INTRODUCTION

I will begin this chapter by formulating and assessing five views about awareness of qualia that are often in play, either explicitly or implicitly, in discussions of property dualism. Then, after discussing this family of views about awareness of qualia, I will consider several dualism-promoting intuitions about qualia themselves. My third and last topic will be the six arguments for property dualism that we encountered in Chapter 2.

Although I make no claim to completeness, it seems fair to say that the considerations I will be reviewing provide most of the motivation for property dualism. By the same token, it seems fair to say that property dualism should be set aside as a metaphysical extravagance if these considerations can be effectively criticized. As the title of the chapter indicates, it is my goal here to formulate objections that are decisive.

AWARENESS OF QUALIA

What is involved in being aware of a pain? What is involved in being aware of how an object looks to one? More generally, what is involved in being aware of a quale? There is no well worked out answer to these questions in the literature on qualia. When one explores that literature, however, one finds that there are five views about awareness of qualia that enjoy wide acceptance. Two of these views appear to be presupposed in most discussions of qualia, including discussions by reductionists. The other three views weigh heavily in favor of property dualism.