3 - Persons and bodies
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 October 2009
Summary
Miserably I tried to shut out the immensities by closing my eyes. But I had neither eyes nor eyelids. I was a disembodied, wandering view-point.
Olaf Stapleton, Star MakerIn Chapter 2 I considered some of the difficulties with achieving a clear conception of the physical and mental. I argued that a philosophical conception of the physical cannot easily by-pass the need to articulate what is mental, or avoid the use of ostension. I then sought to develop a version of dualism that takes seriously the integral nature of personal embodiment. While integrative dualism upholds the contingent character of mental–physical interaction, it is not committed to the hyperprivacy and isolationism that makes it prey to the linguistic and conceptual objections raised by Levin and others. But why embrace integrative dualism, or any kind of substantial dichotomy between persons and bodies, rather than rely on a more temperate outlook like the dual-aspect theory? In this chapter I review six reasons why the dual-aspect theory is not sufficiently dualistic. The arguments may also be read as reasons for not being a materialist. The first five are considered only briefly, as the main work of the chapter defends the sixth, the modal argument for dualism.
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- Consciousness and the Mind of God , pp. 161 - 224Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994