chamberlain’s focus was on air power, but from February 1939 he reluctantly accepted that France must be supported by land forces. Churchill was if anything even slower to see the need for an expeditionary force, but welcomed steps to turn Britain into a military power. Germany was known to be experiencing economic strain as a result of rearmament, but whereas Chamberlain thought that made peace more likely, Churchill saw it would be more in keeping with Hitler’s character to make a move before he faced a domestic crisis and before British rearmament was complete. Even on the eve of Hitler’s seizure of the rump of Czechoslovakia Chamberlain was predicting Europe would settle down for a period of tranquillity. However, when his hopes were disappointed, he promised a review of every aspect of national life relating to defence, including the questions of a ministry of supply – long advocated by Churchill – and conscription.