Introduction

How can donors and other external actors help to bring about durable peace and systems of governance based on democratic institutions and norms in developing countries that have experienced devastating civil wars? Democratization has become an integral part of contemporary peacemaking efforts to end civil wars. Because issues of failed governance and exclusive and discriminatory politics often are the root causes of internal conflicts, democracy is seen as the cure that may both resolve the issues at stake and simultaneously build the foundation for a peaceful postwar political order. The logic behind the view that democracy is a powerful peacebuilding device after intrastate war is that a democratic society is based on overarching principles, such as the right of all parties to exist and have a say, mutually agreed rules for the contest for power and a renunciation of violence as a method for resolving conflicts. As such, it enlarges the number of possible outcomes beyond losing the war or winning it. In theory, therefore, building peace through democracy is the ultimate route to sustainable peace and development in weak and war-torn states.

However, the empirical record of postwar democratization following the end of the Cold War era has demonstrated that this arranged marriage between peace and democracy has, in many cases, experienced serious difficulties, setbacks or even reversals. We argue that one of the key reasons for this oftentimes troubled relationship is the structural characteristics of the state itself in many parts of the developing world, which makes it difficult for the democratic project to work “as intended“.