By the early 1960s the days of formal European empires appeared to be numbered. As nationalist movements began to move into power in Asia and Africa, and as independence was granted by, or wrested from, the departing Europeans, the principle of self-determination became firmly established once more in the value-system of international affairs. The dominant anti-colonial mood was most prominently reflected in the changing make-up and atmosphere of the United Nations. In 1960 the General Assembly had passed a resolution (without dissent) that, ‘All peoples have the right of self-determination … Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.’ The British could be sure that their handling of the Malaysia issue would be subject to a degree of international scrutiny, and they were determined that the veneer of legitimacy should be attached to the whole process. Among some officials, it must also be recognized, there was a genuine sense of responsibility and a desire to chart the best course for peoples about to be released into a potentially hostile local environment. There was, in addition, a practical need to ensure the widest degree of support for the idea of joining Malaysia from the populations of Sarawak and North Borneo. As ministers were only too aware, there was the unhappy precedent of the Central African Federation to consider, established against the wishes of the African majority in the early 1950s, and which by 1961 was in the final stages of collapse.